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ABSTRACT 
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This dissertation responds to a long-standing debate among scholars regarding the 
nature of Platonic Eros and its relation to lack.  The more prominent account of Platonic 
Eros presents the lack of Eros as a deficiency or need experienced by the lover with 
respect to the object needed, lacked, or desired, so that the nature of Eros is construed as 
self-interested or acquisitive, subsisting only so long as the lover lacks the beloved 
object.  This dissertation argues that such an interpretation neglects the different senses of 
lack present in the Symposium and presents an alternative interpretation of Eros based on 
the Symposium’s presentation of Eros as the child of Poverty and Resource.   
 
Chapter one examines the origin and development of the position that Platonic 
Eros is acquisitive or egocentric and the influence this has had on subsequent 
interpretations of Plato’s thought.  Chapter two argues that Diotima’s theogony of Eros 
that presents him as a child of Poverty and Resource is central to understanding the 
account of Eros propounded in her discourse.  Chapter three examines the development 
and refinement of the concepts of lack and poverty that are offered alongside those of 
Eros throughout Socrates’ account of Eros in the Symposium.  Chapters four and five 
discuss the relationship of these concepts of lack to the depiction of Eros as an 
intermediary and the ethical consequences of this relationship.  Chapter six shows how 
the disposition of poverty serves as the source of the erotic ascent toward the vision of the 
beautiful itself.  Chapter seven, drawing upon the analysis of previous chapters, argues 
that the reexamination of the role of poverty in the Symposium reveals that the account of 
Eros offered there describes a katharsis of the affective element in human beings, parallel 
to the katharsis of the rational element described in Plato’s Phaedo.  This katharsis 
involves the embrace of poverty as a way of living, loving, and knowing.  Thus, the 
poverty of Eros does not indicate a lack that is egocentric or acquisitive, but describes a 
kind of asceticism or spiritual discipline that is requisite for the philosophical and moral 
life.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 Plato’s treatment of Eros in the Symposium presents Eros as the child of Poverty 
(piενα) and Resource (piρος), and this is central to understanding the nature of Eros. The 
more prominent interpretation of the Symposium’s account of Eros presents this poverty 
as a lack or need experienced by the lover with respect to the object needed, lacked, or 
desired, so that the nature of Eros is construed as self-interested or acquisitive, subsisting 
only so long as the lover lacks the beloved object.1  This assessment of Eros, however, 
does not resonate with Plato’s presentation of Eros in the Symposium or his other works 
in which Eros and reason are presented as properly in accord with one another  The moral 
life and the philosophical life alike depend on properly trained or directed Eros. Indeed, 
in the context of the Symposium, the philosopher and a mythical personification of Eros 
are portrayed as poor and homeless; what this poverty (piενα) expresses is an appropriate 
detachment from transient goods and an appropriate directing of Eros towards eternal and 
unchanging goods, participation in which is the end or goal of the moral and 
philosophical lives. The poverty of Eros does not indicate a lack that is egocentric or 
acquisitive, desiring to possess private goods for its own pleasure; rather the poverty of 
Eros describes a kind of asceticism or spiritual discipline that is requisite for the 
philosophical and moral life. As a way and not merely a lack, Eros becomes a certain 
disposition in the lover that leads the lover to the Good.  
                                                 
1
 Gregory Vlastos, “The Individual as Object of Love in Plato,” in Platonic Studies, vol. 1 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) 3-42; Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, 
translated by Philip Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953). 
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 Chapter one discusses the major interpretations of Platonic Eros from the last 
century, and traces the origin and development of the position that Platonic Eros is 
acquisitive or egocentric and the influence this has had on subsequent interpretations of 
Plato’s thought.  Though there is a good amount of literature examining the nature of 
Eros, the relationship between poverty and Eros is not sufficiently taken into account in 
this literature.  This is, in part, because little heed is paid to Diotima’s mythological 
account of the parentage of Eros and the way this account affects the interpretation or 
meaning of the ladder of love she subsequently describes.  Egocentric accounts of Eros 
fail to note that the attitude or disposition of properly directed Eros not only precludes a 
grasping desire to possess or dominate the beloved, but necessitates an attitude of poverty 
toward objects and persons that loves them in allowing them to be what they are. I argue 
that the examination of the role that poverty plays in the understanding of Eros will show 
that such an account is unsatisfactory. This chapter concludes by noting that the role of 
poverty is essential to a proper and complete understanding of Eros and that the 
understanding of the relationship between poverty and Eros provides the foundation for 
understanding that Eros is not merely or even primarily acquisitive and egocentric. 
Rather, this relationship shows that Eros is better understood as activity and disposition. 
 Chapter two examines the roles of theogony and myth in the Symposium as a 
whole in order to show that the theogonic account of Eros given by Diotima is crucial to 
understanding the account of Eros contained in her discourse.  Based on the use of 
theogony and myth in the speeches throughout the Symposium, I argue that the theogony 
given by Diotima presents the nature of Eros in which she grounds her prescription for its 
proper use and work. 
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 Chapter three examines the concepts of poverty and lack present in the 
Symposium and Platonic dialogues from the same period.  From the beginning of 
Socrates’ examination of Agathon until the end of Socrates’ speech, the theme of lack 
emerges in various forms, and is manifest in three different Greek terms: νδεια, piενα, and 
φθονα.  Socrates’ speech, in its discussion of Eros, moves from treating its relation to 
νδεια, to its relation to piενα, and finally presents it as φιλοσοφα φθονος.  I argue that 
these are three distinct concepts of lack present in Socrates’ speech in the Symposium, 
and that the sense of lack develops and changes alongside that of Eros as the speech 
progresses.  Of these three words that express the lack of Eros, piενα, or poverty, stands 
out as holding special significance for understanding the lack of Eros because of its 
presence in the myth of Eros’s origins and because of its thematic presence in the 
dialogue as a whole.  The evidence of the dialogue and evidence from the Greek tradition 
prior to and contemporary with Plato, e.g., as present in Hesiod, Xenophon, and 
Aristophanes, shows that the concept of piενα is associated with a disposition of 
moderation.  This disposition is, I argue, fundamental to Plato’s conception of Eros. 
Chapter four examines the relationship between the lack of Eros and his 
intermediate nature.  Proceeding from the articulation of Eros as involving lack, this 
chapter shows that the conception of Eros as deficient leads to the conceptions of Eros as 
intermediary, and as daimon.  The initial discussion of lack leads to the exposition of 
Eros as necessarily relational, and further to Diotima’s description of Eros as existing 
between various sets of opposites and thus as intermediate or µεταξ".  It is this 
intermediate status that identifies Eros as a daimon and the human being who understands 
the daimonic as the daimonic man.  There is a traceable development, then, of the 
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concept of the intermediate in Diotima’s discourse, one that begins with the recognition 
of Eros’s lack, and derives from this lack a structure of Eros that expresses its 
metaphysical reality and the human psychological experience of this reality.  This chapter 
articulates this development and shows that the consequences of Eros’s intermediacy are 
embodied in his portrayal as daimon, particularly in the manner in which he includes both 
Προς and Πενα in his nature.  
 Given that Eros is an intermediate, the question arises as to the consequences of 
this status for the relationship of Eros to virtue.  Chapter five responds to this question by 
examining Diotima’s remarks concerning the use (χρεα) and work (ργον) of Eros.  I 
argue that we should understand ‘use’ not as an instrumental means to acquiring some 
object, but rather as the appropriate directing of an activity proper to an individual being 
toward its proper end.  Eros has a proper use and a proper work, according to the kind of 
being to which he is joined.  Eros, like the cosmos he inhabits, is subject to rational order, 
and, though Eros animates the cosmos and causes all beings to strive toward participation 
in immortality, he causes this striving in accordance with the proper end of each kind of 
being.  Consequently, his proper use for human beings is to lead them toward states of 
ε$δαιµονα, and his proper work is manifest in the various kinds of procreation that afford 
them participation in immortality. 
 Chapter six shows how the nature of Eros as an intermediate binding together 
Προς and Πενα functions as the cause (α%τα) that moves individuals upward in the ascent 
to the vision of the beautiful itself.  The understanding of Eros as poor and as disposition 
in the lover as he makes his ascent is depicted at each level of the ascent.  Poverty, as it 
appears in the discussions of immortality, procreation, and ascent, is revealed as 
 5 
dispositional, in relation to a resourcefulness and productivity, and is embedded in the 
descriptions of Eros that occur at each level of soul; in the ascent passage itself it appears 
in the ‘relaxing’2 of the soul’s passion toward objects it has found σµικρς in relation to 
other objects; it is captured in the description of the penultimate stage of the ascent, 
which presents the lover as procreating in φιλοσοφα φθονος, and is the precondition for 
the vision of beauty itself.   
The final chapter, drawing upon the analysis of previous chapters, argues that the 
reexamination of the role of poverty in the Symposium reveals that the account of Eros 
offered there describes a κθαρσις of the affective element in human beings, parallel to the 
κθαρσις of the rational element described in Plato’s Phaedo.  Consequently, the poverty 
of Eros describes a disposition that is the necessary condition for the final vision of 
Beauty as well as a habit or practice by which this disposition is maintained.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between poverty and Eros 
as it exists in the Symposium.  Some reference will be made to dialogues generally agreed 
to be from the same period of Plato’s thought and writing.3  This study does not propose 
to put forward a comprehensive theory of love, or to demonstrate the development of a 
Platonic theory of love as emerging from the generally accepted chronological order of 
the dialogues.  Rather, it is intended to examine the nature of the lack or poverty that is 
                                                 
2
 Symposium 210b5, 211b6, c1.  
 
3
 R. E. Allen suggests that the Symposium should be read with the Protagoras, given the 
presence of most of the same characters in both dialogues.  He cites Cornford and Robin 
as suggesting that it is a “companion piece” to the Phaedo.  The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 
2: The Symposium, translated with comment by R. E. Allen (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991) 8-12. 
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presented as essential to the nature of Eros in the Symposium and to demonstrate the 
development of this concept alongside the concept of Eros in that same dialogue.   
In what follows, I will discuss the major schools of Platonic interpretation, and 
then present the major interpretations of Platonic Eros from the twentieth century, with 
special attention to the development and influence of the position that the lack of Eros 
indicates that it is egoistic or egocentric.  The first section discusses global issues of 
interpretation, including schools adhering to esoteric hermeneutics, the chronology of the 
Platonic dialogues, and the importance of the dialogue form.  In the second section, I will 
discuss authors writing in the early part of the twentieth century, prior to the rise of the 
discussion of the putatively egocentric nature of Eros.  My discussion here centers on 
Cornford’s presentation, which is in general agreement with those given by Grube, 
Robin, and Friedländer.4  In the third section, I will focus on the scholarly debate that 
becomes popular in the second half of the twentieth century, and focuses on the 
egocentric or egoistic nature of Eros that develops in response to Nygren’s Agape and 
Eros and Vlastos’s landmark article, On the Individual as Object of Love.5  In the fourth 
section, I will discuss some responses to the view that Platonic Eros is egoistic or 
                                                 
4
 F. M. Cornford, “The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” in The Unwritten 
Philosophy and Other Essays, edited with an introductory memoir by W.K.C. Guthrie 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950; reprint Aylesbury: Hazell Watson & 
Viney Ltd., 1967); G. M. A. Grube, Plato’s Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958); Paul 
Friedländer, Plato, 3 vols., translated by Hans Meyerhoff (New York: Pantheon Books 
Inc., 1958);  Léon Robin, La Théorie Platonicienne de l’Amour (Paris: Félix Alcan et 
Guillaumin Réunies, 1908).  Though his writings date from a later period, this view is 
also in accord with that articulated by W. K. C. Guthrie in A History of Greek 
Philosophy, vol. 4 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
 
5Nygren, op. cit.; Vlastos, op. cit.  
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egocentric that attempt to show that this rendering of Platonic Eros is, at best, a partial 
and incomplete account of Plato’s thought on the subject.    
 
A Note on Interpretation 
 
 
 
The scholarship regarding Plato and his Symposium is extensive; in addition to the 
works commenting on Plato’s thought generally and on the Symposium in particular, 
there are traditions and schools of interpretation that have influenced the long discussion 
in Plato scholarship.  These schools and traditions of interpretation pose a particularly 
difficult problem for anyone attempting a history of the literature and debate on a 
particular topic.  This is, in part, due to the different ways in which such schools and 
traditions may be divided.  Where one author divides interpreters according to their 
acceptance or rejection of esoteric doctrine,6 another divides them according to their 
acceptance or rejection of the systematic nature of Plato’s work.7  In addition to these 
global issues of interpretation, there is disagreement as to whether any accurate 
chronology of Plato’s dialogues can be achieved and whether this should influence the 
                                                 
6
 Francisco J. Gonzalez, The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies (Lanham, 
Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1995) 1-22. 
 
7
 E. N. Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 
1977).  Tigerstedt draws a distinction between those who see philosophy as system and 
those who see system as anathema to philosophy, resulting in two approaches to 
interpreting Plato—as a coherent and consistent system or as a continuing and developing 
search for truth and understanding.  He also draws attention to two other much-debated 
issues in Platonic interpretation: Plato’s choice of the dialogue form and his use of irony.  
These two aspects of Plato’s work create special difficulties for understanding Plato’s 
thought because they make it difficult to make unequivocal claims about Plato’s 
intentions in his writings. 
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interpretation of the individual dialogues.8  The Tübingen school is a proponent not only 
of esotericism but also of reconstructing Plato’s “system of philosophy” on the basis of 
Plato’s esoteric doctrine.9  Students of Leo Strauss hold to a kind of esotericism distinct 
from that of the Tübingen school, are in fact critical of the approach of this school, and 
generally resist an approach to Platonic interpretation that attempts to reconstruct a 
“system of philosophy”.10  I mention these very different kinds of esotericism to 
emphasize the difficulty of giving a brief critique or assessment of esotericism in Platonic 
interpretation.  This is further difficult because, prior to the very explicit esotericism of 
Straussians and the Tübingen school, scholars did consider many of the same issues taken 
up by the esotericists as part of their interpretation of Plato.11  The esotericists of the 
Tübingen sort are distinguished primarily by making the esoteric doctrine the primary or 
superior instrument of interpretation, rather than taking the Platonic dialogues as the 
                                                 
8
 John Cooper, introduction to Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1997) vii-xviii. 
 
9
 C. J. de Vogel, Rethinking Plato and Platonism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986) 3-56; W. K. 
C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. V: The Later Plato and the Academy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) includes a good discussion of the 
interpretive problems inherent in the approach of the Tübingen school.  See in particular 
pages 420-423. 
 
10
 Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Symposium, Second Edition (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1987). 
 
11
 See for instance John Burnet, Greek Philosophy:  Thales to Plato, Reprint Edition 
(London: MacMillan and Company, Limited, 1932); W. K. C. Guthrie History, vols. IV 
and V; F. M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952); Friedrich Solmsen, Plato’s 
Theology, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 28, edited by Harry Caplan, James 
Hutton, and H. L. Jones (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942; reprint New York: 
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967).  
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primary source.12  The Straussians are distinguished, similarly, by their emphasis on 
irony and silence in the interpretation of Platonic dialogues.  Thus, what they have in 
common as esotericists is their use of an unknown as an instrument for understanding 
Plato. 
The students of Leo Strauss adopt varying interpretive positions, but in general 
share the view expressed by Rosen, that irony is “the central problem in the interpretation 
of Plato”.13  A consequence of this position is an emphasis on the meaning of what 
remains unsaid within a given dialogue.  This has the rather happy consequence of 
encouraging readers to enter into the dialogue itself, submitting to what Rosen calls a 
“medicinal rhetoric” that aims to turn the souls of men toward the good.14  There is, I 
think, some value, especially pedagogically, in the position Stanley Rosen adopts:  “The 
first step in the study of Plato is easy to state, even trivially obvious, and yet seldom 
honored: to see the dialogues in their own words, independently of presuppositions 
derived from modern conceptions of historical development or sound argumentative 
technique”, but he follows this statement with the claim that the result of this step is to 
recognize irony as “the central problem in the interpretation of Plato” and consequently 
fails to meet his own standards, since the appeal to this use of irony is based on a view of 
                                                 
12
 It is notable that Stanley Rosen criticizes them on just this point, i.e., for making the 
Platonic dialogues secondary in their interpretation of Plato. 
 
13
 Rosen, Symposium, xlii. Rosen also complains that modern readers have lost an 
appropriate sense of irony (in part because of a lack of persecution of writers!) and so 
have more trouble in understanding Plato.   I can only think he has not read his Walker 
Percy and so had his attention drawn to the deeply ironic nature of the American 
Southerner. Perhaps, given the Southerner’s naturally ironic disposition, it is to this 
quadrant that we should turn for better Platonic interpretations. 
 
14
 Rosen, xlviii. 
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the historical political position of an author in Ancient Greece.15  In part because I 
disagree with such undue emphasis on one feature of Plato’s dialogues, and in part 
because I think it is difficult to make a convincing argument for the truth of what Plato 
did not say, I have not devoted much space to interpretations that appeal primarily to 
irony and silence as hermeneutic principles.16 
Such are, in brief, some of the difficulties inherent in esotericism and in 
conversing with its proponents.  As I noted above, however, several issues taken up by 
esotericists have long formed a part of the scholarly discussion of Plato and Platonism.  
Among these are the influence on Plato of the Pre-Socratics, Pythagoreanism, Orphicism, 
and Greek Mystery religions generally, and the use that Plato made of these traditions.  
The Symposium, in particular, is noted for its allusions to Greek Mystery religions and 
consequently some discussion of these aspects of the dialogue will form a part of the 
interpretation I offer here.  In discussing these aspects of Plato’s dialogues, I make no 
claim to special knowledge, nor do I employ the interpretive methods of esotericism.  
Rather, I turn to these dramatic features of Plato’s work in recognition of their 
significance to the medium in which Plato chose to convey his thought. 
It seems neither possible nor desirable to separate Plato’s philosophy from the 
setting in which he placed it, and so also that the dialogue form, the dramatic structure of 
the dialogue one is studying, its relationship to other dialogues, its language, and various 
                                                 
15
 Rosen, xlii.  His further remark that “What counts is the application of sound 
techniques in a particular case and the “soundness” of the techniques can be finally 
judged only by their results” (xxxix) is a bit dubious if not an explicit begging of the 
question.  
 
16
 The interested reader can peruse the works of Seth Benardete, Allan Bloom, Leo 
Strauss, and Stanley Rosen, among others. 
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other dramatic elements bear significantly upon the interpretation of any given Platonic 
dialogue.  In short, whatever argument is being made can only be understood within the 
context of the dialogue—in both its philosophical and dramatic elements.  Consequently, 
I will make use of such features in articulating my own interpretation of Plato.   
A second prominent issue in Platonic interpretation is the chronology of the 
dialogues and whether the relationship of the dialogues to one another must be 
understood with respect to their chronology.  Recently, John Cooper has argued against 
the position that the dialogues should be understood as revealing the development of 
Plato’s thought based on their chronological order.17  The primary issues are that there is 
some dispute regarding both the method for dating the dialogues and the precise dating of 
the dialogues.  This has at times resulted in particular dialogues being understood as 
belonging to the wrong period.  The changeable nature of the dating of the dialogues 
seems then to pose an obstacle to understanding Plato’s work.  Nonetheless, it has been 
common throughout the twentieth century for Plato scholars to refer to dialogues as 
belonging to the early, middle, or late periods, and to consider the chronological place of 
a dialogue when interpreting it.  In particular, the chronological order of dialogues is used 
as a guide as to which dialogues may be profitably read together and as a means to make 
sense of apparent disparities in the positions affirmed in dialogues from different periods.  
Such reference to the chronological order of the dialogues should be distinguished from a 
strict adherence to chronology that uses chronology as the dominant or guiding 
                                                 
17
 Cooper, xii-xviii. 
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hermeneutic principle.18  A complete lack of attention to issues of chronology, however, 
might lead to the conclusion that there is no consistency to Plato’s thought whatsoever 
and also no development in his approach to philosophical problems.  Either of these 
extremes seems to pose problems for readers of Plato.   
  
Platonic Eros in the Early Part of the Twentieth Century 
 
 
 
 In the early part of the twentieth century, writers such as Cornford and Grube 
describe Eros as a “fund of energy”19 or “stream of desire”20 that can be trained or 
directed toward different objects.  This understanding of the Symposium’s account of 
Eros draws on the teachings of other Platonic dialogues, especially those of the Republic, 
Phaedrus, and the Phaedo.  Understood with these other dialogues, as a part of Plato’s 
moral philosophy and as related to the tripartite division of the soul, Eros is viewed as the 
moving force of the soul, as neither good nor evil in itself, but as taking its goodness 
from the object toward which it is directed.  Cornford’s interpretive approach is 
organized around four central points:  the nature of Eros itself; the mythical 
representation of Eros, especially as it portrays Eros as an intermediate or metaxy;21 the 
                                                 
18
 Terence Irwin’s Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), for 
example, studies Plato’s approach to ethics as it develops according to the chronological 
order of the dialogues; the study is predicated on the idea that the chronological order of 
the dialogues reveals a development of Plato’s thought. 
 
19
 F. M. Cornford, “The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” 71. 
 
20
 Grube, 115. 
 
21
 The development of the concept of eros as metaxy is more developed in the writings of 
Paul Friedländer, Plato, vol. 1, An Introduction, translated by Hans Meyerhoff (New 
York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1958), 32-58. 
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relation of the nature of Eros to the education of Eros described in the ascent passage; and 
the final end of Eros, i.e., participation of the soul in immortality by virtue of its vision of 
the forms.  Cornford’s interpretation is characterized by approaching an understanding of 
Eros in relation to the soul and to the end of man, not in isolation from these.  The 
following passage from Cornford explains Eros in this way, using as its starting point the 
tripartite division of the soul articulated in the Republic: 
Hence it appears that we are not to think of the soul as divided into reason, 
a thinking part, on the one side, and irrational appetite on the other; or of 
the internal conflict as between passionless reason, always in the right, and 
passion and desire, usually in the wrong.  That analysis would point to an 
ascetic morality of the repression and mortification of the flesh, the 
extinction of passion and desire, leaving only dispassionate 
contemplation.[…]But the Republic is concerned with this life and the best 
that can be made of our composite nature, in which all three forms of 
desire claim their legitimate satisfaction.  Hence the conception of virtue is 
centred in the notion of a harmony of desires—a condition in which each 
part pursues its appropriate pleasure and finds it truest satisfaction, 
without thwarting or perverting the others.  There is for each type of man 
one best possible balance or harmony of various desires.  The condition 
may not be perfect; but it is more stable and happier than any other. 
Beyond this lies an ideal solution, which would produce the perfect 
individual.  In the later books of the Republic that solution is stated on the 
intellectual side.  There is a higher education which might end in perfect 
knowledge and fashion the only type of man who ought to take control of 
human society—the philosopher-king.  But the process is not purely 
intellectual; it involves the education of desire.  This aspect is developed 
in the Symposium, in the theory of Eros, the name for the impulse of desire 
in all its forms.  We are now to learn that the three impulses which shape 
three types of life are not ultimately distinct and irreducible [71] factors, 
residing in three separate parts of a composite soul, or some in the soul, 
some in the body.  They are manifestations of a single force or fund of 
energy, called Eros, directed through divergent channels towards various 
ends.  This conception makes possible a sublimation of desire; the energy 
can be redirected from one channel to another.  The flow can be diverted 
upwards or downwards.  The downward process is analysed in the eighth 
and ninth books of the Republic.  It leads to the hell of sensuality in the 
tyrannical man.  The upward process is indicated in the Symposium.22 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
22
 Cornford, “The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” 70-1. 
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In Cornford’s analysis, Eros is the general name given to the experience of desire, 
regardless of the objects toward which it is directed.23  This emphasizes a fact of human 
experience: that we feel ourselves moved by objects other than ourselves and that these 
objects are the catalyst for our desires, our deliberations, and subsequent actions.  
Cornford’s analysis focuses on the psychological fact of desire and on Plato’s description 
of it; what are experienced as diverse desires for diverse objects are then explained in 
terms of one desire which may be directed toward diverse objects.  Just as the eye views 
many objects that all belong to the visible with the power of sight, so Eros is directed 
toward many objects that are, in one way or another, desirable.  What distinguishes types 
of Eros are their respective objects, the same objects that distinguish the three types of 
lives in the Republic, as each is characterized by directing its desire toward the 
pleasurable, honorable, or good itself.   
It is in this last sense, in Cornford’s view, that Eros is intermediate, and this 
intermediate status is depicted in (and at least in part the reason for) the myth of his 
origins.  As a ‘fund of energy’ it is intermediate because it can be directed upward or 
downward; Cornford shows this in his interpretation of the Symposium’s discussion of 
Eros as intermediate, and so also draws attention to the contribution of the mythical 
depiction of Eros to Diotima’s discourse as a whole:   
In mythical terms, Eros is neither god nor mortal, but a daimon 
intermediate between the two—one of those spirits through whom 
intercourse between the divine and mortal worlds is maintained.  For the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
23
 This view is shared by R. A. Markus, “The Dialectic of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” 
The Downside Review 73:  219-230 and David Halperin “Platonic Erôs and What Men 
Call Love,” Ancient Philosophy 5: 161-205, 162.  
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object of Eros is to be found in both worlds, the seen and the unseen; here 
there is visible beauty, a likeness of the invisible beauty yonder; and Eros 
lends to Psyche the wings that will carry her across the boundary.  But the 
point here is that desire, in itself, is neutral, neither good nor bad; it takes 
its value from its object.24 
 
The psychological experience of Eros is connected with its metaphysical explanation in 
Cornford’s analysis.  The experience of a ‘fund of energy’ that can be directed toward 
different objects is also identified as the moving force of the soul; Eros is not merely 
experiential, but has its being in the soul itself.25  Cornford writes that “in Plato the soul 
which is detached from the body is the rational intelligence, moved by its own 
characteristic desire to recover the antenatal vision of truth.”26 This ‘characteristic desire’ 
is Eros, and it is the means by which the soul moves toward the divine. 
The final two aspects of Cornford’s analysis to which I would like to draw 
attention are the final end of Eros and the ascent to this final end.  Because Eros is joined 
to the soul as its motive force, Eros and the soul share the same final end—the source of 
goodness and beauty that is the goal of the ascents in both the Symposium and the 
Republic.  Similarly, the ascents of these two dialogues describe the progress of the 
affective and rational elements of the soul, respectively.  Based upon his understanding of 
the nature of Eros and its relation to the soul, Cornford views the ascent passage in 
relation to the theory of education and training of desire in the Republic.  
                                                 
24
 Cornford, “The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” 72. 
 
25
 One might go further and assert that the metaphysical status of eros is that of daimon, 
but Cornford does not argue this, and to do so would be to argue that Plato’s myths are 
meant to be understood literally. 
 
26
 Cornford, Principium Sapientiae, 87. 
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The Greater Mysteries of Eros begin where the musical education of the 
Republic ends; namely in the passion for beauty and goodness as revealed 
in an individual person.  The purpose of that lower education is to produce 
in the soul reasonableness, the rhythms of harmony and grace, and 
simplicity of character.  These qualities, it is hinted, are images, existing in 
individual souls, of the eternal ideals of temperance, courage, and the 
other virtues.  Such an image, says Socrates, is ‘the loveliest object of 
contemplation to him who is able to behold it’.  It inspires the passion of 
love in the ‘musical man’.  The love of beauty in an individual person is 
meant, though the physical side of this passion is expressly excluded.  
‘Music’, Socrates concludes, ends where it should end, in the passion for 
beauty. 
 Now in Diotima’s discourse the Greater Mysteries of Eros take this 
for their point of departure.  They describe the conversion of Eros from the 
love of a single beautiful person to the love of Beauty itself.  The upward 
journey of emotion runs parallel to the upward journey of the intellect in 
the mathematical and dialectical studies of the Republic.  The intellect 
soars from the world of sense to the source of truth and goodness; but the 
wings on which it rises are the wings of desire for the source of beauty.  
The true self, the divine soul, is not a mere faculty of thought and 
dispassionate contemplation of truth; it has its own principle of energy in 
the desire kindled by goodness in the guise of the beautiful.  The 
intimations of immortality already discernible in the lower forms of Eros 
are now confirmed when its true nature is disclosed as a passion for 
immortality in an eternal world.27 
 
This analysis emphasizes not only the parallel motions of Eros and reason in their 
respective ascents but also the nature of the soul in the ascent.28  Eros and reason alike 
must undergo conversion in the process of education in order to attain the vision of the 
good itself.   
                                                 
27
 Ibid., 85-6. 
 
28
 The ascents discussed in the Republic, Phaedo, Symposium, and Phaedrus have been 
connected by some authors with the movement of dialectic and the movement of the 
elenchus.  Erwin Rohde, Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the 
Greeks translated from the eighth edition by W. B. Hillis (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul: 1925; reprint, London: Lund Humphries, 1950) connects the erotic ascent of the 
Symposium with the concept of κθαρσις (and with other “ascents” in the Platonic corpus; 
with the movement of dialectic and the elenchus with purification).  See also Kenneth 
Dorter, “Three Disappearing Ladders in Plato,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 29, no. 3 
(1996): 279-299. 
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In view of the soul’s nature as divine, the Eros that moves the soul upward is an 
Eros directed toward divinity and the immortality proper to divinity.  The final end of 
Eros is participation in immortality, but not merely the mortal immortality that is 
described at the lower levels of Eros.  Rather, because the soul is itself divine, it 
participates in the kind of immortality proper to divinity, the immortality that consists in 
being always the same.     
At last [the final stage of Eros in the Symposium] by the strength gathered 
in these regions of contemplation, the soul becomes capable of a 
revelation that comes, if it comes at all, ‘suddenly’.  Plato here borrows 
from the Eleusinian mysteries the language of the Sacred Marriage and of 
the final revelation, when the ancient symbols of divinity were disclosed 
to the purified initiate in a sudden blaze of light.  The soul is united with 
the divine Beauty, and itself becomes immortal and divine.  The offspring 
of the marriage are not phantoms of goodness like those images of virtue 
which first inspired love for the beautiful person.  The child of Love and 
Beauty is true virtue, dwelling in the soul that has become immortal as the 
lover and the beloved of God.29 
 
 
The attention to myth, the intermediate status of Eros, the depiction of Eros as a 
daimon, and to the various formulations of the meaning of the term Eros are present in 
other authors of the same period.  Both Léon Robin and Paul Friedländer focus on the 
portrayal of Eros as a daimon, as intermediate, and on the implications of the myth of 
Eros in Diotima’s speech as important to understanding the nature of Eros depicted in 
that dialogue.30   The salient feature of this interpretation is its characterization of Eros a 
source or fund of energy; from this understanding of the nature of Eros, Platonic Eros is 
joined to Platonic education understood as a channeling of this common source or fund of 
                                                 
29
 Cornford, Principium Sapientiae, 86 
 
30
 Léon Robin, La Théorie Platonicienne de l’Amour (Paris: Félix Alcan et Guillaumin 
Réunies, 1908; Paul Friedländer, Plato. Vol. 1.  
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energy, the energy or power to move that belongs to the soul and may be directed by 
reason.  Thus, as Guthrie has written, the soul is described as “not simply reason, but eros 
totally absorbed in the quest for truth”.31  
The writers of this period focus on the issue of Eros’s lack only inasmuch as it is 
part of the myth of his origins and as part of the dialectical movement to establish the 
intermediate nature of Eros.  The definition of Eros as lack of the desired object that is 
the result of Socrates’ questioning Agathon is treated as a step away from a false 
conception of Eros as beautiful and good himself and as necessarily inculcating virtue in 
those who follow him; and as a step toward the conception of Eros as intermediate 
between good and evil.  The depiction of Eros as poor, deficient, or needy does not 
feature largely in these discussions, though it is discussed in the context of the myth of 
Eros’s origins.  The authors are also alike in applying the nature of Eros as established 
through a discussion of his intermediate nature to the ascent passage, which is to say that 
the goodness of Eros is determined by its object.  It is notable, however, that though 
poverty and lack are not made thematic in the writers of this period, both Rohde and 
Cornford connect the ascent passage of the Symposium with the κθαρσις of the Phaedo.32  
None of the authors cited above, however, treat the theme of poverty or lack as it emerges 
in the dialogue alongside the developing concept of Eros.  As we shall see in the next 
section, the issue of Eros’s lack becomes central to the scholarly discussion in the latter 
part of the twentieth century. 
 
                                                 
31
 Guthrie, History, 4: 556. 
 
32
 See Cornford, Principium Sapientiae, c. 5 and Rohde, Psyche, c. 13. 
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Platonic Eros in the Mid- to Late-Twentieth Century: 
 The Rise of the Egoistic Interpretation 
 
 
 
 The Platonic scholarship of the last half of the twentieth century has been 
dominated by debate over the egoistic or egocentric nature of Eros.33  Noting the 
characterization of Eros as a desire for what the lover lacks, scholarly discussion centers 
on the question of whether Eros is solely acquisitive or egocentric in nature, leaving no 
room for love for another person for her own sake.34  This is perhaps due to the influence 
of Anders Nygren who is frequently noted for his indictment of Eros as acquisitive and 
egocentric; indeed his work seems to set the stage for much subsequent discussion.35  The 
philosophical discussion that develops in response to Nygren’s work focuses on two 
                                                 
33
 Some of the literature treats egoism and egocentrism as interchangeable terms.   The 
negative connotation of both terms is one that indicates a selfishness akin to 
possessiveness or acquisitiveness as contrasted with altruism.  Insofar as the debate is 
largely rooted in Nygren’s critique, it is perhaps worth noting that he uses the term 
‘egocentric’ in contrast to the term ‘theocentric’; removed from the context of this 
discussion, egocentrism takes on, it seems, a different meaning.   Vlastos also uses the 
term ‘egocentric’, but Santas calls his version ‘egoistic’.  Needless to say, one of the 
difficulties in the scholarly discussion is the inconsistency in the definitions of egoism, 
egocentrism and the usage of these terms by the various authors.  The meanings of the 
terms are further complicated by the association of ‘egoism’ with moral and 
psychological theories.  I have tried consistently to employ the terms employed by the 
authors I am discussing, even though these authors do not always use one term to the 
exclusion of the other or provide definitions for their terms.  Where authors do provide 
definitions for these terms, I have cited them. 
 
34
 Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled:  Plato and the God of Love (Oxford; New York: 
Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1994); Vlastos op. cit.; Grube op. cit. 
 
35
 Nygren writes that “the very fact that Eros is acquisitive love is sufficient to show its 
egocentric character: for all desire, or appetite, and longing is more or less 
egocentric…The aim of love is to gain possession of an object which is regarded as 
valuable and which man feels he needs,” 180. 
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primary and related issues: the problem of egoism in ancient conceptions of love and the 
question of what constitutes an adequate theory of love.36  In some authors, the two issues 
are not clearly separated from one another; others seem to attempt a response to one 
within the context of the other, and this seems only to obscure the issue at hand.  What 
seems to pervade the discussion, from Vlastos forward, is the idea that Eros, because it 
involves lack or deficiency, is always seeking to acquire what it lacks, and so is, in some 
sense at least, vulnerable to Nygren’s charges.37  This understanding of Eros is then 
further examined within the context of a theory of love, implicitly or explicitly expressed, 
that views the love between two individuals as paradigmatic or at the very least as an 
indispensable component of a theory of love, and it must be included that this love has a 
self-sacrificial character; altruism is its test.38   
Gregory Vlastos, for instance, in his (1973) article The Individual as an Object of 
Love in Plato, criticizes Nygren for neglecting “to reckon with the fact that philia is a 
near-synonym of agape”39 and proceeds to search Plato’s treatments of both philia and 
                                                 
36
 Halperin and Santas address the latter explicitly, Vlastos implicitly.  Within this larger 
framework, however, the issue of egoism seems always to surface, as the charge against 
ancient and especially Platonic accounts of love. 
 
37
 A particularly interesting lacuna in this line of inquiry is a consideration of the nature 
of the lack that belongs to eros. 
 
38
 The love between individuals that is described here is, in some sense, the descendant of 
Romantic or courtly love, insofar as it seeks a theory of love that views the individual as 
loved for her own sake, for the virtue she embodies, and for whom the lover is willing to 
make great sacrifices.  This view is, however, not restricted to the relationship of lovers, 
but seen to apply to the relations between parent and child, friends, or siblings.  An 
interesting discussion of the different conceptions of love—Platonic, Christian, Freudian, 
and Romantic—that influence the contemporary reader may be found in Thomas Gould, 
Platonic Love (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). 
 
39
 Vlastos, 6, n. 13.   
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Eros for the understanding “that to love a person we must wish for that person’s good for 
that person’s sake, not for ours….”40  In his treatment of the Symposium, Vlastos 
concludes that “…the individual cannot be as lovable as the Idea; the Idea, and it alone, is 
to be loved for its own sake; the individual only so far as in him and by him ideal 
perfection is copied fugitively in flux.”41  Vlastos acknowledges that Platonic Eros is not 
“as “egocentric” and acquisitive” as Nygren has claimed: it is only too patently 
Ideocentric and creative.”42  But in the end, he attributes to it “the spiritualized 
egocentricism of Socratic philia.”43  Though Vlastos recognizes that Eros ends in creative 
activity that produces beautiful things, he holds that this activity is still egoistic since “it 
is not said or implied or so much as hinted at that “birth in beauty” should be motivated 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
40
 Ibid., 6. 
 
41
 Ibid., 34.  
 
42
 Ibid. 30.  John Rist in Eros and Psyche (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 
23, draws attention to the ostensibly ideocentric nature of eros:  “We are not then to love 
the Gods, but Wisdom and the Forms; and this, as Plato must have been well aware, is a 
paradoxical notion.  For to most men love is a very personal emotion.  Is it possible to 
experience love for realities which are in a sense abstractions?  The history of Platonism 
in the Ancient World shows, as we shall see, that this kind of love was too rarefied to 
last.  Plato was demanding an emotional response beyond the range of most of even the 
greatest of his admirers, and with this tacit condemnation many modern scholars and 
critics would agree.” In support of this claim he cites a passage from Grube’s Plato’s 
Thought, which iterates a similar doubt of the plausibility of an account of love that is, at 
first glance, so impersonal.  Underlying this criticism is the complaint that love of 
individuals is the paradigm or at the very least crucial to any adequate theory of love; this 
is one of the major trends in modern scholarship on the issue (see e.g. Santas and 
Halperin); underlying this criticism too, though, is the view, shared by Grube and 
Cornford, that the conception of eros that Plato articulates is one that argues for a 
channeling of a common source or fund of energy, the energy or power to move that 
belongs to the soul and may be directed by reason; the implication here, however, is quite 
clearly that reason alone does not move.  
 
43
 Vlastos, 30. 
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by love of persons—that the ultimate purpose of the creative act should be to enrich the 
lives of persons who are themselves worthy of love for their own sake.”44  The 
motivation for “birth in beauty” is limited to the lover’s desire for self-perfection and her 
desire to fulfill the experienced deficiency that is characteristic of Eros.  Thus, though 
Vlastos begins his article by noting the deficiency of Nygren’s account, his final 
conclusions regarding Platonic love are not far removed from Nygren’s own.  As 
Osborne notes: 
His [Vlastos’s] article…reflects some of the same concerns as Nygren, 
and although Vlastos disagrees with Nygren’s one-sided and inadequate 
understanding of what the Greeks could regard as love, he does not 
actually break loose from the dichotomy that he inherits from 
Nygren…But for Vlastos some charges are still justified against Plato, 
though not simply for taking love to be an egoistic tendency, as Nygren’s 
challenge had stressed, but also for his failure to value the individual, 
seeing in love only an admiration of the qualities that an individual 
instantiates, and not the individual as a person in her own right.45   
 
Osborne’s conclusions regarding Vlastos’s work are significant, for scholarship 
on the concept of Eros subsequent to Vlastos’s article draw upon his thought and work.  
Evidence of this is seen not only in the ubiquitous citing of his article, but also in the 
continued presence of the issues of egoism and possibility of the individual as an object 
of love in Plato’s thought.  Two premises, implicitly or explicitly stated, appear in 
subsequent authors:  that the concept of self-perfection in Plato is egocentric; and that the 
concept of Eros is egocentric.46  Indeed, authors such as Santas seem to begin from the 
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 Ibid., 30-31.  
 
45
 Osborne, appendix, 222. 
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 Utlimately, Vlastos himself seems to assert that Platonic eros is more ideocentric than 
egoistic, but his article as a whole, because of its indictment of ideal of self-perfection, 
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assumption that Eros, at least in its structure, is egoistic.  Consequently, any attempt to 
defend Plato from accusations of egoism begins with its assumption, and generally 
follows by appealing to some one aspect or other of Plato’s account that might provide 
for the possibility of a love that is not egoistic.47   
David Halperin (1985) and Gerasimos Santas (1988) both make use of a 
distinction between aim and object borrowed from Freud in interpreting Platonic Eros.48  
I have included both formulations of the distinction here because Halperin articulates 
more clearly what the “aim” signifies; Santas’s discussion of the distinction, however, is 
significant because it contributes to (and perhaps is the basis for) his distinction between 
generic and specific Eros.  David Halperin, in “Platonic Erôs and What Men Call Love” 
explains this distinction and its relevance in the Symposium as follows:   
Plato provisionally agrees with his contemporaries, then, in regarding erôs 
as a response to the stimulus of visual beauty, but he strenuously disagrees 
with them about the nature of that response.  Such is the point of 
                                                                                                                                                 
seems unable to avoid the conclusion that eros is also egoistic.  It seems, too, that this 
exerts its influence on subsequent authors. 
 
47
 See especially Timothy Mahoney, “Is Socratic erōs in the Symposium Egoistic?” 
Apeiron 29, no.1 (March 1996):1-18. 
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 Both authors are responding, in different ways, to the scholarly discussion of Plato’s 
concept of love and the charge that Plato cannot offer a satisfactory theory of love.  
Santas’s treatment, however, is meant to be a discussion of the relationship between the 
Platonic and Freudian accounts of love, whereas Halperin employs the Freudian 
terminology because he thinks that “this distinction helps to make conceptually clear 
what is already implicit in Plato.  Diotima’s discussion of erôs, for example, seems to be 
organized along the lines of the psychoanalytic distinction...” (196, n. 101).  Though 
Halperin takes the historical Greek understanding of eros as appetite and then sexual 
desire for his starting point, his view is perhaps best epitomized in the following lines:  
“Plato enlarges the scope of desire (for that is what erôs primarily signifies) until it has 
become—if not the foundation for a theory of all love, as Gould claims—at least a 
substitute and replacement for other, more conventional ways of formulating the affective 
basis of human choice and motivation” (162). 
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Diotima’s crucial and much-neglected distinction between the object and 
the aim of erotic desire: ‘ “Erôs is not for the beautiful, Socrates, as you 
suppose.”  “What is it, then?”  “It is for birth and procreation in the 
beautiful”’ (206e).  Leaving aside for the moment what Diotima means by 
‘birth and procreation in the beautiful’, we must first examine the 
consequences of her denial that erôs is a desire for beauty.  As her later, 
celebrated account of the Platonic lover’s contemplative ascent to the 
Form of the Beautiful makes clear, Diotima does not intend to repudiate in 
the passage I have just quoted the common notion, which she elsewhere 
espouses, that beauty is the ultimate object of erôs: indeed, she has already 
admitted that erôs has something to do with beauty; it is all about beauty, 
as she rather cagily puts it (῎Ερως δ’+στ,ν ρος piερ, τ- καλν: 204b3; cf. 
203c4, 206e1).  Her insistence that erôs is a desire for ‘birth and 
procreation in the beautiful’ does not bear at all on the identity of the 
erotic object.  Rather, in the passage quoted above Diotima is speaking 
entirely to the question of the erotic aim—that is, she is attempting to 
specify what the lover wants his erotic object for, what he wishes to do 
with it or to accomplish by means of it. 49 
 
Similarly, Gerasimos Santas (1988) utilizes the distinction between object and aim in 
Plato and Freud: Two Theories of Love.50  Writing on Symposium 204d-205a:   
We can understand Diotima’s questions by drawing a distinction between 
the object and the aim of Eros, parallel to the distinction Freud draws 
between the object and the aim of the sexual instinct: the object is that 
from which the attraction emanates or which the lover finds attractive; the 
aim is that towards which the instinct of eros strives.51   
 
Applying this distinction, Santas argues that Diotima’s questions indicate that the 
beautiful and the good are the objects of Eros.  The aim, he asserts, is stated in Socrates’ 
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 It is notable that Santas does not fault Nygren’s account of Platonic eros.  He writes:  
Thus, given the long history of the concept of Christian love comparisons to Plato are a 
complex matter, something that sometimes writers forget when they object to Nygren’s 
thesis that Christian agape and Platonic eros have nothing in common.  If we restrict this 
thesis to Nygren’s interpretation of agape in the Gospels and St. Paul and to Plato’s 
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somewhat different conception of eros and agape, and hence different relations between 
them, see, e.g., Adams, R.M., ‘Pure Love’, Journal of Religion and Ethics (52, n.31). 
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replies and is summarized as follows: “Happiness is the final aim of all desire, and it 
consists in the possession of good things.”52  Santas derives a further proposition from 
Socrates’ replies: “The lover of good things loves the good things to be his for the sake of 
his own happiness.”53  This last proposition, according to Santas, articulates the “egoistic 
model of eros”.  This, along with his distinction between aim and object, allows him to 
conclude that “Eros is egoistic relative to its aim: in loving good things the aim of the 
lover is to make them his own for the sake of his own happiness. And insofar as the lover 
is successful in attaining his aim eros would bring happiness to the lover.”54  Thus, Santas 
concludes: 
For the present, we note that the deficiency and egoistic models of eros go 
well together.  If one supposes that the source of eros is a perceived 
deficiency in the lover, it is natural to think that the lover’s aim will be to 
make up that deficiency in himself:  he will love others insofar as he 
perceives them to be useful or valuable to himself in making up his 
deficiencies.  This seems to be the conception that Plato has also of philia 
in the Lysis.55  
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 Santas, 31-2.  “In the case of love of things, as distinct from love of persons, this 
conception of love is perhaps natural; it is natural to think that when a man loves, say, 
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of Platonic eros” (32). 
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From this conclusion, Santas proceeds to draw a distinction between generic and specific 
Eros.  He has already distinguished two objects of Eros, the good and the beautiful, and 
so distinguishes two kinds of Eros according to these objects.56  The textual ground for 
this distinction is found at Symposium 205b, where Diotima argues that the usage of 
piοησις is similar to that of Eros, having come to be too narrowly applied given its original 
designation.  Commenting on this passage, Santas writes: 
 
Generically, poetry is the composing of all these things, but common 
linguistic practice gives the name of the whole to only a part of it.  
Presumably, this common linguistic use is an abuse because it hides the 
whole-part or genus-species relation that exists between poetry in general 
and that part of it concerned with music and meters.  Similarly, Diotima 
continues, generically (to men kephalaion) eros is all desire for good 
things and happiness, but those who pursue him in a variety of ways—in 
money making, sports, philosophy—are not said to love (eran) and are not 
called lovers (erastai), whereas those who pursue him in one particular 
form are given the name of the whole, are said to love, and are called 
lovers (205d).  This too is a linguistic abuse, presumably for the same 
reasons: it hides the relation of whole-part or genus-species, which 
according to Plato’s theory holds between eros of good things and eros of 
beautiful things.57   
 
Generic Eros is “for the good to be one’s own forever.”58  “Taken in context, the 
definition says that the object of generic Eros is the good or good things, and that the aim 
of the lover is to make these things his own forever for the sake of his own happiness.”59 
Santas goes on to examine the ensuing dialogue, and finds in the exchange from 206b-, 
the definition of specific Eros:  “The characteristic work of specific eros is the begetting 
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of offspring on a beautiful object by means of body or soul.”60  The distinction between 
generic and specific Eros leads Santas to the conclusion that “unlike the case of generic 
eros, it is the beautiful rather than the good that is the attracting object; and unlike the 
former case where possession of the good was the aim, here the aim is not to possess the 
beautiful but to generate offspring on it.”61 
 Early on in his discussion of Eros, Santas distinguishes between the “deficiency 
model” of love and the “egoistic model” of love.  It is notable that the deficiency62 and 
egoistic63 models of love are based on propositions derived from Socrates’ elenchus of 
Agathon and Diotima’s elenchus of Socrates; thus Santas seems to be at variance with the 
view that the initial defining of the term, while not discarded, is neither complete nor the 
final formulation of the definition of the term in question.   In his concluding treatment of 
Eros in the Symposium, he returns to these models: 
 
Several things are noteworthy about eros proper as defined here.  It is 
constituted by two desires, the desire to beget offspring, and the desire for 
the lover’s own immortality.  Both desires satisfy the deficiency model, 
and the desire for immortality satisfies the egoistic model.  Eros is 
                                                 
60Ibid.  Santas fails to note that Diotima’s question regarding the work of eros marks a 
change in the direction of her discourse that was forecast by Socrates’ remarks at 201e1, 
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presumably beneficial to the lover insofar as immortality is something 
good.  This eros may also be beneficial to the offspring, at least in cases 
where the offspring is a sentient being, animal or human; but concern and 
care of the offspring is conceived as a means to the lover’s own 
immortality.  Since the lover’s own immortality is the final aim of this 
eros, eros proper can appropriately be said to be egoistic.  We shall see 
shortly that this is fully confirmed by Diotima’s subsequent explanations.  
Second, the definition contains an implicit reference to the relation 
between the two desires, that is, between begetting offspring and 
immortality: a means-end relation.  In humans this relation is recognized 
by reason, as Diotima remarks; in animals presumably by instinct. Third, 
possession of the beautiful object referred to in the definition is not the 
aim of either desire; rather, its role seems to be as the attracting object 
which sparks or releases the desire to beget.  Later, in the ladder of eros, 
beautiful objects also seem to assume the role as well of model for the 
creation of offspring.  Thus, the structure of eros proper seems different 
from that of generic eros: in the latter it is the good rather than the 
beautiful that is the attracting object—or perhaps happiness—and it is 
possession of it, not generation or creation, that is the aim.  Finally, in the 
explanation we have reconstructed, the desire for immortality assumes a 
new role, independent of its problematic derivation from generic eros: 
even if this derivation is mistaken, as it may be, the hypothesis of the 
desire for immortality may have genuine validity insofar as it explains the 
behavior of courting, mating, and offspring-rearing behavior.64 
 
Drawing upon Santas’s distinction between generic and specific Eros, Timothy 
Mahoney has attempted to address the issue of egoism and Eros in “Is Socratic erōs in the 
Symposium Egoistic?” (1996)  His division of the positions adopted in the literature is 
based not only upon authors’ explicit claims regarding egocentrism or egoism and Eros, 
but also on the application of Santas’s strong distinction between generic and specific 
Eros.  Mahoney finds that this distinction is at the heart of fundamental disagreement 
among scholars about the nature of Eros itself because he sees the dialogue’s division 
into the treatment of generic and specific Eros as corresponding to the dialogue’s division 
into a treatment of lesser and greater mysteries, where the lesser mysteries entail egoism 
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and the greater mysteries do not.  Authors addressing issues of egoism, Mahoney argues, 
focus on one or the other of these definitions of Eros as primary in advancing their 
arguments, and may thus be catalogued according to whether they focus on generic or 
specific Eros.65  Utilizing this method of division, Mahoney identifies three positions in 
the literature and describes them as follows:  
1) Those who judge it[Eros] to be egoistic focus on what they take to be the 
acquisitive and egocentric aspects of Socrates’s claim that erōs is wanting to 
possess the good forever for the sake of one’s own eudaimonia (204e-5a, 206a).66  
[Mahoney places Vlastos, Kosman, Singer, Nussbaum, and Santas in this 
category.] 
2) Those who judge it not to be egoistic focus on the benevolent and productive 
aspects of erōs: it causes mortals to give birth to and to nurture physical and 
‘spiritual’ children (206b), to sacrifice themselves for these children when 
necessary (207b), and, at the highest levels of procreation, to give birth to and to 
nurture true virtue (212a).67  [Mahoney places Markus, Armstrong, Gould, 
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 “Those who claim that Socratic eros is egoistic focus primarily on the portion of the 
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cites “Santas 32-40 and n. 34 on generic and specific eros”, where Santas identifies the 
text of 199c-206b as containing the foundation for the distinction between generic and 
specific eros.  This division identifies generic eros as the subject of the passage beginning 
with the elenchus of Agathon and ending with Diotima’s description of eros as 
“permanent possession of the good”.  Specific eros is then taken to be the subject of the 
remainder of Diotima’s discourse.  “Those who maintain that eros is not egoistic focus on 
the section which deals with specific eros: eros conceived of as the drive to produce and 
nurture children in order to possess goods vicariously through these children” (Mahoney, 
6).  Mahoney identifies these passages as including 205a9, beginning at the end of the 
first part of Diotima’s speech and continuing until she begins “explaining the ‘final and 
highest’ mystery (210a1).  This begins her description of the ‘ladder of eros’” (Mahoney, 
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Brentlinger, Kraut, Moore, Halperin, Price, and, with caveat, Irwin, in this 
category.] 
3) There is also a third group comprised of [sic] those who claim that erōs is egoistic 
at its lower levels, but non-egoistic at its highest level.  [Mahoney places 
Cornford, Rist, and Moravcsik in this category.] 68 
 
Mahoney’s own position is the third of these, and this position, along with his division of 
the literature, reflects the consequences of the scholarly trend to assess the treatment of 
Eros in the Symposium in terms of egoism:  
At its lower levels, Socratic erōs does not allow that one is motivated to 
promote the welfare of others for their own sake independently of a 
concern for one’s own immortality and one’s lasting reputation.  In so far 
as Socratic erōs at these levels never severs one’s concern for others from 
these self-centered desires, it is egoistic.  But there is good reason to 
believe that at the highest level of Socratic erōs the desire for one’s own 
immortality and one’s lasting reputation is superseded by the desire to 
promote goodness in general.  In fact, at the highest level of eros, 
promoting goodness in general is one’s preeminent aim and how well one 
achieves it is the measure of one’s happiness.  Since the preeminent aim at 
this highest level of erōs is not self-centered, I conclude that at this level 
Socratic erōs in the Symposium is not egoistic.69 
 
Mahoney’s division of the dialogue according to generic and specific Eros, moreover, 
appears to be a misconstrual of the structure and division of the dialogue.  Socrates draws 
the lines of division at the beginning of his speech, when he commends the format of first 
articulating the nature of Eros and then speaking of the works of Eros.  The section 
identified by Mahoney as addressing ‘generic’ Eros is the section that addresses the 
nature of Eros; the section he identifies as addressing ‘specific’ Eros is the section that 
addresses the works of Eros.  This is clearly reflected in the language of the dialogue and 
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bears significantly upon its interpretation.70  Further, Vlastos’s note that Diotima never 
gives up the first definition of Eros as the desire to possess the good forever is correct; 
this definition is understood in a different manner in the second part of the dialogue 
precisely because this latter part addresses the works—and so also the manifestations—of 
Eros in the cosmos. 
The four points that structure Cornford’s explanation of Eros are not immediately 
apparent in the treatments of Mahoney and Santas.  In these authors, the nature of Eros is 
limited to a conception of a desirer who is deficient with respect to the object of his love; 
even when engaged in procreation, this desirer is only a desirer possessing his initial 
deficiency and because of this possession rendered fecund.  The nature of Eros as 
intermediate is not developed, nor the significance of his nature as at once piρος and piενα; 
the relationship of Eros to the education of the soul is almost nonexistent, and the ascent 
passage is understood as a series of merely instrumental goods enjoyed on the way to the 
final end;71 the final end of Eros as participation in divine immortality is not 
distinguished from lower forms of participation in immortality because the distinction 
between the two kinds of immortality is not made, and consequently the relevance of this 
to understanding the activity characteristic of the highest level of the ladder of love is 
missed. 
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An aspect of Cornford’s analysis that is perhaps relevant in discussing Mahoney 
is his emphasis on Eros as proper to the soul in its “original state”; Mahoney’s divisions 
and his own position seem to presuppose that Eros begins with (or as) the basest kind of 
desire, that proper to the lowest part of the soul.  Halperin and Santas proceed along 
similar lines.  If one begins with this, then Eros can only become something beyond 
appetitive desire by a radical transformation, but always remains, at root the appetitive 
desire that drives humans and animals alike toward the satisfactions of hunger, thirst, and 
sex.72  But Cornford, having first outlined the tripartite nature of the soul, makes clear 
that the Eros in question is not the “lowest common denominator” as Mahoney’s 
treatment suggests: 
To return to the theory of Eros:  the energy which carries the soul in this 
highest flight is the same that is manifested at lower levels in the instinct 
that perpetuates the race and in every form of worldly ambition.  It is the 
energy of life itself, the moving force of the soul; and the soul was defined 
by Plato precisely as the one thing that has the power of self-motion.  The 
Platonic doctrine of Eros has been compared, and even identified, with 
modern theories of sublimation.  But the ultimate standpoints of Plato and 
of Freud seem to be diametrically opposed. […]The self-moving energy of 
the human soul resides properly in the highest part, the immortal nature.  It 
does not rise from beneath, but rather sinks from above when the spirit is 
ensnared in the flesh.  So, when the energy is withdrawn from the lower 
channels, it is gathered up into its original source.  This is indeed a 
conversion or transfiguration; but not a sublimation of desire that has 
hitherto existed only in the lower forms.  A force that was in origin 
spiritual, after an incidental and temporary declension, becomes purely 
spiritual again.  The opposition to Freud is not merely due to 
misunderstanding and prejudice.  It is due to the fact that the religious 
consciousness of Christianity has been, almost from the first, under the 
influence of Platonism.73 
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 Though Cornford is concerned to differentiate the Platonic theory of Eros from a 
Freudian theory of sublimated or repressed desire, he is not troubled by issues of egoism.  
Thomas Gould also concerns himself with this issue, though his treatment of Platonic 
love is extended to include a discussion of Romantic and Christian love as well, since 
such conceptions influence our ability to understand Platonic love on its own terms, and 
indeed, contribute to the tendency to criticize its shortcomings by measuring it according 
to standards of later eras.  The assessment of Eros in terms of egoism indeed seems to be 
such a case.  The most general response to the charge of egoism would involve 
addressing the issue of egoism as a meta-ethical issue, which results in recognizing its 
assumptions that (1) there is an underlying human nature and (2) what this nature is 
determines the very possibility of egoism with regard to the Eros in question.  In brief, 
the overemphasis on egoism takes Eros out of its context, and assumes that an 
investigation of Eros removed from the context of Platonic metaphysics, epistemology, 
and ethics can give an adequate account of Platonic Eros.  As R. E. Allen has recently 
written, “egoism has as its contrast altruism: but that contrast is otiose if the good of the 
self is the good of others.”74  In the next section, I will briefly examine the contributions 
of two authors who reject the characterization of Eros as egoistic, and who do so by 
appealing to the evidence available in the Platonic corpus. 
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Platonic Eros in the Mid- to Late-Twentieth Century: 
The Response to the Charge of Egoism 
 
 
 
Of those who have responded to the charge that Platonic Eros is egoistic, there are 
two in particular I will discuss here because they, more than others, I think, have drawn 
together a number of important features of Eros that are present in Diotima’s discourse.  
Markus contributes an examination of the varying representations of Eros as god and as 
relation, and a discussion of the dialectical movement of the dialogue.  These two aspects 
of his treatment situate Eros within the metaphysical and psychological on the one hand, 
and within Plato’s dramatic and stylistic development of a theme, on the other.  Kosman, 
in addition to addressing specific issues with the charge of egoism, draws attention to the 
presentation of Eros as metaxy and its relationship to lack or being +νδε/ς.  In doing so, he 
also draws attention to an aspect of Platonic Eros that is conspicuously absent from the 
scholarly discussions of Eros as egoistic:  the nature of the lack that is taken to be so 
central to egoistic Eros.  Having understood Eros first and foremost according to the 
initial formulation of Eros as a desire for the beloved object that the lover necessarily 
lacks, the issue of the nature of this lack is passed over.   
Plato’s love is sometimes described as desire for an object not possessed.  
But this is a seriously misleading representation of the view found in the 
dialogues.  It is true that in the Symposium eros is characterized as loving 
that which it loves when it doesn’t have it: ο$κ ργον α$τ- ο0 +piιθυµε2 τε κα, 
+ρ3.  But that characterization does not specify an essential feature of 
love’s object; it specifies rather an accidental consequent of a stronger 
feature, namely that love is the desire for that of which the love is +νδε/ς, 
the desire for what one lacks. 
 That of which one is +νδε/ς is not simply that which one does not 
have, nor which one wants in the sense of desires, but that which one 
lacks, or wants in the sense of needing, missing and requiring for the 
fulfillment and completion of some nature.  That of which a person is 
+νδε/ς is thus something to which he has, under some description and 
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relative to it, a claim or right.  Only relative, of course, to that description: 
a person might desire something upon which he had no claim, which in no 
sense belonged to him, and still, relative to that desire, be +νδε/ς of the 
means of acquiring it.75 
 
Kosman’s analysis points to the need for attention to the nature of the lack of Eros, and 
his further analysis in this article suggests that the lack of Eros is similar to the lack of the 
sensible world relative to the forms that are its cause.76    
In a well-known article, R. A. Markus notes that the elenchus is an important 
element in the movement of the dialogue as a whole, from the first speech given by 
Phaedrus, glorifying Eros as a god to the subsequent speeches focused on love as a 
relation, and back to the glorification of Eros as a god in Agathon’s speech, only to move 
once again to Eros as relation in the elenchus.77  These two depictions of Eros—as god 
and as relation—are brought together in modified form in Diotima’s mythical account of 
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“Since then [Phaedrus’s speech], the tendency, culminating in Aristophanes’ speech, 
has been to lay all the stress on the relational quality of love:  the principle of affinity of a 
part for its counterpart, the cohesive force which unites them in a complete whole.  
Agathon now asserts—and it is, except in rhetoric, a bare assertion—that ‘love is, in the 
first place, supreme in beauty and goodness, and in the second place the cause of like 
qualities in other’ (197 C). 
 This statement of Agathon’s, is, of course, incompatible with the Aristophanic 
account, so far unchallenged, and Socrates pounces on it in his cross-questioning of 
Agathon.  This bit of the genuine Socratic method is intended to reintroduce into the 
discussion the relational quality of love and adds nothing to the substance of what 
Aristophanes has already said except Agathon’s easily won consent.  The upshot of the 
discussion is that ‘love’ is a word which can only be used meaningfully in phrases like 
‘love of…’; but ‘love of..’ necessarily involves desire for…’ and desire for…’ is 
incompatible with ‘possession of…’ Agathon is tactfully reduced to silence, but the stress 
which his speech had placed on the ‘perfection’ of love at this stage in the dialogue 
served as a reminder of something that risked being forgotten” (Markus, 222-223).  
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the birth of Eros.  Here, he is portrayed both in terms of his place with respect to the gods 
and as relational as the mediating daimon between gods and men.  His intercourse with 
divinity is part of his nature as a daimon.  In both of these senses, as god and as relation, 
Eros is presented as intermediate.  As the particular kind of god he is, as daimon, Eros is 
the third term in a relation between gods and mortals.  Indeed, the Phaedrus’s discussion 
of Eros as a type of mania is suggestive of just such a relation—one in which daemonic 
intervention leads the soul of man toward the divine.78  The dialogue, then, moves back 
and forth between conceptions of Eros as relational and as divine, or one might say, 
between conceptions of Eros insofar as it is experienced psychologically and as it may be 
understood metaphysically.  In the presentation of Eros as intermediate there is a constant 
shifting between these two senses of Eros; and while they may be understood distinctly 
and discussed separately, I think that Plato’s own usage suggests that while they are 
distinct aspects of Eros, they are certainly not different metaphysical instances of Eros.  
That is to say, while we may discuss the psychological apart from the metaphysical, they 
are nonetheless one and the same Eros; our distinction is a distinction between perceived 
manifestations, not between kinds or discrete entities.  The conception of Eros as divine 
possession that appears in the Phaedrus is a good example of just how Eros may be at 
once a daimon that leads a soul and a relation between that soul and its beloved object; in 
the Phaedrus, Eros possesses the soul, and joins it to the god in whose train it follows.  
Another important contribution of Markus is his focus on the dialectical aspect of 
the dialogue.  At the outset of his discussion, Markus identifies his objective as “to 
discern in the platonic ‘dialectic of love’ the features which have recommended it to 
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Christian thinkers like St. Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius….”79  The view he takes 
understands the dialogue itself as dialectic, and the fruits of such an interpretation are 
indicated by his remarks below: 
 
I have used the word ‘dialectic’, and—objectionable as it is—used it 
advisedly.  For the truth about love which Socrates knows is being shown 
us as mediated by Plato’s account; and the subtleties of the dramatic 
structure in Plato’s account evoke a movement, not only from the 
superficiality of Phaedrus’ eulogy to Diotima’s discourse initiating 
Socrates into the ‘perfect revelation of love’ (210A), but also a movement 
within Socrates’ own statement.  In both these movements—I shall hint at 
the way in which they constantly reflect each other—[the] positions 
established, though they are continuously subjected to criticism and 
modification, are never merely discarded.  Thus Socrates in his speech is 
made to cover the ground already covered by the other speakers, refining, 
qualifying and deepening their contributions; and not only theirs, but what 
is both more important and less obvious, also his own.  The dialogue as a 
whole, then, presents in a dramatic structure Plato’s view of love.  Only 
this view is not systematically stated, but allowed to emerge in what, 
failing a better term, I have called a ‘dialectic’, in which the contribution 
made by Socrates is but one, though the culminating stage.80 
  
If Markus’s suggestion is correct, then those authors identifying the early 
formulation of Eros as a desire for what one lacks have only a fragment of Plato’s 
understanding of love, and have taken this one part to represent the whole.  Remarkably, 
this seems to be precisely what Plato finds wanting in the speakers preceding Diotima; 
each considers only one aspect of Eros and so all fail to provide an adequate account of it. 
The writings of Markus and Kosman suggest that a good deal is missing from 
current discussions of Platonic Eros, especially those focused on the issue of egocentrism.  
They draw our attention to the need for a discussion of the nature of lack in the 
Symposium, with attention to the manner in which Plato treats of a theme—the meaning 
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of lack, as the meaning of Eros, will be presented in dialectical movement.  The concept 
of lack plays an important role in the dialogue; it is reformulated along with the 
reformulations of Eros in Diotima’s discourse, and thus develops alongside the concept 
of Eros.  Such simultaneous reformulations are appropriate to the nature of Eros as 
intermediate or as metaxy, for it is in just this formulation that he has at once resource and 
poverty.  The writings of Markus and Kosman also recall the four points articulated in 
Cornford’s treatment of Eros:  the nature of Eros; the intermediacy of Eros; the relation 
of Eros to the education of the soul and the ascent; and the final end of Eros as 
participation in divine immortality.  Their conceptions of Eros are situated within an 
understanding of Platonic metaphysics, psychology, epistemology, and ethics. 
 In what follows, I will argue that the understanding of the relationship between 
poverty and Eros provides the foundation for understanding that Eros is not merely or 
even primarily acquisitive and egocentric. Rather, this relationship shows that Eros is 
better understood as activity and disposition. Though some of the interpretations 
considered above are consonant with an understanding of Eros as activity and disposition, 
none adequately addresses the role that poverty plays in the movement of Eros or in the 
disposition Eros. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
MYTH AND RELIGION IN THE INTERPRETATION OF EROS IN THE 
SYMPOSIUM 
 
 
 
I have argued in chapter one that the emphasis on the deficiency of Eros that 
predominates the scholarly literature is in itself a deficient account of Eros.  This is in 
part a consequence of the insufficient attention paid to the development of the concept of 
lack throughout the discourse of Diotima, but also due to the neglect of the theogonic 
account of Eros that she provides as an elucidation of his nature and intermediacy.  In this 
account, Eros is presented as a child of Poverty (piενα) and Resource (piρος).  The 
dialogue’s subsequent analysis of this account reveals that the parentage of Eros indicates 
his nature: as the child of poverty he is lack or deficiency and as a child of resource he is 
a way to something.81  In spite of the inclusion of a specific kind of poverty, i.e. piενα, in 
this account, the argument that Eros is acquisitive or egocentric focuses on the earlier 
formulation of Eros as in need (+νδε/ς) of his beloved object.  Not only does such an 
interpretation neglect an important development in the dialogue’s conception of lack, as I 
will argue in chapter three, it fails to recognize the centrality of the theogonic account of 
Eros in Diotima’s discourse.  For it is this passage that most clearly articulates the nature 
of Eros insofar as it involves lack and poverty, and so also this passage that is vital to 
understanding the nature of his lack. 
That the centrality of Diotima’s myth of Eros transforms the interpretation of the 
rest of her discourse will be shown in subsequent chapters.  Reading the Symposium with 
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an emphasis on this myth as central to its meaning, however, requires some consideration 
of the roles of myth and religion in the dialogue.  The remainder of this chapter will be 
devoted to a consideration of myth and religion in the Symposium.  I would like to 
suggest at the outset, however, that the prominence of both of these in the Symposium is 
indicative of their importance to the dialogue as a whole and their relationship to one 
another.  Though a thorough examination of the role of myth in Plato generally is beyond 
the scope of this study, I think it is necessary to make note of a few significant points. 82   
For the purposes of this study, I will survey commentaries on Diotima’s myth in the 
Symposium, and, by examining the meaning of the term ‘µ4θος’, and its relation to or 
distinction from allegory, work toward a general understanding of the role of myth in 
order to show its place within the dialogue itself, especially insofar as this bears upon the 
interpretation of the relationship between Eros and poverty in the Symposium.   In the 
second part of this chapter, I will focus on the role of myth as providing the foundation 
for prescribed action throughout the speeches in the Symposium, in order to show that this 
same relationship exists between Diotima’s myth of Eros’s origins and the way of Eros 
she describes in the lover’s ascent to the Beautiful.83 
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 Diotima’s account of Eros’s parentage is often referred to, categorized, or treated 
as a myth by commentators,84 though neither Diotima nor Socrates identifies this account 
as a µ4θος.  It is, in fact, for this reason that Moors’s study of Platonic myth omits the 
Symposium’s theogonic account from its catalogue of myths in the Platonic corpus.85    
The commentaries of Dover86 and Rowe87 remark on the contents of the account of 
Eros’s parentage but make no remarks concerning whether it should be regarded as myth 
and what implications this might have for the interpretation of Diotima’s discourse as a 
whole.  The commentaries of Allen88 and Bury89 identify the account as myth, but Allen 
is focused on arguing against the Plotinian allegorical interpretation, while Bury, 
distinguishing his own interpretation from that of Plotinus, treats the myth as allegorical: 
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In the allegory the qualities which characterize Eros are fancifully deduced 
from an origin which is related in the authoritative manner of an ancient 
theogony.  The parents of Eros are Poros and Penia.  Poros is clearly 
intended to be regarded as a God (203B ο7 θεο, ο9 τε λλοι κα :…Προς): 
he attends the celestial banquet and drinks nectar like the rest.  The nature 
of Penia is less clearly stated: she cannot be a divine being according to 
the description of the divine nature as ε$δαµων and possessing τγαθ; κα, 
καλ given in the context preceding (202c ff.); and the list of the qualities 
which she hands down to her son Eros shows that she is in all respects the 
very antithesis of Poros.  We must conclude, therefore, that as Poros is the 
source of the divine side of the nature of Eros, so Penia is the source of the 
anti-divine side; and from the description of Eros as δαµων, combined 
with the definition of τ- δαιµνιον as µεταξ< θεο4 τε κα, θνητο4 (202E), we 
are justified in identifying this anti-divine side with mortality, and in 
regarding = Πενα as a personification of = θνητ> φ"σις.90 
 
Bury further notes that “Plotinus is not far astray when he equates piενα with ?λη, matter, 
potency.”91  Where Plotinus finds every aspect of the story of Eros’s birth to serve as a 
symbol with an underlying meaning, however, Bury counts the “incidental details of the 
allegory, such as ‘the garden of Zeus’” to be “merely put in for purposes of literary effect, 
to fill up and round off the story.”92  
 Allen’s comments, directed against a heavily allegorical interpretation, indicate 
the more common attitude toward the myth: 
The personification of Eros as a child of Poros and Penia is a fiction, its 
logical force requiring us to consider Eros as the lover qua lover, the lover 
just insofar as he loves.  But there is an ancient tradition of interpretation, 
descended from Plotinus, which takes it as something more.  Plotinus 
maintained that Eros is a substance (ο$σα), sprung from another substance 
but nevertheless a being in its own right, and the cause of the affection of 
love in the human soul (“On Love”, Ennead III 5. 3-4). Plotinus 
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interpreted the myth of Poros and Penia as an allegory meant to represent 
metaphysical connections….93 
 
Allen’s comments above agree with the commentaries of Dover and Rowe in treating the 
characters in the story of Eros’s birth as personifications of forces or abstractions, rather 
than as indicating an underlying meaning or symbolizing an underlying metaphysical 
principle.   A second point of agreement among the three commentators is the 
interpretation of this story in terms of what Allen calls its “logical force”; though we are 
not to understand the story as an allegory in which every detail symbolizes something 
else, we may discern Plato’s meaning if we read the story as a rational account.  The 
story may then be understood along the lines set out by Diotima in the subsequent 
passage; this shows that the story is not itself particularly important, and that Diotima’s 
exposition of the tale contains its meaning.  Such an interpretation avoids the difficulties 
involved with the role of myth in Platonic dialogues and the uncertainty involved with an 
allegorical interpretation that assigns objects or concepts to every identifiable symbol in 
the myth.  It fails, however, to answer or even to raise the question of why Diotima tells a 
story at all and why she does so in this particular place.    
The treatments of Bury, Allen, Rowe, and Dover point to a difficulty in 
understanding the theogonic account of Eros contained in Diotima’s discourse.  There is 
concern among these authors to distinguish Diotima’s account from allegory, and this 
concern is, in some instances, so great that the account is not considered insofar as it is a 
myth or theogony either.  But whether or not the account should be interpreted 
allegorically is an issue that is secondary to its status as myth.  We must first determine 
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whether and in what sense Diotima’s account may be considered myth; only then can we 
address the issues involved with allegorical interpretation.   
The difficulty of determining whether the passage in question should be 
designated a ‘µ4θος’ is due, in part, to the ambiguity of the term itself.  In his study of 
Platonic myth, Moors notes that the meaning of the Greek term µ4θος is much broader 
than its usual English counterpart:   
Myth, both for Plato and for the classical Greek mind, was a flexible 
commodity.  The term µ4θος and related terms meaning myth-telling, 
myth-teller, myth-like, and so on, can stand either for a story—be it a story 
addressing the distant past or one which in some way addresses matters 
which cannot be verified sensually or are fantastic—or stand for little 
more than narration, saying, use of speech, word, or verbal expression 
(especially so, as we shall observe, in those usages of mythical terms by 
Plato which are garnered from Homer and from other poets).94 
 
The broad usage of the term µ4θος is noted also by Brisson, who notes further that “the 
meaning of µ4θος was modified according to the transformations which affected the 
vocabulary of terms relating to “say” and “speech” during a period of historical evolution 
which culminates with Plato.”95  The comments of both authors reveal the very broad 
sense of µ4θος and the things that the term may designate, and support the inclusion of 
Diotima’s theogonic account of Eros in the category of µ4θος.   
 The designation of a particular Platonic text as containing a µ4θος is further 
complicated by commentators who wish to distinguish clearly myth from allegory.  This 
appears as a problem in the works of both Friedländer and Stewart.96     The motivation 
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for distinguishing sharply between myth and allegory is rooted not only in the attempt to 
separate the neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato from Plato himself, but also in Plato’s 
criticism of allegorical interpretations of myth found in his dialogues.  It seems, however, 
to be a mistake to attempt to draw a clear line between myth and allegory in the works of 
Plato, and attempts to do so are complicated by the narrower modern sense of the English 
term ‘allegory’.  Today, we are inclined to think of an allegory as involving a one-to-one 
correspondence between the symbol in a story and the thing it symbolizes.  This is, 
indeed, the sort of allegorical reading Plotinus provides of the Symposium in Ennead 
III.5.  As Brisson notes, however, the term ‘allegory’ from the Greek λληγορα is a later 
development; the term with which Plato is concerned, 0piνοια, has a broader connotation 
and does not necessarily indicate a one-to-one correspondence between symbol and 
thing.97   
The passages in which Plato rejects the allegorical interpretation of myth are well-
known.98  The first occurs in the Republic’s critique of myth,99 and, as Rist rightly notes, 
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Plato’s objection here “is not to the allegories themselves, for he never denies that the 
myths may have an “undersense” (0piνοια), but is based on the fact that young people 
cannot distinguish what is allegorical and what is not, and are thus liable to be 
corrupted.”100  It is notable that it is in this same passage of the Republic that Plato 
advocates the view that the factual falsity of a myth is irrelevant, for though the story be 
unverifiable, it reveals the truth insofar as it reveals the true nature of gods, daimons, and 
heroes.101  It is this kind of factual falsity that is at issue in the second passage, from the 
Phaedrus, that is also cited as an example of Plato’s rejection of the allegorical 
interpretation of myth.  What Phaedrus requests from Socrates in this passage is first, 
confirmation that the place where they are walking is the place where “they say Boreas 
seized Orithyia from the river”102 and second, to know whether Socrates accepts the story 
as true.103  Socrates responds as follows: 
I should be quite in fashion if I disbelieved it, as the men of science do.  I 
might proceed to give a scientific account of how the maiden, while at 
play with Pharmacia, was blown by a gust of Boreas down from the rocks 
hard by, and having thus met her death was said to have been seized by 
Boreas, though it may have happened on the Areopagus, according to 
another version of the occurrence.  For my part, Phaedrus, I regard such 
theories as no doubt attractive, but as the invention of clever, industrious 
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people who are not exactly to be envied, for the simple reason that they 
must then go on and tell us the real truth about the appearance of centaurs 
and the Chimera, not to mention a whole host of such creatures, Gorgons 
and Pegasuses and countless other remarkable monsters of legend flocking 
in on them.  If our skeptic, with his somewhat crude science, means to 
reduce every one of them to the standard of probability, he’ll need a deal 
of time for it.  I myself have certainly no time for the business, and I’ll tell 
you why, my friend.  I can’t as yet ‘know myself,’ as the inscription at 
Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me 
ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters.104 
 
As Rist notes, what Socrates objects to here is the “rationalizing of mythology”.105  What 
the men of science seek is a means of explaining the origin of a myth by reducing 
personified forces, such as Boreas, to material forces, like wind.  The persuasive force of 
the myth is removed, as is its instructive element, when the myth is thus reduced to an 
embellishment of the factual occurrence of a girl who unfortunately played too close to 
the water on a windy day and came to a bad end.  Whether or not such an occurrence took 
place and on what spot is irrelevant; the point of the myth is not to relate factual truth. 
There are, then, two distinct ways of erring with regard to “allegorical” 
interpretation of myth.  The first is to assign symbolic import to every detail of a story, 
as, for example, Plotinus does in his interpretation of myth in the Symposium.  In such an 
interpretation, the characters, objects, and events of the story are replaced by rational 
concepts, and the end result is the reduction of the meaning of the story to an array of 
rational concepts and explanations.  The second is to reduce the story to material or 
factual elements, so that it has no meaning or import beyond its parts or its being a factual 
account.  In this second case whether these events happened matters; the meaning of the 
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event or story does not.  In both instances, the problem is that the story has not been 
allowed to serve its educational end, which is to form the manner in which the soul 
undergoes pleasure and pain and to inculcate in the soul an ability to distinguish the truly 
fine from the base.  If we take seriously the proposed educational system of the Republic, 
the rejection of the allegorical interpretation of myths makes good sense, for myths are 
supposed to educate the passions of the soul with regard to what is beautiful and fine, and 
this is accomplished, in part, by presenting the soul with models of the beautiful and fine 
that can be imitated.  A rationalization of myth would thus defeat the purpose of myth 
itself.  Edelstein describes this functioning of myth as follows: 
The myth, shaped in accordance with reason, brings to the realm of the 
passions the light of the intellect; it instigates man to act with hope and 
confidence toward the goal which reason has set out before him.  Through 
the myth the inner core of man’s existence receives the commands of the 
intellect in terms that are adequate to its irrational nature.  Thus man in his 
entirety is put under the guidance of philosophy….106 
 
Though the purpose of myth, as Edelstein describes it, is to guide and form the irrational 
element in human beings, this does not render the myth itself irrational, nor place it at 
odds with a rational account.  As we shall see, the myth of Eros’s origins that Diotima 
provides in the Symposium is a good example of how myth can function within rational 
discourse and contribute to it. 
In order to understand the relationship between myth and the nonrational, we 
must bear in mind that there is more than one sense of the nonrational for Plato.  There is, 
on the one hand, the irrational element of the soul, both the passions of the irrational 
appetites and of the θυµς.  This is the nonrational that cannot attain the rational level; but 
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there is also that which, like Beauty itself, is beyond rational, cannot be discovered by or 
explained in terms of linear, discursive reasoning, but must be grasped intuitively by νο4ς.  
In one sense, myth trains the “lower” irrational parts of man, but in another, it answers to 
the rational element in its highest dimension, at the level of νο/σις rather than δινοια.  
Guthrie describes the role of myth with respect to this highest element in a comment on 
the Seventh Letter: 
‘Whoever has followed this exploratory mythos’, concludes Plato (344d), 
‘will know that if Dionysius or any lesser or greater man has written about 
the first and highest principles of reality (physis), he has not in my view 
heard or understood anything aright on the subject. Otherwise he would 
have reverenced these things as I do, and not exposed them to unfitting 
and unseemly treatment.’ It is curious that we should owe to such an angry 
outburst Plato’s only personal summing-up of his epistemological 
principles, yet so it appears to be.  It is a mythos because the experience of 
intuiting the Fifth, the highest and most knowable Being, cannot be 
communicated literally, but only in metaphor—here the metaphor of spark 
and flame.  Plato has never hesitated to admit the existence of truths which 
outrun the resources of dialectical procedure.  In the Phaedo and Phaedrus 
immortality can be demonstrated, but the details of life out of the body and 
of transmigration can only be reflected in mythical form.  The nature of 
the soul is a reality of this kind: one cannot say what it is, only what it 
resembles (phdr. 246a).107 
 
This conception that myth goes beyond rational discourse, to capture what cannot be 
conveyed through dialectic, is a feature of the interpretations given by both Friedländer 
and Stewart.  In his work on the myths of Plato, J. A. Stewart argues that “Myth is an 
organic part of the Platonic Drama, not an added ornament…but the Platonic Myth is not 
illustrative—it is not Allegory rendering pictorially results already obtained by 
argument.”108  Rather, Stewart suggests, the myth carries the argument of the dialogue to 
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a new level, one that could not have been attained in any other manner.109  Friedländer 
too recognizes this as a feature of Plato’s use of myth, but distinguishes different uses of 
myth both within individual dialogues and in the historical stages of Plato’s work.  He 
recognizes three levels or divisions, and argues that the first two of these are present 
within the Symposium itself, distinguishing the mythical accounts included in the earlier 
speeches in the Symposium from the mythical account in Diotima’s speech.  These he 
designates as pre-Socratic and Socratic, respectively: 
 
All these speeches represent mythology on the first level.  This does not 
mean they are nothing but delightfully meaningless play.  Would Plato 
have written them down if they were?  And are there not sufficient hints in 
them of what is genuinely Platonic?  The over-all impression, to be sure, is 
as if they “mythologized” into the blue, and no distinction is made 
between what is to be retained and what is to be discarded.  When 
Socrates begins to speak, all the earlier speeches collapse as “illusory.”  
For they preceded conceptual discourse; and such a procedure, according 
to Socrates, is a poor substitute for Logos and truth.  In Socrates’ speech, 
the fairy tale about the procreation of Eros by Poros (Plenty) and Penia 
(Poverty) is, in itself, not so different from the previous tales; yet it is most 
important to appreciate the changed setting.  Socrates first clarified the 
nature of love in rational, conceptual discourse, defining the most 
important aspects.  Love is love of something, namely of beauty.  Love is 
a desire and a want.  Love wishes to possess what it lacks.  This is the 
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“truth,” before which all previous speeches with their mythical tales 
vanish.  Altogether different is the Socratic myth, which now follows; it is 
not a will-o’-the wisp in empty space—at best, an accidental hint pointing 
toward the truth; at worst confusing play—but continues upon the lines 
just drawn by the Logos.110  
 
Thus, for Friedländer, the account of Eros’s birth is a part of the whole λγος being 
offered by Diotima; the account is a further development in the explanation of the nature 
of Eros.  The use of dialectic as a prelude to myth allows myth to move beyond the 
bounds of reason.  The relationship between µ4θος and λγος that Friedländer describes 
lies at a point between the two erroneous interpretations of myth discussed above; myth 
does not have to be allegorical in order to be part of the λγος; nor ought it be reduced to 
the rational or verifiable concepts it is taken to contain or represent.  The fact that myth 
cannot be reduced to rational explanation of one kind or another, however, does not mean 
that it is irrational.  It is perhaps more properly designated as transrational, for it 
embodies truths that cannot be conveyed through dialectic in a form accessible to the 
rational soul, answering to the affectivity of the rational element. 
 This ability of myth to communicate that which eludes rational discourse is the 
same ability Hannah Arendt attributes to metaphorical thinking; myth is, indeed, a kind 
of metaphorical thinking.111  Arendt describes the capacity of metaphors to serve as a 
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The Life of the Mind, and one of these occurs in titles of works she cites.  Nonetheless, 
her analysis of metaphorical thinking upon which I draw here continually analyzes the 
relationship between sensible images and intellectual meaning, in much the same manner 
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Discovery of the Mind (New York, Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1960). Additionally, as 
the reader may have already noted, the investigations of this chapter have established (1) 
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bridge between the world of sense and the world of thought.  “No language,” she writes, 
“has a ready-made vocabulary for the needs of mental activity: they all borrow their 
vocabulary from words originally meant to correspond either to sense experience or to 
other experiences of ordinary life.”112  In Diotima’s myth in the Symposium, this 
appropriation of everyday experience for the sake of illuminating spiritual phenomena is 
immediately apparent; Eros is the child of Προς and Πενα, and the description of his 
nature in relation to his parents describes both the poverty (piενα) of the day-laborer and 
his resourcefulness (piρος) that springs from and is inseparable from his poverty.  The 
concrete image of the day-laborer, the physical hardships and deficiencies he endures, his 
constant motion in pursuit of resources, serve as metaphors for the spiritual, emotional, 
and rational aspects of human experience.   
                                                                                                                                                 
that the term µ4θος has much broader scope in Greek than it does in modern English, on 
that is inclusive of metaphor; and (2) that the mythical elements of the Symposium 
discussed here are never designated as myth by Plato himself, and his use of imagery her 
more closely resembles metaphor than myth narrowly construed. It might be objected that 
my use of Arendt here is at odds with the view of myth she expresses in the essay, “What 
is Authority?”  In this essay, Arendt writes of the myth of Er that it is “a myth which 
Plato himself obviously neither believed nor wanted the philosophers to believe” 
(Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority?” in Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2006), 108). The reason for her view that Plato does not believe in the literal truth 
of his own myths is clarified in the next sentence, where she writes “What the allegory of 
the cave story in the middle of the Republic is for the few or for the philosopher the myth 
of hell at the end is for the many who are not capable of philosophical truth” (Ibid.).  It 
can be safely concluded from the context of Arendt’s remarks here that she is not 
expressing a view that applies to all myths in the Platonic corpus.  Furthermore, she here 
recognizes the distinction between the literal truth of myth and the metaphorical sense, 
the latter of which she clearly holds to be the conveyor of truth for Plato.  In the section 
of The Life of the Mind on which I draw here, it is this latter sense that she propounds.  
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If Arendt’s analysis of metaphor is correct, then the attempt to find a one-to-one 
correspondence between symbol and concept is a mistake; the metaphor is not meant to 
point through symbol to thing but through visible relation to invisible relation, and to 
unite the sensible and intelligible.  The myth of Eros’s origins and the description of the 
Eros-daimon, in this sense, are the sensible depictions of the movements and struggles of 
the human soul.  The relationship Eros has to Poverty and Resource is set out in physical, 
sensible terms in order to make visible this same triadic relationship as it exists in the 
soul.  The relation is that of the simultaneous possession of poverty and abundance, as 
ultimately conveyed at the pinnacle of the lover’s ascent to the Beautiful by the term 
αφθονος.  Both myth and daimon indicate the mean, in the geometric sense, that allows for 
the unification of the extremes.113  The different aspects of Eros do not serve as symbols 
for concepts or things, but as elucidations of the concept of Eros itself, by depicting its 
internal distinctions. 
As Arendt’s analysis shows, myth need not be allegorized to be made intelligible, 
but because myth is metaphorical, it is tempting to treat it as allegory in the narrow sense 
discussed above.  As we have seen however, the term ‘µ4θος’ has a very broad 
designation, and since Plato himself associates myth with intuitive comprehension it 
seems advisable to eschew an allegorical interpretation of Diotima’s myth in the 
Symposium.  The myths in the Symposium in particular are used by the encomiasts to 
provide a genealogical account of Eros, and this account of his lineage stands as the 
foundation for his great works; he who is of good birth produces good things.  The 
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relationship between the theogonies of Eros and the works attributed to him provides 
further insight into the role of myth in Diotima’s account, for she too makes use of Eros’s 
origins to explain his works and effects.  The next section will examine the role of myth 
in the Symposium, with special attention to the relationship between the theogonies of 
Eros and his effects.  
 
Mythology in the Symposium 
 
 
 
As we have seen, the very broad designation of the term µ4θος allows for the 
inclusion of the account of Eros’s origins as an instance of myth.  It is further notable that 
the subject of the Symposium itself places the reader quite squarely in the domain of 
myth, since Eros is a figure in popular and traditional myth and he is identified as a god 
to whom praise should be given at the beginning of the dialogue.  Though there is only 
one occurrence of the term µ4θος in the Symposium itself (in a comment made by 
Erixymachus at 177a3-4),114 every speech delivered in the dialogue makes use of some 
sort of myth, either by alluding to the events and personages of well-known stories, or by 
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drawing on myths to provide an account of Eros’s parentage.115  Elements of myth, and 
so also religion, are found throughout the dialogue and mythical accounts that are found 
wanting are revised and corrected in Diotima’s discourse.  The prominence of mythical 
elements in the dialogue, along with Diotima’s thorough correction of her predecessors, 
indicate that the mythical elements in the dialogue are significant to understanding 
Plato’s account of Eros. 
Further evidence for the importance of myth in the Symposium is provided by the 
uniqueness of the subject-matter; the inclusion of myth in every speech; the use of myth 
to establish the nature of Eros and, on the basis of this nature, to prescribe action; the use 
of language and imagery of mystery religions, which are founded on myths; and the 
presence of a priestess who appropriates the language and ritual of mystery religions in 
order to describe the proper path (Mρθ> :δς) to the final revelation of Eros, the vision of 
Beauty. 
Properly speaking, the “myth” of Eros’s origins in the Symposium is a theogony, 
and its presence in Diotima’s discourse is consistent not only with the theogonies 
provided in the speeches given by the other speakers in the Symposium, but also with the 
form and practice of encomia.116  The fact that the theogonies of Eros offered in the 
Symposium appear quite properly as a consequence of the practice of encomia may 
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appear to suggest that these mythical elements of the dialogue are neither remarkable nor 
significant.  In point of fact, however, the several theogonies offered serve to emphasize 
the centrality of myth in the dialogue as a whole, for their presence repeatedly draws 
attention to the mythical being at the center of the discourse:  Eros.  No other Platonic 
dialogue takes for its primary subject a divine or semi-divine being. 
Friedländer argues that the language of myth itself is significant in understanding 
Plato’s import in this passage: 
It would be a mistake to take—as one might be tempted to do—the story 
about Penia and Poros as an allegorical symbol for the rational concept of 
metaxy.  As soon as Diotima begins to speak through the ‘demonic’ 
Socrates, Eros is present as a ‘great demon,’ and we are in a mythical 
realm.  And the metaxy itself is seen just as much from a mythical as from 
a rational perspective referring to the cosmos, which ‘is bound together 
with itself’ through this demonic realm.117  
 
Friedländer’s comments draw attention to the importance of the mythical elements in the 
Symposium, and emphasize that part of the meaning of myth is lost if it is allegorized 
away.  This is, in part, because the myth serves as one among other indications to the 
reader that the account given by Diotima is in the “mythical” realm, and this draws 
attention to another important facet of the language of the dialogue, namely its liberal use 
of religious language, imagery, and allusion.  Myth, while part of the historical and 
literary traditions of Greece, was also alive in the religious practice of the time.  Indeed, 
the myths regarding the divinities at the centers of the cults of Orpheus, Dionysus, and 
Demeter, may be seen as the foundation for the religious rituals of these cults and for the 
practices and ways of life adopted by the adherents to these cults.  The orgiastic frenzies 
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involved with celebrations of Dionysus involve celebrants in the tearing apart and 
dismemberment of small animals, and these animals symbolize Dionysus himself, and his 
dismemberment by the Titans.118  The tympanum used to accompany dance is made from 
stretching the hide of such an animal across the frame, and so the drum itself points back 
to the events of the death of Dionysus.  The rituals surrounding Demeter include the 
sacrifice of pigs because “when Demeter’s daughter sank into the earth, the pigs of the 
swineherd Eubouleus were swallowed up as well.”119  The rituals surrounding individual 
gods and goddesses are incarnations of the stories of these gods and goddesses.  This 
connection between myth and ritual is also evident in the speeches given in the 
Symposium, as each of the speakers makes use of myth first to describe the nature of Eros 
and then, based on this, to recommend action and practice in erotic matters.  The works 
and actions of Eros flow from his nature, and the followers of Eros, possessed by him, are 
like him in nature and action. 
Phaedrus, citing Hesiod, Acusilaus, and Parmenides, identifies Eros as among the 
oldest of the gods.120  From the evidence of these authors, Phaedrus concludes that Eros 
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has no parents, since he is himself one of the original gods.  The theogonies that Phaedrus 
cites identify Earth, Chaos, and Eros as the oldest beings in the cosmos, and the origins of 
all else.  From the venerability of Eros’s age Phaedrus derives the venerability of Eros’s 
gifts to humankind;  Eros gives the greatest gifts to humans because he is one of the 
oldest deities.  The honor that belongs to the aged, to the traditional, to those descended 
from honorable families, is akin to the honor that those possessed by Eros pursue.  The 
gift of Eros, in Phaedrus’s account, is thus the inspiration to act honorably.  It is by the 
inspiration of Eros that men who want to live well do so:   
What it is that should guide human beings who mean to live well, in their 
whole lives: this, nothing—not kinship, or public honours, or wealth, or 
anything else—is capable of implanting so well as love can.  What is it 
that I refer to?  The feeling of shame at shameful things, and love of 
honour in the case of fine ones; without these it is impossible for either a 
city or an individual to enact great and fine actions.121   
 
We do not learn of Eros’s parentage, but that he is himself venerable because he is 
himself an origin.  As honorable himself, Eros serves as the inspiration to love honor.  
Phaedrus’s account is, in many respects, a superficial one, but the relationship between 
the origins of Eros and the practices that Eros inspires is clear enough.  It is Eros that 
makes us feel shame or pride as a consequence of our actions, and so Eros that causes us 
to love honor and cultivate virtue in ourselves.   
Phaedrus ends his speech as he began, by drawing from traditional mythology; 
but his latter use of mythology is designed to give concrete examples of the work that 
Eros accomplishes in human beings.  The most enduring of honorable actions are those 
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preserved in mythical accounts, like those of Alcestis and Orpheus, who both acted from 
Eros.  By this latter use of myth, Phaedrus gives a further prescriptive account of the 
proper use of Eros, and this is captured in his concluding words: 
So it is that I declare Love oldest of gods, and most honoured, and with 
most power when it comes to the acquisition of virtue and happiness by 
human beings, both in life and after they have ended it.122    
 
Pausanius, immediately following Phaedrus, corrects Phaedrus’s theogony and his 
explanation of it; not only has Phaedrus failed to distinguish between Heavenly and 
Vulgar Eros, he has also failed to distinguish the beautiful and shameful practices (piρXξις) 
attendant upon each.123  Though Pausanius proposes a genealogy different from that of 
Phaedrus, it is still grounded in traditional Greek mythology.  In the accounts of 
Pausanius and Erixymachus, the distinction between heavenly and earthly Eros serves as 
the foundation for the actions and dispositions proper to each type of Eros.  Pausanius, 
after distinguishing between the two kinds of Eros, states that 
Every action (piρXξις) is like this: when done, in and by itself it is neither 
fine nor shameful.  So for example with what we are doing now: Whether 
we drink, or sing, or talk to each other, none of these things is in itself 
fine, but rather the manner in which it is done is what determines how it 
turns out, in the doing of it; if it is done in a fine way, and correctly, it 
becomes fine, and if incorrectly, shameful.  This is how it is with loving 
and with Love: not all of Love is fine, or a worthy object of encomium—
only the Love who impels us to love in a fine way.124  
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One loves in a fine way when one loves with a view to inculcating virtue in the beloved; 
and the beloved behaves well insofar as he yields for the sake of gaining in wisdom and 
virtue, even if this is not the ultimate consequence of his yielding.  Pausanius’s account 
holds that one loves well when one loves what is lasting, i.e., character of soul rather than 
beauty of body; when one loves character rather than body, one is not seeking merely or 
primarily sexual gratification, but rather to guide the beloved in order to make him 
virtuous.  Heavenly Eros serves as the foundation for prescribed action in both of these 
senses, it identifies the appropriate object of love, character, and it describes how one 
should act with respect to this object, i.e., with a view to inculcating excellence. 
Pausanius’s distinction between Heavenly and Vulgar Eros is taken up by 
Erixymachus, who uses it to explain the physician’s art as consisting in the establishment 
of good or heavenly Eros in the body.  For Erixymachus, the two kinds of Eros are not 
distinguished by their respective objects or the manner in which one loves the object; 
rather, good Eros designates the proper proportion of various opposites in the body, and 
the balance of these opposites results in the harmony that, in the body, is called health.  
Bad or vulgar Eros, according to this account, is imbalance and lack of harmony.  The 
physician is able to transform bad Eros into good Eros by the proper amount of filling up 
and emptying.125  Erixymachus, adopting Pausanius’s distinction between fine and 
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shameful Eros, identifies fine Eros as order and concord, and shameful Eros as disorder 
and discord.  Where fine and beautiful Eros is found, things are in a good state and 
flourishing; this truth applies not only to the bodies of human beings, but to all of nature.  
Eros functions in a variety of arts and crafts as the power that establishes and maintains 
order and concord.   Knowledge of the medical art, according to Erixymachus, is the 
knowledge that allows the physician to distinguish between good and bad Eros and also 
to cause good Eros by the restoration of order and concord in instances when this has 
been disrupted.126   
The same theme as before comes back again: that it is the people who are 
orderly that one must gratify, and in such a way that those who are not yet 
orderly might become more so, and it is these people’s love that should be 
cherished, and this is the beautiful Love, the heavenly one, the one who 
belongs to the Heavenly Muse; the other one, the common one, belongs to 
Polymnia, and he must be applied with caution to those to whom one 
applies him, in order that the pleasure he brings may be enjoyed, but that 
he may implant no tendency to immorality, just as in the sphere of my 
own expertise it is a considerable task to deal properly with desires 
                                                                                                                                                 
distinguish between the truly fine and beautiful and the base and ugly.  Xenophon’s 
Symposium portrays a similar shortcoming in the character of Antisthenes, whose poverty 
fails to be guided by Eros because though he has just the right amount of things, he has 
them in a way that fails to appreciate their worth or to distinguish the truly fine from the 
base. 
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relating to the expertise of the cook, so that the pleasure may be enjoyed 
without ill effects.127   
 
Good Eros prescribes, once again, a way of life, that of balance and moderation.  Where 
there is order, balance, and moderation, there is health.   
Aristophanes’ account is singular in many respects.  He discards the theogonies of 
his predecessors, choosing instead to give an account describing the fall of humanity 
from a better and more perfect existence to its current imperfect state, which is the cause 
of the human experience of Eros.  This, in itself, sets Aristophanes’ account apart, for he 
is the first of the speakers to ground his explanation of Eros in humanity rather than 
divinity.  Nonetheless, Aristophanes’ explanation utilizes traditional myth by alluding to 
a Homeric account of the fall of humanity that arises from impiety,128 and also bears a 
resemblance to the account of the different ages of humanity found in Hesiod’s Works 
and Days.129  At any rate, the suggestion that the broken and incomplete nature of 
humanity is a consequence of divine punishment for impiety yields an account of Eros 
that, while still within the realm of myth and grounded in the mythical traditions of 
Greece, is singular in advancing a definition of Eros as internal to human nature.130  
There is very little discussion of Eros insofar as he is a god, but instead an exhortation to 
behave piously so that the gods will assist us in finding our complements and once again 
achieving wholeness:   
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The way to happiness for the human race would be if our love were to run 
its full course and each of us were to find our own beloved, returning to 
our original nature.  If this is what is best for us, necessarily what is 
closest to this among the things presently available to us must also be best; 
and this is to find a beloved with a nature congenial to oneself—and if we 
are to hymn the god who is responsible for that, we should justly hymn 
Love, who both provides us with the greatest benefits in the present by 
leading us to what belongs to us, and accords us the greatest hopes for the 
future, that if we for our part accord piety to the gods, he will establish us 
in our original condition and, by healing us, make us blessed and happy.131   
 
The account of humanity as having fallen from a prior, more perfect state falls still within 
the category of myth, but less easily within the category of theogony.  Nonetheless, 
insofar as this myth is intended to give an account of the origin, and thus in some sense 
the lineage, of Eros, it serves as a kind of theogony.  Though Aristophanes gives an 
account of Eros in terms of its human origin, he ends his account with an exhortation to 
his audience to behave piously lest the human race suffer further punishment for defiance 
of the gods.  His tale thus also prescribes action on the basis of the mythical account of 
Eros he has given. 
Agathon’s speech, like Aristophanes’, departs from the structure adopted by 
earlier speakers, but maintains the relationship between the nature of the god himself with 
the effects he produces in humans.  At the outset of his speech, Agathon states that he 
will speak first of the character of Eros and then of his gifts to humans, though he does 
not, as the first three speakers, appeal to accounts of Eros’s origins to begin his speech.  
Nonetheless, Agathon pointedly rejects Phaedrus’s theogony on the grounds that the gods 
would never have behaved in the fashion described by Phaedrus “if Love had been there 
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among them”.132  On these grounds, supplemented by the observation that Eros is always 
found among the young, Agathon argues that Eros is among the youngest, rather than the 
oldest, of the gods. 
Though Agathon speaks at length about the nature of Eros based upon his 
observable manifestations among human beings, and draws upon the Greek literary 
tradition to provide support for his characterization, he never gives a positive account of 
Eros’s origins.  His theogony, insofar as he gives one, is given by the negation of the 
positive accounts that he rejects.  The positive account of Eros’s nature is drawn in part 
from the works of other poets, and his citations of great tragic poets, such as Euripides, 
Sophocles, and Homer, indicate that he views tragic poetry as the source of truth 
regarding the mythical portrayal of the gods.133  His rejection of the Hesiodic tradition, 
however, indicates that he views tragic poetry not only as the source of truth, but also as 
the purveyor of truth; the tragic poet is the authority on myth, in its transmission, 
interpretation, and creation.  Unlike the first three speakers of the dialogue who make use 
of already established tradition to ground what they say about Eros’s nature, Agathon 
cites others’ accounts only after he has described the nature of Eros.  He begins with a 
description of the nature of Eros, and the mythological descriptions he subsequently 
utilizes reflect this initial description of Eros as young, beautiful, delicate, and soft.  Like 
Aristophanes, Agathon creates his own account of Eros, making liberal use of the Greek 
poetic tradition to support his creation. 
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Though Agathon’s account differs in many respects from the previous speeches, 
the principle underlying the relationship between Eros and his followers remains the 
same, for all of the speakers describe the followers or initiates of Eros as becoming or 
being like Eros himself.  Thus, we find in Agathon’s statement “that Love, being himself 
first most beautiful and best, is then responsible for others’ possession of things of this 
sort”;134 Eros is the cause of beauty and excellence in others because he is the primary 
instance of beauty and excellence.  Like his predecessors, Agathon concludes his speech 
with an exhortation to follow Eros, and thus become like him:   
He is the one who empties us of estrangement and fills us with kinship, 
causing us to come together in all such gatherings as ours, acting as guide 
in festivals, when choruses perform, at sacrifices; bringing gentleness, 
excluding savagery; generous with good will, miserly with ill will; 
gracious, kind; a spectacle for the wise, admired by the gods; coveted by 
those without portion of him, prized by those with a portion; father of 
delicacy, daintiness, luxuriance, charms, desire, longing; caring for good, 
uncaring of bad; in trouble, in fear, in longing, in speaking, a steersman, 
defender, fellow-soldier and saviour without peer, ornament at once of all 
gods and all men, most beautiful and best guide, whom everyone must 
follow, hymning him beautifully, sharing in the song he sings to charm the 
mind of all gods and men.135   
 
Throughout the speeches we have considered thus far, we have discerned a 
relationship between the theogonic account of Eros and the practices and behaviors that 
Eros inspires.  It is not merely that the origins of Eros indicate his nature and so prescribe 
action; it is also the case that the followers of Eros become like the god himself or, if you 
will, being possessed by Eros, are led to become like him;  they, being possessed by Eros, 
are manifestations of the god dwelling within them.  Similarly, Diotima’s portrayal of the 
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Eros-daimon, provides a very “human” picture of Eros; the images she uses to depict 
Eros in his birth and life call to mind a specifically human existence and a concretely 
human experience.  This human manifestation of Eros is reiterated in Alcibiades’ 
depiction of Socrates and echoes the description of Socrates given in the introductory 
portion of the Symposium. 
Diotima’s theogonic account begins when Socrates asks who are the mother and 
father of Eros; she replies that it will take a long time to set out in detail, but she will tell 
him anyway (εcρω).136   The first verb, διηγ5οµαι, means “to set out in detail or describe in 
full”, the second verb, εcρω , means to say or tell.137  The myth of Eros’s parentage thus 
begins as a saying or telling, and one that will be thorough.  This is a clear indication that 
what is to follow is not a story to be glossed over as mere literary embellishment, but an 
important development within the full account of the nature of eros.  It further suggests, 
that while the account may be made sense of allegorically, it cannot be reduced to such 
an interpretation, since the “myth” begins the effort to set out the nature of Eros in detail.  
It seems from this that we should take quite seriously the account of Eros’s nature given 
here as central to understanding Plato’s conception of eros. 
The placement of the myth within the conversation between Diotima and Socrates 
also emphasizes its significance.  The account of Eros’s origins is offered as a second 
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stage in Diotima’s speech; it follows immediately upon Diotima’s examination of 
Socrates, which has established the nature of Eros as intermediate, as daimon, and as 
bound to the concepts of desire and lack.  This first stage of Diotima’s discourse ends 
with the proclamation that one who is wise with regard to things of the daimon-world—
the world of Eros—is a δαιµνιος ν/ρ, and it is implied that this is something for which 
one should strive.  The nature of Eros as intermediate, daimon, bound to desire and lack 
prepares the reader for Diotima’s account of his origins and reappears in her explanation 
of the significance of his origins for understanding Eros’s nature.   
The myth itself departs from traditional theogonic accounts of Eros, presenting 
him as the child of Προς and Πενα, while nodding to tradition by placing his conception 
on Aphrodite’s birthday.138  Diotima’s myth serves as a correction to the accounts that 
were offered by earlier speakers, and, in the course of her speech as a whole she corrects 
each of these earlier accounts.  But Diotima’s myth and speech do not merely correct the 
accounts of Eros offered in previous speeches; rather, she incorporates aspects of Eros 
from previous speeches that are in accord with her own, while correcting those aspects 
that she deems incorrect.  Though it is beyond the scope of the current study to examine 
every instance of this phenomenon, one example will, perhaps, illuminate what Diotima 
does and why these corrections are so crucial to understanding the account of Eros put 
forward in the Symposium. 
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In her conversation with Socrates, Diotima refers to “a story that’s told, according 
to which those who seek the other half of themselves who are in love,”139 and continues 
to correct this story, saying: 
But my story declares that love is neither of a half nor of a whole, unless, 
my friend, it turns out actually to be good, since people are even willing to 
have their own feet and hands cut off, if their own state seems to them to 
be a bad one.  For it’s not, I think, what it their own that either group is 
embracing, except if someone calls what is good ‘what belongs to’ him, 
and ‘his own’, and what is bad ‘alien’; since there is nothing else that 
people are in love with except the good.140 
 
The reference to a story in which lovers long for their other halves is clearly a reference 
to the story of Aristophanes.141  But Diotima does not completely reject the points raised 
by Aristophanes, as she recognizes that the soul does long for something that belongs to 
it, something of which it is in need and to which it may once have been joined.  It is 
perhaps even accurate to say that the absence the soul experiences in longing for its 
beloved object is the absence of the realm of the Forms, which are most like the soul 
itself and, in their goodness and beauty, the delight of the soul.  The remarks Diotima 
makes in the above passage do more than allude to and correct Aristophanes; they 
provide a more complete understanding of Eros itself and foreshadow Diotima’s 
description of the soul’s ascent to the vision of Beauty.  So it is with each of the 
preceding speeches; not only does Diotima correct and revise her predecessors, she 
incorporates aspects of their theories into her own; the result is that Diotima’s account is 
fuller and more complete, since it has included within it all of the aspects of Eros 
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considered in the previous speeches, and added to them what was lacking.  This helps us 
to understand Diotima’s meaning better, but also helps us to understand that the earlier 
speeches of the Symposium provide the foundations for Diotima’s speech, each 
contributing something to the whole as it is presented by Diotima.  This relationship 
between the theogonies offered in the earlier speeches and that offered by Diotima also 
underscores the importance of theogony in understanding the nature of Eros. 
Diotima’s myth of Eros does not stand out as something merely added to the 
dialogue to incorporate a theogony.  Rather, it grows out of the discourse that 
immediately precedes it, and incorporates the concepts of intermediacy, intentionality, 
and deficiency.  Eros, in this tale, is intermediate not only as daimon, but also by virtue of 
his origins, so that he is understood as comprising Προς (resourcefulness, way) and Πενα 
(poverty) in his intermediacy; it is thus that the account of his origins establishes the 
relationship among Eros, Προς, and Πενα.    
Προς, often translated as “resource” has a rather more dynamic sense to it, for as 
Guthrie notes, it means “‘finding a way’, resourcefulness”.142  Weil notes that “piρος is 
the origin of the verbs piρω and piορζω, literally to open the way, but above all to procure, 
to supply, to give.”143  It is, indeed, reminiscent of the verbs used to describe the 
daimonic activity of Eros in the preceding passage of Diotima’s speech, i.e. διαpiορθµε"ω 
and Zρµηνε"ω, which indicate the active nature of Eros as providing a path from the 
human to the divine.  This sense of piρος is also noted by Dover, who writes:   
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piρος, etymologically cognate with piερειν ‘pierce’, is applied to any means 
(e.g. a path or a ferry) of getting across or over land or water; then of any 
means which enable one to cope with a difficulty, or of the provision of 
monetary or other resources (cf. our expression ‘ways and means’).144  
 
The meaning of the word piρος itself, and its obvious correlation with a piορος, indicates 
that this element of Eros’s nature should be understood not so much as having resources, 
which would have been aptly indicated in the mythical account by piλο4τος, but as being 
the very way or path itself.145  Indeed, such is Eros’s nature as piρος, for as daimon, he 
provides a “way to” the divine.   
Πενα, or poverty, contributes the other part of Eros’s nature.  The dialogue’s new 
epithet for the lack of Eros brings with it the connotation of deficiencies of the worker.  
Such a lack is not absolute, for the worker has just enough on which to subsist, but no 
excess.  This sort of poverty is closely associated with the virtue of moderation 
(σωφροσ"νη), since the life associated with it produces men of virtue, strength, and 
endurance, who are not prone to excesses, indulgences, or softness.146  Taken with the 
portrayal of Eros as daimon and as piρος, this conception of poverty suggests that a life 
practicing moderation is a life led by the daimon Eros.  Since Eros is a daimon, such a 
life is also an inspired life; one who is led by Eros is characterized by enthusiasm or 
divine possession.  This characterization of Eros as at once ascetic and enthusiastic may 
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appear paradoxical, but Diotima’s explanation of the characteristics of Eros shows how 
both his poverty and his resource are essential parts of the phenomena and the divinity 
designated as Eros. 
In Prolegomena to the study of Greek Religion, Jane Harrison describes ascetism 
and ecstasy as the two different characterizations of Dionysus and his followers.147  There 
are, in the cult of Dionysus, two distinct dispositions:  one is characterized by the 
gentleness with which the female celebrants suckle and care for young wildlife; the other 
is characterized by the violent frenzy with which these same celebrants rend them to 
pieces.  Both actions occur to the celebrants as instances of standing outside of 
themselves, as a kind of κστασις; both are, indeed, pictures of humanity at one with the 
violent extremes of the natural world, no longer guided by human rationality or morality, 
but possessed by some other power, some daimon or god.  Such is the duality of Eros, at 
one moment bitter, at another sweet; at one moment poor and needy, at another filled 
with vision of the beautiful itself.  The asceticism described by the poverty of Eros is the 
condition for the resourcefulness that leads the lover to the primary instance of κστασις—
the vision of Beauty. 
Diotima’s theogonic account, like those of the preceding speakers, is followed by 
a description of the kind of life Eros lives as a consequence of his parentage.  If the myth 
in Plato’s Symposium that presents Eros as a child of poverty (piενα) and resource (piρος) 
is understood as central to the view of Eros articulated by Diotima, both the nature of 
Eros itself and the implications it holds for the ethical life are presented in a new light.  
As deficiency, Eros indicates at once a lack in the lover and the object of Eros that is 
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desired by the lover. Diotima’s further explication of Eros shows that its nature does not 
lie merely in its lack of the beloved object, but also in its longing for the beloved object, 
and that the true nature of Eros is revealed by understanding its proper object. The object 
is not merely a beautiful particular that the lover desires to possess as her own, but a 
desire to possess a good. The desire to possess this good is so strong that the lover is 
willing to suffer for the sake of the good: willing, in the particular, to suffer bodily harm 
in order to attain or keep the good; willing, in the case of procreation, to suffer for the 
sake of offspring. The poverty of Eros, then, is not merely indicative of the lack of the 
beloved object, but also of the disposition of the lover as willingly undergoing 
deprivations for the sake of the beloved object.  Πενα, as one essential component of 
Eros’s nature, describes not only lack, but a disposition toward the possession of different 
kinds of goods.  
    In the analysis of Eros and its role in the ascent to the Beautiful, this deprivation 
is not merely one aspect of the nature of Eros, but points to an understanding of poverty 
as a way of being or disposition. Indeed, the joining together of the figures of Προς and 
Πενα in the single figure of Eros suggests that the poverty of Eros is at once his way.  
The description of Eros himself portrays him as poor and in need on the one hand, but 
seeking and finding a way on the other; he is intermediate between the state of 
deprivation and the state of possession. In addition to the many descriptions of Eros as 
intermediate between extremes (e.g. between the mortal and immortal, ignorance and 
wisdom), Eros in this way becomes intermediate as a disposition in the lover that leads 
the lover to the Good. Poverty is one essential aspect of this disposition, as a way that 
entails the cultivation of an appropriate lack that mediates between the lover and the 
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beloved object.   The nature of Eros entails poverty; it is thus in a spiritual poverty that a 
way to the Good is found; one does not ‘acquire’ the Good so much as one makes a 
‘place’ for it in the soul, which, being filled with Good, is united to it. 
Diotima’s description of the ‘ladder of love’ in the Symposium lends itself to 
understanding Eros as such a way of being and not merely as a lack that longs for 
fulfillment by gaining possession of the sought object. In order to move from one stage of 
Eros to another, the lover must recognize that the object toward which he is currently 
directed is not perfect or complete, and so not the ultimate end of his striving. This 
recognition causes him to change his orientation toward it to reflect its position in the 
cosmos.148  Such a change in orientation requires adopting an attitude of detachment 
toward the thing, described in the ascent passage by the term φθονος. This is an attitude 
of poverty; it lets the thing be what it is and loves it insofar as it ought to be loved given 
the sort of thing that it is. In recognizing the sort of love appropriate to different things, 
and as proportional to different kinds of beauty and goodness, the lover recognizes also 
‘higher’ objects of love and so his gaze is directed to the next level of loveable objects. 
Each movement to a higher object of love results in an object that is closer to both the 
beautiful and the immortal. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF POVERTY: FROM DEFICIENCY TO 
ABUNDANCE 
 
 
 
Much of the scholarship149 since Vlastos’s influential article has taken his 
conception of Platonic Eros and ε$δαιµονα to indicate that the Platonic conceptions of 
both Eros and human excellence are egoistic.  Consequently, the discussion of Platonic 
Eros has focused on the formulation of Eros as lack that appears in the elenchus of 
Agathon and in the early portion of the exchange between Socrates and Diotima.  This 
formulation of Eros as lack of the desired object then becomes the definition of Eros by 
which or in terms of which the rest of the exchange between Socrates and Diotima is 
interpreted and understood.  This interpretation presents Eros and its lack as parallel to 
appetitive desire and its lack:  the subject experiences some pain or absence that is 
indicative of the desire to possess a certain object; upon attaining the object, the pain is 
remedied, absence filled, and desire ceases.  But this interpretation captures only one 
aspect of Plato’s treatment of desire, and so also only one aspect of his treatment of the 
lack that appears to be its concomitant. 
What is absent from these discussions is a general investigation into the concept 
of lack in the Symposium that would reveal its gradual development; such an 
investigation would also show that a very different concept of lack is operative in Plato’s 
treatment of Eros in the Symposium.150  From the beginning of Socrates’ examination of 
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Agathon until the end of Socrates’ speech, the theme of lack emerges in various forms, 
and is manifest in three different Greek terms: νδεια, piενα, and φθονα.  Socrates’ 
speech, in its discussion of Eros, moves from treating its relation to νδεια, to its relation 
to piενα, and finally presents it as φιλοσοφα φθονος.  It is apparent, then, that there are at 
least three senses of lack at work in Socrates’ speech in the Symposium, and that the 
sense of lack develops and changes alongside that of Eros as the speech progresses.  Of 
these three words that express the lack of Eros, piενα, or poverty, stands out as holding 
special significance for understanding the lack of Eros because of its presence in the myth 
of Eros’s origins and because of its thematic presence in the dialogue as a whole.  In what 
follows, I will begin by discussing the importance of piενα in the Symposium and then 
proceed to examine the various senses of lack that emerge in the discussion of Eros. 
 
The Importance of Poverty (piενα) in the Symposium 
 
 
 
Poverty frames the discussion in the Symposium.  The opening of the dialogue 
describes the appearance of Aristodemus, the follower of Socrates who is “small, always 
barefoot”151 as Socrates himself habitually is;  this image of the poorly clothed and 
somewhat filthy philosopher is echoed in Aristodemus’ subsequent description of 
Socrates, who he encounters in an unusual state: clean, well-dressed, and shod.152  Both 
Aristodemus and Socrates are here portrayed as poor, for their usual habit of dress is that 
of the poor.  The final description of Socrates by Alcibiades again portrays Socrates as 
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poor, and as an embodiment of the Eros-daimon previously described by Diotima, even 
though Alcibiades was not present for that discussion.153  The middle portion of 
Diotima’s speech identifies Eros as a child of Poverty; indeed his intermediate status is 
inextricably bound to poverty, and the description of his nature includes a description of 
his life of poverty. The theme of poverty,154 then, is woven throughout the Symposium, 
and serves as a framework for the discussion of Eros.   
R.E. Allen notes that it is not only poverty that frames the drama of the 
Symposium, but hubris as well.155   Allen argues that “the reader is meant to be reminded 
of Socrates’ trial by Alcibiades’ speech” and draws attention to the charge of hubris he 
levels against Socrates.156  This charge, as Allen notes, echoes Agathon’s charge of 
hubris found at the beginning of the dialogue.157  If it is Socrates’ trial of which we are to 
think, then it is perhaps also appropriate to recall Socrates’ witness to his innocence.  In 
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the Apology, Socrates defends his teaching with the following words:  “I, on the other 
hand, have a convincing witness that I speak the truth, my poverty (piενα).”158  
In Greek Popular Morality, Kenneth Dover’s discussion of poverty indicates its 
connection to hubris.  According to his work, it was not uncommon for defendants to 
invoke poverty as evidence for their innocence, particularly to show that they had not 
acted out of hubris.159  In both the Apology and the Symposium, Socrates’ poverty is 
presented as such a defense against the charge of hubris. 
It is notable, then, that in the Symposium the Eros-daimon and Socrates alike are 
presented as poor.  The grasping and greedy nature of hubris is their antithesis; their 
poverty is a testament to their virtue.  Hubris itself is contrasted with moderation in the 
Phaedrus.160   Dover draws attention to the causes of hubris and σωφροσ"νη in his 
discussion of poverty, writing “the good things of life implant hybris but the bad things 
sōphrosynē.”161  Thus the portrayal of both Socrates and Eros as poor suggests that 
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moderation (σωφροσ"νη) is related to, if not concomitant with, poverty and so also Eros.  
Poverty and hubris set the tone for the drama of the Symposium, marking the beginning 
and end of the presentation of Socrates as the paradigmatic erotic man.  It seems, then, 
that poverty (and perhaps in particular poverty as opposed to hubris) is central to an 
understanding of the Symposium.  It is necessary, then, to investigate what sort of thing 
poverty is and what sense it carries in the context of the Symposium and its discussion of 
Eros. 
 
The Concept of Poverty 
 
 
 
 The concept of poverty itself is quite broad; it may signify a simple lack or 
deficiency; it may signify a harmful lack or deficiency; it may signify deficiency with 
respect to money, material goods, physical well-being, spiritual or mental well-being.162  
Poverty is also conceived of in degrees, from absolute indigence to meager subsistence.  
It may indicate a void that needs filling, or it may indicate a void that remains empty. As 
Plato’s discussion in Republic IX explains, mixed pleasures that arise from fulfilling 
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voids, like hunger, involve voids that require filling; but the pleasure arising from seeing 
involves a “void” of another kind, one that is never filled, and such pleasures bear a 
closer resemblance to those that are proper to the rational soul.  In seeing, smelling, and 
thinking, pleasure occurs in the activity itself, and is not arrived at as a consequence of 
movement from a state of deficiency to a state of satiety.  The examples of seeing and 
smelling also reveal that poverty can indicate a state or disposition; in this sense it may 
indicate a faculty in its potentiality, in a state of readiness, that is brought into actuality 
by the presence of some object outside of it.  This is, for instance, what occurs when the 
eye or the soul beholds something beautiful.   
There are two other kinds of conceptual distinctions that are relevant to the 
discussion of poverty in the Symposium.  The first distinction is between material and 
immaterial poverty.  By material poverty, I mean deficiencies with respect to physical or 
material goods.  By immaterial poverty, I mean deficiencies with respect to spiritual or 
mental goods.  The second distinction is between kinds or degrees of poverty.   Extreme 
poverty is designated by terms such as indigence and usually indicates an absolute or 
nearly absolute deficiency of goods necessary for life.  The term “working poor”, on the 
other hand, is often used to indicate a class of people who have some goods necessary for 
life, but who have only enough of these to subsist or survive.  Both of these distinctions 
are found in Greek discussions of poverty. 
Though the term for poverty (piενα) has for its primary meaning a lack of material 
goods, it is sometimes used to signify other kinds of lack as well.  Xenophon, in his 
Symposium, uses the term in reference to the soul.163  Euripides applies poverty to the 
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body in Electra,164 and in Works and Days, Hesiod writes of “baneful, spirit-destroying 
(θυµοφθρος) poverty.”165  The term poverty, then, is applicable not only to external 
material goods, but to body, soul, and θυµς, and so also to immaterial goods.  It is 
evident, then, that the use of the term poverty and its derivatives to describe both material 
and immaterial lack is not strange to the Greek mind, and that our own understanding of 
the term in Plato’s writing should not be restricted to material or physical deficiencies 
associated with desire. 
The Greek language also distinguishes between the poverty proper to the working 
man (piενα), and the absolute poverty of the beggar (piτωχεα), thus recognizing different 
degrees of deficiency.  The latter term, piτωχεα, does not appear in the text of the 
Symposium, but two other terms expressing deficiency do appear:  νδεια and φθονα.  
The first term, νδεια, is used to indicate want, lack, or need; in particular, when coupled 
with +piιθυµα, νδεια carries the meaning of want or need.166  Though the word is 
sometimes used to indicate material or economic deficiency,167 the meaning of the word 
is broader than this and can indicate a lack of any sort.  The second term, φθονα, 
describes “the lack of a grudging attitude, therefore ‘abundance.’”168  While this may 
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seem to be a paradoxical definition, attending to the etymology of the term reveals that 
the meaning of abundance is secondary, arising from the understanding that a lack of 
φθνος, or envy, frees the soul from the trammels of desire, allowing it to enjoy fully the 
goods of which it is possessed, thus providing one with abundance.169  Within the 
Symposium, νδεια appears in the elenchus of Agathon as the term descriptive of the lack 
that is common in the experiences of +piιθυµα, Eros, and βουλησις.  The language of lack, 
however, shifts to using piενα in Diotima’s presentation of the parentage of Eros.  ῎Ενδεια 
appears only twice in this discussion.170  jφθονος appears in the final section of Diotima’s 
discourse, as descriptive of the philosophical disposition of the true lover at the pinnacle 
of his erotic ascent.  In what follows, I will examine the meaning of each of these terms, 
their use in Platonic dialogues from the same period as the Symposium, and the role they 
play in the development of the concept of poverty in the Symposium. 
 
῎Ενδεια 
 
 
 
῎Ενδεια is a rather general term for deficiency or lack.  In the middle dialogues, 
Plato uses the term in two primary ways.  First, νδεια appears in discussions of pleasure, 
and here often indicates the deficiency that is experienced as painful in appetition.171  
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Socrates speaks here of the “filling of the deficiency” as a pleasure.172  Second, νδεια 
appears in discussions of virtue,173 and here indicates a deficiency in two senses:  as a 
deficiency of knowledge (either +piιστ/µη or τ5χνη) and as a deficiency of participation in 
the Form of the virtue in question (as, e.g. temperance in the Charmides).174  This sense 
of νδεια appears also in discussions of the Forms and the sensible world.  A passage in 
the Phaedo uses νδεια to indicate lack of participation in the Form of equality, so that the 
being existing in the sensible realm is characterized by this deficiency and is, at the same 
time, stretching toward (Mρ5γω) the perfection of the Form that it lacks.175  
 
῎Ενδεια in the Gorgias and the Protagoras 
 
 
 
Both the Gorgias and the Protagoras use νδεια to indicate the deficiency 
experienced in appetition.  In the Protagoras, νδεια is contrasted with 0piερβολ/ in the 
context of a discussion of pleasure.176  Socrates argues here that “our salvation in life 
depends on the right choice of pleasures and pains, be they more or fewer, greater or 
lesser, farther or nearer” and so seems “first of all, to be measurement, which is the study 
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of relative excess (0piερβολ/) and deficiency (νδεια) and equality.”177  Those who err in 
choices regarding pleasure and pain are described as having a deficiency (νδεια) of 
+piιστ/µη (with regard to measurement).178 This deficiency is described as ignorance, and 
this seems to be a way of falling short of knowledge; what is lacking here is participation 
in +piιστ/µη, and in this sense, νδεια is a lack with respect to the fulfillment of one’s 
rational nature.  
Similarly, in the Gorgias, νδεια is used to describe a deficiency of wisdom or 
justice.  Later in the same work νδεια is used to describe a deficiency in skill (τ5χνη).  In 
the Gorgias and the Protragoras, νδεια is applied to describe a falling short of the form 
of a virtue, such as wisdom, and a falling short of an ability or power, like oratory.179 
 
῎Ενδεια in Republic IX and the Philebus 
 
 
 
bνδεια appears again in the discussion of pleasure in the Philebus.180  Here, νδεια 
is opposed to =δον/, so that those who are diseased “feel greater deprivations (νδεια), and 
also greater pleasures (=δον/) at their replenishment.”181  Later in the same dialogue, in 
response to Protarchus’ question as to what “kinds of pleasures that one could rightly 
regard as true”, Socrates responds that these are “Those that are related to so-called pure 
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colors and to shapes and to most smells and sounds and in general all those that are based 
on imperceptible and painless lacks (νδεια), while their fulfillments are perceptible and 
pleasant.”182   
This distinction between kinds of pleasures is articulated as the distinction 
between pure and mixed pleasures in Book IX of the Republic, and a further distinction is 
drawn between the mixed and fleeting pleasures of the body and the pure and more real 
pleasures of the soul.183  Indeed, in this passage Socrates argues that a mixed pleasure is 
not pleasure at all, but merely the cessation of pain.  These pleasures, which involve 
constant change and motion from the state of pain to its cessation, are sharply contrasted 
with the pure and true pleasures of the philosophical part of the soul.  The example of 
bodily pleasure, however, does provide a foundation for describing the truer pleasures of 
the soul; for just as there are “kinds of filling up (piλ/ρωσις) such as filling up with bread 
or drink or delicacies or food in general”, so also is there a “kind of filling up that is with 
true belief, knowledge, understanding, and, in sum, with all of virtue.”184  It is clear, 
however, that Plato does not mean that the filling up of the soul brings humans to an 
intermediate state between pain and pleasure as does the filling up of the body.  The 
bodily desires require constant refilling and involve constant motion between states of 
depletion and repletion; but knowledge, understanding, and virtue complete the soul in a 
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way that does not require continual refilling.  The question posed by Plato’s treatment of 
desire and its bodily and spiritual manifestations, then, is what sort of emptiness or 
deficiency is involved in each.   
Aristotle argues that the view “that pain is the lack of that which is according to 
nature, and pleasure is replenishment” is insufficient to account for all kinds of pleasures, 
even those counted to be sensual.185  Plato’s examples in Republic IX make a similar 
point; the examples of sight and smell show that not all sensual pleasures are preceded by 
a painful state or, as the examples in the Philebus, a perceptible lack.  This indicates that 
Plato does not view lack or deficiency as a sufficient account of desire or Eros; the 
description of desire as a lack of the desired object is only partial.  We may be able to 
distinguish particular bodily desires that involve the presence of pain and clearly involve 
a painful deficiency.  It is clear, though, that the spectrum of sensual experience exceeds 
this model, and since desire itself is not limited to sensual experience though it be 
understood as its parallel, its manifestations as proper to other elements of the soul will, 
similarly, exceed a model of desire based on fulfillment of perceptible deficiency. 
The imperceptible deficiency that Plato describes as present in the experience of 
the sensual pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell provide a model for understanding what 
sort of deficiency is involved in these instances.  The pleasure of a beautiful sight 
indicates that some beautiful object that was not previously present is now present and 
that gazing at it is pleasant.  Any object, regardless of its beauty, might have activated the 
activity of seeing.  The beauty of the object in particular is what makes the activity 
pleasant.  This indicates a further perfection of the activity of seeing rather than the filling 
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of a deficiency; and yet, when we gaze at something beautiful the activity of seeing is 
more complete and more intense, and in this sense fills the deficiency of the activity of 
seeing that would occur if the visible object were deficient in beauty.  There are then, two 
deficiencies to be distinguished in the experienced pleasure of beautiful visions:  the first 
is the deficiency of the visible object, which may be more or less beautiful, the second is 
the deficiency in the activity of seeing itself, which may be more or less pleasant and 
intense depending on the beauty of its object.   
The discussion of pleasure in Book IX of the Republic is presented in terms of 
piλ/ρωσις and κεν6σις.  The highest pleasures are those that do not involve kinesis, because 
they are not a movement from a state of emptiness to a state of fulfillment.  These are 
pleasures like smell and sight, which do not involve a movement from a painful state of 
deficiency to a sated state that is not so much pleasurable as an absence of pain.  The true 
pleasures are the pure pleasures which involve no pain or experienced deficiency.  
Gazing at a beautiful object is the physical analogue of the intellectual pleasure Plato has 
in mind.  The intermediate state at which one arrives upon filling a deficiency is called 
=συχα; this is a state of rest.  If pure pleasures proceed from this state, the implication is 
that stillness (=συχα) is a precondition for pure pleasure.  At any rate, the pain suggested 
in Plato’s treatment of pleasure here is the longing for fulfillment that involves pain; the 
pleasures of smell and sight do not involve the same kind of deficiency, but rather 
proceed from the intermediate state.  In these cases, the powers of sight and smell are in 
repose but ready to be acted upon from without and in being actuated by beautiful and 
pleasant objects, bring pleasure.  Had the objects encountered been ugly and unpleasant, 
the consequent motion would have been aversion and been attended by pain.  This is the 
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analogue for what occurs at the level of mind or soul.  So, what is commonly taken to be 
pleasure is this movement from a state of deficiency to a state of rest.  Such a pleasure is 
not a true or pure pleasure in Plato’s sense, as it involves pain and because the resultant 
state is not one of actual pleasure, but one of the absence of either pleasure or pain.  Pure 
pleasure is beyond this intermediate state, and the best kind of pleasure (or filling up) is 
that of the soul, not just because it proceeds from an intermediate state rather than from a 
deficiency, but also because the pleasures proper to the soul are different in kind.  It is 
precisely because the pleasures of the soul are different in kind that they are more stable 
and more permanent.  The quality of the pleasures that are proper to the soul are like the 
quality of the soul itself, and so appropriate to it and to the soul’s proper activity.  Thus, 
the best pleasures are those achieved by the exercise of the soul’s proper activity, reason. 
 
῎Ενδεια in the Symposium 
 
 
 
In the Symposium, νδεια first appears as a description of Eros in the elenchus of 
Agathon.  The first question of the elenchus is whether Eros “is always ‘of 
something.’”186  It is from Agathon’s affirmation of this that Socrates moves to a 
discussion of Eros as desire.  Both Allen and Bury note that the discussion in the 
elenchus is designed to mark the futuristic nature of desire—that a person does not desire 
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what he has at present, but may desire to continue to have it.187  It is this feature of desire 
that allows Socrates to proceed to his next conclusion—that one desires what one does 
not have, and thus what one lacks (νδεια).  It is thus as desire (+piιθυµα) that Eros is 
described in terms of its deficiency.188  This feature of Eros is reiterated by Diotima a 
short time later:  “And yet you’ve agreed, in Love’s case, that a lack of good and 
beautiful things is what makes him desire the very things he lacks.”189  This observation, 
that Eros lacks good and beautiful things, excludes him from divinity, leading to the 
conclusion that Eros is a daimon and ultimately to the account of his mythical origins.   
The elenchus presents the following argument: Eros is a kind of desire or wish, 
and desiring and wishing are always for something, and something that we do not have at 
present.  In this way, the understanding of Eros as desire is the thematic introduction of  
Eros as intrinsically bound to poverty.  Though the myth of Eros’s parentage does not 
begin Diotima’s account of Eros, the idea of poverty as essential to the nature of Eros is 
present from the beginning of her account, having already been established as proper to 
Eros in the elenchus of Agathon.   
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Given the senses of νδεια identified previously, νδεια in the Symposium might 
indicate the painful deficiency experienced in appetition; given the presence of +piιθυµα in 
the elenchus of Agathon, this seems plausible.  ῎Ενδεια then might be taken to indicate, 
appropriately, the lack that accompanies desire, especially desire of a bodily nature.  In 
two of the passages (from the Philebus and the Republic) mentioned above, however, 
Plato’s discussions of pleasure and desire indicate that the pleasure derived from 
fulfilling a perceptible deficiency is a pleasure of the lowest order.  Furthermore, his 
examination of Agathon uses the example of fulfillment as an example of cessation of 
desire, in a way that is parallel to the examples of the fulfillment of bodily deficiencies 
given in the Republic.  The filling of this lack, then, leaves the desirer (or lover) in an 
intermediate state that is neither pleasure nor pain, but =συχα.  True pleasure proceeds 
from this state, not from a state of perceived deficiency or pain. Thus, in one sense, and 
because Plato often speaks on more than one level, νδεια can be taken to be the lack that 
is proper to +piιθυµα in Socrates’ initial exchange with Agathon.  It is not, however, 
limited to this sense.   
In another sense, however, νδεια in this part of the Symposium can be taken to 
indicate a deficiency in the lover himself, with respect to his participation in the Forms.  
Applying such an interpretation to the meaning of νδεια in the Symposium would suggest 
that the lack of Eros is descriptive of the lover’s various deficiencies with respect to 
Forms.  This is borne out by the later portrayal of the Eros-daimon as intermediate and so 
lacking full participation in beauty, wisdom, goodness, and immortality.  The lover, just 
as the Eros-daimon who possesses him, is in need of beauty, wisdom, goodness, and 
immortality.  Possession by the Eros-daimon is a means by which to reach toward the 
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perfections of the Forms, participation in which completes and perfects the lover himself.  
This indicates that Eros, in its broadest meaning, is the lack of what is perfective of any 
given lover, and indeed this is in agreement with the presentation of cosmic Eros in 
which all things stretch toward the fulfillment of their individual Forms and at the same 
time toward a participation in the immortality that is proper only to the Forms 
themselves.  Kosman suggests such an understanding of νδεια in the following passage: 
 
But the conclusion is clear and interesting, for it suggests that the piρPτον 
φλον is that of which we may be said to be properly +νδεε2ς, and this is our 
own true but fugitive nature, that which is for us φ"σει ο%κε2ν, even if we are 
separated from it. [Lysis] 
The proper object of erotic love is thus understood by Plato to be 
τ- ο%κε2ον κα, +νδεRς, that which belongs naturally to oneself, but from 
which one has been separated.  Erotic love is thus primarily for Plato self-
love, for it is finally our true self which is at once native to us and lacked 
by us….”Self-love” does not here mean love of love, like the 
understanding of understanding in the Charmides, but one’s love of one’s 
self. Nor does it mean selfish love, the vanity and egocentricism which is 
assailed in Book V of the Laws.  It means at the human level that erotic 
self-striving which characterizes all being: the desire of each thing to 
become what it is.190 
 
Kosman’s interpretation is supported by the use of νδεια at Symposium  204a5-6, where 
Diotima says that “The person who doesn’t think he lacks something won’t desire what 
he doesn’t think he lacks.”  This statement follows upon her account of Eros’s parentage 
and her explanation of how his parentage further explains his intermediate nature.  It is 
necessary, on this account, that one who seeks wisdom be neither wise nor ignorant, else 
he will not seek wisdom, either because he does not lack it, or because he is not aware 
that he lacks it.  Ultimately, the νδεια of the lover is distinct from the lack of mere bodily 
desire, which ceases upon fulfillment.  This may be one aspect or sense of Eros, insofar 
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as it indicates sexual desire or desire generally.191  As noted earlier, however, νδεια and 
its derivatives appear throughout the elenchus of Agathon and in the initial exchange 
between Socrates and Diotima; the term gives way to piενα further along in the dialogue.  
The absence of νδεια in the ensuing treatment is notable. 
 
Πενα 
 
 
 
Πενα is the abstract substantive etymologically related to the verb pi5νοµαι and the 
substantive pi5νης, which means “one who works for his living, day-labourer, poor man” 
and is opposed to the piλο"σιος or wealthy man.192  The kind of poverty indicated by piενα 
is not an absolute impoverishment, but indicates a lack of the sort of surplus that is proper 
to the wealthy man.   The pi5νης has just enough to meet his needs, and no more.  As such, 
the pi5νης has no leisure, but must be constantly at work, seeking the things necessary to 
his survival.  Contrasted with νδεια, then, piενα indicates a more specific kind of lack than 
does νδεια, and this is deficiency as embodied in the working man; not deficiency or lack 
simpliciter, but with respect to the excesses of extreme lack or extreme surplus.  As such, 
piενα indicates appropriate deficiency, i.e., the pi5νης has what is necessary for his well-
being, but not a surplus that would be detrimental to his well-being nor a deficiency that 
would be detrimental to his well-being.  
Plato’s usage of piενα in the middle dialogues does not indicate the same sort of 
distinct usages as νδεια.  Πενα appears most frequently in general discussions of wealth 
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and poverty as they are related to material possessions and consequently how these 
condition the possibilities of the person or city to whom they belong.  In the Phaedo and 
the Symposium, however, piενα is discussed as it is related to the philosopher, and this 
indicates that the term bears significantly on how the philosophical life is to be lived.  
Nonetheless, because Plato’s use of piενα and its cognates is more often attributive than 
descriptive, it will be useful to draw upon other historical sources to further clarify the 
concept of piενα.  As the discussion of piενα in section one above has shown, general 
Greek usage connects piενα with σωφροσ"νη and opposes it to greed and hubris.  In what 
follows, I will make use of the texts of Aristophanes and Xenophon, and the historical 
work of Jaeger to provide a fuller understanding of piενα and its relationship to σωφροσ"νη.  
This will, in turn, provide the foundation for understanding the significance of piενα in 
Diotima’s explanation of Eros’s nature and origins. 
In the Symposium, the term ‘piενα’ emerges in the context of the myth of the 
origins of Eros.  In this myth, Diotima identifies the parents of Eros as Προς (Resource) 
and Πενα (Poverty).193  The parentage of Eros is then used to describe the nature of Eros 
himself: 
Because, then, he is the son of Resource and Poverty, Love’s situation is 
like this.  First, he is always poor (pi5νης), and far from delicate and 
beautiful, as most people think he is; he is hard, dirty, barefoot, homeless, 
always sleeping on the ground, without blankets, stretching out under the 
sky in doorways and by the roadside, because he has his mother’s nature, 
always with lack (νδεια) as his companion.  His father’s side, for its part, 
makes him a schemer after the beautiful and good, courageous, impetuous, 
and intense, a clever hunter, always weaving new devices, both passionate 
for wisdom and resourceful in looking for it, philosophizing through all 
his life, a clever magician, sorcerer, and sophist; his nature is neither that 
of an immortal, nor that of a mortal, but on the same day, now he 
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flourishes and lives, when he finds resources, and now he dies, but then 
comes back to life again, because of his father’s nature, and what he gets 
for himself is always slipping away from him, so that Love is neither 
resourceless at any moment, nor rich, and again is in the middle between 
wisdom and ignorance.194 
 
It is at once striking that, though Socrates’ speech to this point has spoken of 
Eros’s lack in terms of νδεια, the term used to describe the kind of lack essential to Eros’s 
nature by virtue of his parentage is piενα.  Striking, too, is the choice of piρος as a partner 
for piενα, since its more usual complement would be piλο4τος.195  From a literary 
perspective, these choices frustrate the expectations of the reader for two reasons: 
because piενα has taken the place of νδεια, and because the myth of origins is introduced 
immediately after a section thematizing the intermediate nature of Eros as it exists 
between several pairs of opposites.  As an intermediate and as a daimon, Eros is placed 
between knowledge and ignorance, beauty and ugliness, good and bad; one would expect, 
then, that the intermediate nature he inherits from his parents would be a consequence of 
just such a pair of opposites.  But this is not what follows.   
Insofar as Eros is intermediate between Προς and Πενα, he contains the natures 
of both.  In the same way that daimons bind the all to the all, Eros binds Προς to Πενα. 
Such being would not be possible in the case of opposites that must yield to one another.  
Nor is this intermediacy the same as that which, lying between opposites, represents a 
point on a graded scale that begins with nonbeing and ends with absolute being.  Rather, 
this very different kind of intermediacy lies in Eros holding together two seemingly 
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disparate elements of being—poverty and resourcefulness.  This is borne out by the text, 
quoted above, that follows the myth in which Diotima describes the attributes that Eros 
has inherited from each of his parents.  From this singular kind of intermediacy comes a 
singular kind of poverty, for though Eros is poor, he is never without resource; he is not 
utterly barren, but neither is he wealthy.  This poverty is a state of being in which the 
poor man is continuously inventive, striving toward the things that he needs, and yet he is 
never so completely deficient that he becomes mired in and paralyzed by deficiency.  He 
has learned to live with deficiency; it is his companion.  Poverty, however, provides him 
with daring and inventiveness; poverty provides him with a way to the things that he 
needs.  
The conception of poverty in the myth presents the lack of Eros as the lack proper 
to the working man, the lack of piενα.  It is this lack that depicts the philosopher not only 
as lover, but as the embodiment of the pi5νης, and so provides the foundation for the later 
conception of him as engaging in φιλοσοφα φθονος.  Such also is the depiction of the 
philosopher in the Phaedo, and it is notable that poverty is mentioned as something that 
does not cause fear in the philosophical soul because it is not φιλοχρ/µατος.  
It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who practice 
philosophy in the right way keep away from all bodily passions, master them and 
do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for fear of wasting their 
substance and of poverty, which the majority and the money-lovers fear, nor for 
fear of dishonor and ill repute, like the ambitious and lovers of honors, that they 
keep away from them.196 
 
 Πενα in the Phaedo and the Republic is associated with the money-loving part of the 
soul, which is itself contrasted with the honor-loving and learning-loving parts of the 
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soul.  As is often the case with Plato, the material and tangible serves as a model for 
understanding the immaterial and intangible, and here piενα forms a part of the 
philosopher’s practice for dying as the tangible description of his moderation.197  But this 
is not the sum of the philosopher’s moderation, for he must also steer clear of overzealous 
attachment to honor, and, ultimately to beliefs that might prevent his progress toward 
truth.  The above passage from the Phaedo indicates that the philosopher does not live a 
moderate life because he is afraid of poverty; he does not act out of fear of suffering or 
deprivation.  Instead, he acts out of a desire to be united with the divine, and is willing to 
forego bodily pleasure for the sake of attaining the much greater pleasures proper to the 
soul itself. 198   
 Πενα, χρηµατα, and φιλοχρ/µατος appear together in other of Plato’s dialogues as 
well.  The description of poverty as a corruption of a person’s financial state (χρηµατικ/) 
in the Gorgias is one example of this.199  Here, poverty is not just a deficiency, but a bad 
state of one’s finances, analogous to disease as a bad state of the body and injustice as a 
bad state of the soul.200   
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The money-loving (φιλοχρ/µατος) part of the soul is found to be at the root of 
political conflict in the Republic.  It is the cause of war with other states as well as the 
cause of civil war.201  The healthy city, proposed in Book II, avoids the evils of poverty 
and war by prescribing a life for its citizenry that aims at moderation.202  It is Glaucon’s 
insistence on the addition of “things that go beyond what is necessary for a city” that 
brings about the increased needs of the city and ultimately lead it to war.203  In this 
instance, the city does not have enough or thinks it does not and, consequently, looks for 
more outside of itself.  Had it maintained its subsistence state, there would have been no 
need for war, nor would it have been beset by poverty. 
In Book IV, poverty and wealth are identified as the conditions that ruin good 
craftsmanship.204  Poverty deprives the craftsman of what he needs to do his craft well, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
201
 Resp. 373b1-e9. 
 
202
 Resp. 372a1-c1. 
 
203
 Resp. 373b4. 
 
204
“Consider whether or not the following things corrupt the other workers, so that they 
become bad.  –What things? –Wealth and poverty. –How do they corrupt the other 
workers? –Like this.  Do you think that a potter who has become wealthy will still be 
willing to pay attention to his craft? –Not at all. –Won’t he become more idle and 
careless than he was? –Much more.  --Then won’t he become a worse potter?  --Far 
worse.  –And surely if poverty prevents him from having tools or any of the other things 
he needs for his craft, he’ll produce poorer work and will teach his sons, or anyone else 
he teaches, to be worse craftsmen.  –of course.  –So poverty and wealth make a craftsman 
and his products worse.  –It seems, then, that we’ve found other things that our guardians 
must guard against in every way, to prevent them from slipping into the city unnoticed.  –
What are they?  --Both wealth and poverty.  The former makes for luxury, idleness, and 
revolution; the latter for slavishness, bad work, and revolution as well” (Resp. 4. 421d1-
422a2). 
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while wealth makes him less likely to practice his craft or to practice it with care.205  It is 
the state intermediate between these two extremes that causes the craftsman to perform 
his craft well.206  Excess and deficiency—wealth and poverty—create conditions under 
which the craftsman will not or cannot work.  Wealth and poverty as extremes are 
harmful; what is desirable and perfective is the appropriate amount.   
The passages from the Republic reveal a complexity in Plato’s characterization of 
poverty and wealth, but one that seems in accord with the attitude of Plato’s Greece.  On 
the one hand, wealth is viewed as necessary to living a good life, practicing and acquiring 
arête; one is able to cultivate perfection only when one has leisure to devote to such 
cultivation.  But, as Dover notes, “like the appetites and passions, wealth can in itself 
distort an otherwise virtuous character.”207  And so, alongside the recognition that 
poverty is not a desirable state, and that material deficiencies might interfere with the 
acquisition and practice of virtue, the singular virtue of the working man (pi5νης) is 
articulated.  Jaeger writes of this virtue of the working man in the following passage: 
It is not for nothing that Greece was the cradle of a civilization which 
places work high among the virtues.  We must not be deceived by the 
carefree life of the Homeric gentlemen into forgetting that the land of 
Greece always demanded hard and constant labour from its people.208  
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And again, in a passage on Hesiod’s Works and Days, Jaeger writes of the conception of 
virtue that emerges from the peasant life: 
In the first part [of Works and Days] Hesiod made his hearers feel the 
curse of strife; now he must show them the values of work.  He praises it 
as the only way to arête, difficult though it is.  The idea of arête embraces 
both personal ability and its products—welfare, success, repute.  It is 
neither the arête of the warrior noble, nor the arête of the landowning 
class, built on wealth, but the arête of the working man, expressed in the 
possession of a modest competence.  Arête is the catchword of the second 
part of the poem, the real Erga.  The aim of work is arête as the common 
man understands it.  He wishes to make something of his arête, and he 
engages, not in the ambitious rivalry for chivalrous prowess and praise 
which is commended by the code of the aristocrat, but in the quiet strong 
rivalry of work.  In the sweat of his brow shall he eat bread—but that is 
not a curse, it is a blessing.  Only the sweat of his brow can win him arête.  
From this it is obvious that Hesiod deliberately sets up against the 
aristocratic training of Homer’s heroes a working-class ideal of education, 
based on the arête of the ordinary man.  Righteousness and Work are the 
foundations on which it is built.209 
 
The passage from Jaeger indicates that poverty is a teacher of virtue, and of virtue of a 
distinct kind.  The virtue Jaeger describes as belonging to Hesiod’s peasant develops the 
soul of man in a direction quite different from the aristocrat; instead of beginning with 
surplus and leisure, the peasant begins with deficiency and work.  If we consider the 
development of the virtue of the peasant in terms of Plato’s tripartite division of the soul 
we see moderation of irrational appetites, but also moderation of the honor-loving part of 
the soul.  As Jaeger suggests, the glory of the peasant is not in his status or reputation.210  
This is not to say that his θυµς is not developed, nor that he is without a certain kind of 
courage, but the power of θυµς is directed here toward perseverance and endurance 
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through daily hardship. (It could be the root of the daring implanted by poverty, too).  
This conception of virtue as endurance and perseverance is of a piece with Plato’s 
description of Eros as the child of Προς and Πενα, for he must daily work for what he 
needs, enduring and persevering through hardship. 
Xenophon’s Symposium situates a discussion of wealth and poverty within the 
context of what it means to be free or liberal—the quality of the true gentleman 
(καλοικγαθοι).  The focus of this discussion is of aristocratic arête, rather than of that 
proper to the peasant.  Yet the speakers in Xenophon’s Symposium focus on wealth and 
poverty as means to achieving freedom and thus also goodness; and once again piενα is 
brought to the fore as a means of acquiring and maintaining virtue.211  Bartlett notes that 
“Liberality (eleutherios) generally speaking is behavior appropriate to a free man 
(eleutheros) and came to signify more narrowly the freedom from an undue attachment to 
wealth, i.e., generosity (see, e.g. 4.43 below and Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 4.1).”212  
There are two speakers, other than Socrates himself, whose speeches are remarkable for 
their focus on wealth and poverty.  In the speeches of Charmides and Antisthenes, lack of 
wealth is identified as the source of the speakers’ freedom.  
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Poverty in these speeches is spoken of as both material and spiritual.213  
Charmides praises poverty because it has freed him from many ills.214  Though he was 
once wealthy, he has since been deprived of his wealth and many of the things that 
followed from it.  But in this new poverty, Charmides finds a new tranquility.  He 
identifies three ways in which his new poverty has benefited him: he no longer fears loss 
of material goods, no longer fears loss of public goods such as reputation, and he is no 
longer constrained by the city.215  The consequences Charmides derives from these show 
that his new poverty allows him “to be bold [rather] than fearful, to be free rather than a 
slave, to be tended to rather than to tend to another, and to be trusted by the fatherland 
rather than distrusted by it.”216  His having nothing does not cause him sorrow, but grants 
him freedom, especially from fear.  Charmides concludes his speech with the following 
observation:  “But now I lose nothing, for I have nothing to lose, and I always hope that 
I’ll lay hold of something.”217  When Callias asks him if he tries to avoid goods that come 
his way, in order to avoid becoming wealthy again, Charmides responds with a 
description of his attitude toward possible goods that is strikingly similar to the 
description of the daimon Eros in Plato’s Symposium.  He says, “This I do not do, but I 
bear up with a real love of danger if I expect to lay hold of something from somewhere or 
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other.”218  Charmides, much like Plato’s daimon Eros, lives with need and pregnant 
expectation. 
Antisthenes’ speech follows that of Charmides.  He begins with a distinction 
between material and spiritual poverty:  “human beings do not have wealth and poverty 
in their household but in their souls.”219  His explanation of this statement indicates that 
the desire for more belongs properly to the soul, and in support of this, he cites examples 
of those who have plenty but still desire more.  In brief, it seems that the wealthiest of 
men can be hungry for more wealth, and so their need or desire is not rooted in anything 
material, but rather in the soul itself.  “Now I for my part feel great pity for them because 
of their sickness.  For in my opinion they suffer the same things as someone who could 
never be satiated although he had and ate a great deal.”220  The poverty he describes is 
one of having just enough, sufficiency: “Nevertheless, I can eat to the point that I’m not 
hungry and can drink until I’m not thirsty and be dressed in such a way that I’m no colder 
when outside than the fabulously wealthy Callias here.”221  Antisthenes’ commitment to 
poverty is quite striking, but it differs from the poverty that Plato seems to advocate in a 
significant way.  Antisthenes states that no task would be “too base” (φα4λος) for him to 
perform to get what he needed to survive, and that those who “look to cheap things” are 
more likely to be just than those who must have the more precious ones.  This suggests, 
perhaps, a vulgarity or inability to appreciate the fine; though, it might also suggest that 
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the “precious” things are not themselves truly fine.  Either way, it suggests that the 
poverty of Antisthenes is a poverty more like that of the Cynics than of Plato’s Socrates,  
for it involves a rejection of all good things, bereft of appropriate appreciation for the 
truly noble, fine, and good.222  Love and desire are not ordered or trained, but quashed. 
Dover notes that there is precedent for the personification of Πενα in 
Aristophanes’ Ploutos.223   Though this is not sufficient to determine that Plato chose 
Πενα because there was a recent precedent, it does suggest that he might have intended 
some allusion to the Πενα of Aristophanes.  Of particular interest is the defence Πενα 
gives of herself in this play.  She argues against the criticisms of two Athenian citizens 
that she is of greater benefit to humanity than is wealth.   
You are trying to mock and make jokes, with no concern for serious 
discussion, and refusing to recognize that I produce better men than 
Wealth does—better men both mentally and physically.  With him, they 
are gouty and pot-bellied and thick-calved and obscenely fat; with me 
they’re lean and wasp-like and sting their enemies hard.224 
 
Notable too is the passage in which Πενα distinguishes herself from the absolute 
deficiency that is designated by piτωχεα: 
 
My kind of life doesn’t involve that sort of thing, by Zeus, and it never 
could.  The life of the destitute (piτωχεα), which is what you’re talking 
about, is to have to live on nothing.  The life of a poor man (pi5νης) is to 
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live economically and keep at one’s work, not having any surplus but not 
having a shortfall either.225 
 
 These passages from Aristophanes support the understanding of piενα as a state 
intermediate between extreme deficiency and surplus, and as a state that maintains virtue.  
Taken together with the passages we have considered from Aristophanes, Hesiod, and 
Xenophon, we can conclude that the lack of piενα is not an absolute deficiency, nor is it 
the deficiency associated with the pain of appetitive lack.  It is a lack of excess, the 
poverty of the working man who is just able to meet his needs, and so is in an 
intermediate state between absolute deficiency, or piτωχεα, and surplus; it is an 
appropriate deficiency, in brief, moderation. 
The concept of lack that is presented as central to an understanding of Eros’s 
nature is found in the concept of Πενα.  As we have seen, piενα itself indicates a state 
characterized by both industry and moderation.  The poor man is not weak and 
emaciated, but strong and industrious.  This industrious and resourceful aspect of piενα in 
Eros is emphasized by its combination with piρος in Plato’s myth.  Πενα is the kind of 
lack that involves resourcefulness; this is revealed even in Πενα’s plot to have a child by 
Resource.   
Understanding piενα as a kind of moderation helps us to reconceptualize the Eros-
daimon. As simultaneously poor and resourceful, he is a kind of ascetic and embodies, to 
borrow a phrase from Desmond, the “praise of poverty”.  But the poverty of the Eros-
daimon is not merely material, and so neither is his asceticism.  Plato’s extension of the 
material to the immaterial yields a fuller conception of the inner life of the ascetic, the 
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poverty of soul and mind that is the necessary discipline for ascending to the vision of 
Beauty and for achieving the abundance and freedom of φθονος. 
Our conception of poverty cannot remain defined and constrained by materiality.  
Just as the objects of Eros become further removed from sensible reality as the lover 
ascends toward the vision of Beauty, so also do the objects of poverty.  If poverty 
describes a moderation of the bodily pleasure at the lowest levels, this disposition of the 
soul not to be controlled by bodily desires is descriptive of the appropriate disposition of 
the other parts of the human soul as well.  Moderation applies also to the spirited element 
in man, that he not love and grasp at victory and honor to excess.  For the rational 
element, this implies that the mind must acquire a disposition of attentive waiting.  The 
mind must wait to catch sight of the Beautiful; vision of the highest form, of Beauty 
itself, cannot be forced; the mind waits upon its object.   
This disposition of poverty throughout the entire soul yields also a different 
conception of the longing that is generally associated with Eros.  Because Eros is no 
longer the painful deficiency of appetite, the subjective experience of Eros is different.  
As the Socrates-Diotima dialogue moves into its final stage, Eros is characterized by its 
“lack of a grudging attitude”.   If there is deficiency here, it is not a perceptible painful 
deficiency within the subject.  The longing of the one who waits attentively is different 
from the longing of the one who grasps things (even objects of knowledge) and clings to 
them, unwilling to give up falsity and opinion for the sake of truth.  
Plato’s Socrates continually directs the attention of his pupils away from the 
transient material goods of this world and toward the eternal immateriality that is the only 
true good; and the path to this good involves always the embrace of poverty—not a 
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denial that one has a mortal nature with the needs entailed by such a nature, but a denial 
that this is the sum of what it is to be human.  The embrace of poverty involves living in 
such a way that one’s physical needs are met, but not excessively indulged and not made 
the guiding principle of human existence.  Rather the desire for such things that might 
consume a human being is directed to other things; this is what Diotima describes in the 
ascent passage.  Poverty taken with piρος becomes the way of Eros.   
 
῎Αφθονος 
 
 
 
Of the three terms that Plato uses to indicate lack in the Symposium, φθονος is 
perhaps the term whose meaning is most difficult to capture.  Its expression of deficiency 
is most specific—it is a lack of φθνος, or envy.  To be φθονος is to be without greed, 
envy, graspingess.   
῎Αφθονος appears infrequently in other dialogues.  In the Apology it is used to 
denote great quantity.  In the Protagoras, it conveys generosity, as opposed to stinginess, 
and in particular with regard to teaching what one knows (in this example, craft-
knowledge), and so a generosity of soul.  Perhaps most revealing is its opposite, φθνος, 
as characteristic of the tyrannical man in the Republic: 
In truth, then, and whatever some people may think, a real tyrant is really 
a slave, compelled to engage in the worst kind of fawning, slavery, and 
pandering to the worst kind of people.  He’s so far from satisfying his 
desires in any way that it is clear—if one happens to know that one must 
study his whole soul—that he’s in the greatest need of most things and 
truly poor.  And, if indeed his state is like that of the city he rules, then 
he’s full of fear, convulsions, and pains throughout his life.  And it is like 
this, isn’t it? […] And we’ll also attribute to the man what we mentioned 
before, namely, that he is inevitably envious, untrustworthy, unjust, 
friendless, impious, host and nurse to every kind of vice, and that his 
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ruling makes him even more so.  And because of all these, he is extremely 
unfortunate and goes on to make those near him like himself.226 
 
At opposite ends of the erotic spectrum stand the tyrant and the philosopher; just as the 
tryrant embodies Eros at its worst, the philosopher embodies Eros at its best; likewise 
each of these types displays the attachment to or detachment from things that are 
inseparable from the type of Eros by which they are defined. 
In the Symposium, φθονος is joined with φιλοσοφα to describe the activity in 
which the lover is engaged at the penultimate state of the ascent to the vision of Beauty.  
It is, in fact, the last step the lover himself can take; this is the stage at which he arrives 
and waits, hoping to catch sight of Beauty itself.  And so it seems to describe a state that 
is also an activity: a state that is preparation for vision, but which must remain engaged in 
its activity to maintain itself, and so a sort of habit or disposition.  A disposition expresses 
itself in discrete moments of time through particular actions.  The disposition of 
moderation in the mind is built on the moderation associated with piενα; it is the extension 
of this disposition from bodily appetites to the appetites of θυµς and νο4ς.  When the 
whole soul has acquired piενα, the whole soul is without greed in every respect, and so in 
a state of φθονος. 
In the progression of conceptions of lack in the Symposium, φθονος seems to 
follow naturally upon the presentation of Eros as the child of Προς and Πενα.  On one 
conception of the spectrum of kinds of poverty and wealth, one might recognize piτωχεα 
as absolute deficiency and φθονος as absolute abundance (rather than wealth as piλο4τος), 
and piενα would be intermediate between the two.  Indeed, φθονος is more appropriate to 
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describe the wealth or abundance of the philosophical lover because it does not carry with 
it the hazards attendant upon piλο4τος.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
What emerges from the analysis of these three terms and their roles in Socrates’ 
speech is a clearer understanding of the lack of Eros.  Plato’s treatment of lack in the 
section of the Symposium beginning with the elenchus of Agathon and ending with 
Diotima’s description of the ascent to the vision of Beauty, moves from deficiency to 
abundance, and this movement in reflected in the changing terminology used to describe 
the lack of Eros.  ῎Ενδεια designates the deficiency associated with +piιθυµα and with the 
impetus for self-perfection.  Πενα, which brings with it moderation, designates an 
appropriate deficiency.  ῎Αφθονος, opposed to the φθνος of the tyrannical man, designates 
the deficiency that is abundance. 
We have seen that there are three terms Plato uses to designate the lack of Eros in 
the discourse between Socrates and Diotima in the Symposium.  The first of these is 
νδεια, which indicates a lack simply taken, a deficiency.  It is used primarily to designate 
the kinds of lack experienced in appetitive desire, those that are filled, and whose filling 
ends desire.  It is also used by Plato to describe the deficiencies of material things with 
respect to their ideal forms, and so in this sense also indicates the sort of interior erotic 
striving of all being (and beings) on a metaphysical level.   The term νδεια, however, is 
prominent only in the elenchus of Agathon and the first portion of the exchange between 
Socrates and Diotima.  The result of this discussion is to identify Eros as an intermediary 
or daimon, and this leads to the next stage of the discussion of Eros's lack.   
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The second lack is the lack of Πενα, which is the lack associated with the poverty 
of the day-laborer.  This is not an absolute lack, nor a lack simply considered.  The 
poverty of the day-laborer is one of sufficiency; he has just enough to meet his needs and 
no more.  This is depicted, to some degree, in Diotima's explanation of the myth of Eros's 
parentage.  In other Greek literature, piενα appears also as a teacher of virtue, especially 
the virtue of moderation.  It is opposed not only to wealth (piλο4τος), but also to the 
hubris and greed that are the offspring of wealth.  Where extreme excess and deficiency 
breed vice, appropriate deficiency breeds virtue.  Πενα is also viewed as implanting 
daring (out of necessity).  In the Symposium, Eros as daimon, and Socrates as Eros, are 
both presented as embodying this kind of poverty.  This poverty, as it implants 
moderation, is a poverty that is dispositional, and as a lack, is not a lack simply taken, but 
a lack with respect to excess and deficiency.  This picture of poverty concludes the 
section of the discourse that deals with the nature of Eros itself, and the language of lack 
and deficiency do not appear again in the discourse until the third and final term for lack, 
φθονος, appears in the ascent passage.  Πενα designates what sort of thing Eros is, 
insofar as he is also Προς; φθονος describes the works of Eros, the fruits of having 
acquired the requisite piενα, i.e. the disposition of moderation.  At the penultimate stage 
of the ascent, the lover is described as pouring forth in φιλοσοφα φθονος, or “a love of 
wisdom that grudges nothing”.   The φθονος is, literally, not envying or grudging.  It is 
opposed to the φθνος that characterizes the Republic's tyrannical man, the very picture of 
Eros gone awry.  jφθονος, being this lack of a grudging attitude, is often used to describe 
abundance and flourishing.  In the Symposium, it describes the disposition necessary for 
the lover to achieve the vision of Absolute Beauty.  Both piενα and φθονος describe a 
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disposition essential to the true lover, the lack of graspingness that allows the lover to 
view the beloved object with both clarity and appreciation; the attitude of attentive 
waiting that allows the beloved object to be revealed.  There is thus no desire to hold, 
possess, or control what is loved, but instead a desire to dwell with it, as the soul desires 
to dwell with the Forms.  The disposition brought about by piενα —that of moderation—
governs not only the irrational appetitive element in man, but also θυµς and νο4ς, as each 
element has its own sort of graspingness that is its own undoing. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE INTERMEDIACY OF EROS 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the nature of Eros as it emerges in the exchange between 
Socrates and Diotima.  The most significant feature of this examination is its 
development of the intermediate nature of Eros, and the sense in which Eros is at once 
Προς and Πενα develops out of the establishment of his intermediate nature.  The 
discussion of Eros, beginning with the elenchus of Agathon, introduces the conception of 
Eros as involving νδεια, or lack, and from here proceeds to show the relational character 
of Eros.  This initial discussion of lack leads to the exposition of Eros as necessarily 
relational, and further to Diotima’s description of Eros as existing between various sets of 
opposites and thus as intermediate or µεταξ".  It is his intermediate status that identifies 
Eros as a daimon and the human being who understands the daimonic as the δαιµνιος 
ν/ρ.  There is a traceable development, then, of the concept of the intermediate in 
Diotima’s discourse, one that begins with the recognition of Eros’s lack, and derives from 
this lack a structure of Eros that expresses its metaphysical reality and the human 
psychological experience of this reality.  It will be the purpose of this chapter to articulate 
this development. 
The consequences of Eros’s intermediacy are embodied in his portrayal as 
daimon, and particularly in the manner in which he includes both Προς and Πενα in his 
nature. The metaphysical status of the intermediate itself bears upon the interpretation of 
Eros’s nature as intermediate between these terms.  In the last chapter, we examined the 
sense in which the poverty of Eros is had in the disposition of temperance (σωφροσ"νη).  
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This disposition of proper proportion is one manifestation of measure and is closely 
related to the concepts of middle and intermediacy.227   
The Eros-daimon implants the resource (piρος) that is the means or way by which 
the true lover ascends to the vision of the beautiful.  In this sense, as a daimon possessing 
the lover, Eros can be understood as Προς.  On one interpretation, the disposition of 
poverty necessary to the lover might be the precondition for daimonic possession; if one 
is to be blessed by the gods, one must not be possessed of hubris.  The disposition of 
poverty, the acquisition of temperance, the having of things in appropriate proportion, are 
conditions for divine blessing.  On the other hand, if Eros quite truly embraces both Προς 
and Πενα, it seems more likely that daimonic possession implants both the disposition of 
poverty and the “energy” or motion of Προς.  It is, in fact, the perfect philosophical 
disposition:  a mind that moves because inspired by the beauty of Truth, but which does 
not cling to its own perception of the truth because it recognizes its own finitude; the 
philosopher is drawn to truth itself, but willing to part with his “own” truths if they are 
found inadequate or defective.  Possession by the Eros daimon enables one to see beauty 
more truly and this improved or keener vision allows one to desire the right objects, to 
the right degree, and in the right way.  The way of life Eros implants is Πενα, as the 
proper amount of love for the proper sorts of things, and thus possession by the Eros 
daimon yields the sort of appropriate detachment depicted in the character of Socrates. 
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Eros, Desire, and Wish: Establishing the Intermediacy of Eros 
 
 
 
The early discussion of Eros, first between Agathon and Socrates, and then 
between Socrates and Diotima, introduces the triadic structure of Eros; it is this 
establishment of Eros’s triadic structure that serves as the foundation for its status as 
intermediate.  The movement of the dialogue reveals Eros’s intermediacy to be a 
consequence of his deficiency; the movement from the elenchus of Agathon, through 
Diotima’s initial questioning of Socrates, arriving at Diotima’s pronouncement that Eros 
is a daimon, suggests that the examination of Eros and its relationship to lack is for the 
sake of establishing his nature as daimon and so also as intermediate or µεταξ".  In what 
follows, I will examine the development of the intermediate status of Eros as it emerges 
in the elenchus of Agathon and Diotima’s questioning of Socrates.   
These two passages, in addition to establishing the intermediate status of Eros, 
discuss the relationships that exist among Eros, desire (+piιθυµα), and wish (βο"λησις).  
Common to all of these terms is the indication that the desiring, loving, or wishing 
subject lacks the object that she desires, loves, or wishes to have.  Though the distinctions 
among these terms may appear unimportant, they contribute significantly to 
understanding the development of the concept of Eros, especially with respect to 
establishing the similarities and differences among these three terms. 
In order to understand Plato’s concern with distinguishing among these terms, it 
will be useful to begin by noting something of the history and usage of the term ‘Eros’.  
Dover’s survey of the earliest uses of Eros and related words notes that: 
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Eros (with a short o), (which) in Homer means ‘desire’ for a woman (Il. 
xiv 315), for food and drink (Il. i 469 and elsewhere, in the formula ‘when 
they had expelled [i.e. satisfied] their eros of food and drink’) and for 
other things for which one may feel a desire capable of satisfaction (e.g. Il. 
xxiv 227, ‘when I have expelled my eros of lamentation’), and in Hesiod 
is personified as one of the first divine beings to come into existence 
(Theogony 120-2, ‘most beautiful among the immortals’).228 
 
The example of expelling one’s “eros of lamentation” suggests the conception of 
universal or cosmic Eros that is present in both the speeches of Erixymachus and 
Diotima, where Eros is conceived of primarily as the cause of motion rather than as 
psychological desire.229  In the formulation cited above, Eros expresses the agent’s need 
or striving for lamentation in order to rid herself of it; it is a sort of κθαρσις, as one must 
lament in order to be rid of lamentation.  The structure revealed here is one of divine 
possession, by which something apparently external takes hold of the agent, and from 
which the agent is only freed when she expels from herself the very thing that has taken 
possession of her.230  This might mean, however, that something further is required.  
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 Dodds notes that this conception of daimonic possession is applied to various 
emotions in the Greek world.  “There are a number of passages in Homer in which 
unwise and unaccountable conduct is attributed to ate, or described by the cognate verb 
aasasthai, without explicit reference to divine intervention.  But ate in Homer is not itself 
a personal agent:  the two passages which speak of ate in personal terms, Il. 9.505 ff. and 
19.91 ff., are transparent pieces of allegory.  Nor does the word ever, at any rate in the 
Iliad, mean objective disaster, as it so commonly does in tragedy.  Always, or practically 
always, ate is a state of mind—a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal 
consciousness.  It is, in fact, a partial and temporary insanity; and, like all insanity, it is 
ascribed, not to physiological or psychological causes, but to an external “daemonic” 
agency.  In the Odyssey, it is true, excessive consumption of wine is said to cause ate; the 
implication, however, is probably not that ate can be produced “naturally,” but rather that 
wine has something supernatural or daemonic about it.  Apart from this special case, the 
agents productive of ate, where they are specified, seem always to be supernatural 
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Lamentation may be expelled by pouring forth many tears, by wailing and beating of the 
breast, but hunger is expelled by receiving food into the body.  In both cases Eros 
expresses a need of or for something, and this displays an intentional aspect of Eros, as 
directed toward things other than itself, and as moving toward these things.  In the above 
examples, both hunger and lamentation are expelled and thus “poured out”; in hunger, an 
appetible object is necessary to accomplish this, but this is not the case for lamentation.  
Hunger begins with a void that must be filled, but lamentation does not.  Another notable 
aspect of this early use of Eros is that it identifies desires “capable of satisfaction”.  
Dover’s analysis suggests that, historically, there is a close association among +piιθυµα 
and the various words derived from Eros and +ρω.231 
If we now turn our attention to the elenchus of Agathon and Socrates’ ensuing 
remarks, we find that Socrates makes several attempts to formulate a definition of Eros in 
                                                                                                                                                 
beings; so we may class all instances of nonalcoholic ate in Homer under the head of 
what I propose to call “psychic intervention.” 
 If we review them, we shall observe that ate is by no means necessarily either a 
synonym for, or a result of, wickedness.  The assertion of Liddell and Scott that ate is 
“mostly sent as the punishment of guilty rashness” is quite untrue of Homer.  The ate 
(here a sort of stunned bewilderment) which overtook Patroclus after Apollo had struck 
him might possibly be claimed as an instance…” (E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the 
Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 5. 
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with homosexual reference, and ibid. 4. 62-4, in a jocular figurative passage on 
‘procuring’ enthusiastic pupils and teachers for their mutual intellectual benefit” (Dover, 
Greek Homosexuality, 43-44). 
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terms of its relationship to desire (+piιθυµα).232  The formulation arising from the 
examination of Agathon understands Eros and desire as similar because they both entail a 
lack (νδεια).  At the beginning of his own discourse, Socrates indicates that he will treat 
first of the nature of Eros and then of its works, and in his discussion of the nature of 
Eros, the relations among Eros, +piιθυµα, and νδεια again figure prominently.  In what 
follows, I will first provide an overview of the various definitions offered in the section 
of the Symposium beginning with the elenchus of Agathon and ending at 209b where 
Diotima begins her discussion of the works or effects of Eros.  After this summary, I will 
examine the importance of the presence of +piιθυµα and βο"λησις in these passages, and 
how this contributes to the understanding of Eros’s lack (νδεια).   
The first provisional definition is in the elenchus of Agathon, where Socrates asks 
whether Eros desires (+piιθυµ5ω) “that of which it is the love”.233  The next provisional 
definition occurs at 202d1, where Diotima shows Socrates that his answers have led to 
the conclusion that “Eros, by reason of lack of good and beautiful things, desires those 
very things he lacks.”234  Eros is next defined as the wish (βο"λησις) humans have “to 
possess good things for themselves forever”,235 and again, shortly after this as “every 
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 Bury notes that Socrates’ “encomium proper is preceded by a preliminary dialectical 
discussion with Agathon, the object of which is to clear the ground of some popular 
misconceptions of the nature of Eros” (introduction,  xxxvi).  He seems to be correct in 
this, as an examination of the argument, I think, will reveal. 
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 Symp. 200a2. 
 
234
 Symp. 202d1. 
 
235
 Symp. 205a1.  Later, however, at Symposium 206a1-10 βο"λοµαι drops out, and Eros is 
simply “of” the things that are its objects (in the genitive). 
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desire (+piιθυµα) for good things and happiness.”236  The final formulation of the 
definition of Eros is provided by Diotima: 
Eros necessarily desires (+piιθυµ5ω) immortality with the good, from what 
has been agreed, since its object is to possess the good for itself forever.  It 
necessarily follows from this account, then, that Eros is also love of 
immortality…Once she asked, Socrates, what do you think is cause (α%τα)  
of this love (Eros) and desire (+piιθυµα)?...all beasts…desire (+piιθυµ5ω) to 
reproduce.237 
 
As is evident from this brief summary, the examination of Eros from the elenchus 
of Agathon through Diotima’s discourse on the nature of Eros frequently refers to its 
relationship to +piιθυµα and βο"λησις.  Though both terms appear frequently in the 
discussion of what sort of thing Eros is, they appear much less frequently after the 
discussion turns toward an examination of the works of Eros, and neither term appears in 
the ascent passage.  The location and incidence of these terms in the various provisional 
definitions of Eros that are offered as descriptions of its nature introduce νδεια as an 
aspect of Eros, and suggest that βο"λησις and +piιθυµα, though closely related to Eros, may 
be distinguished from it.  
Bury suggests that the initial discussion of Eros in the elenchus238 in terms of 
+piιθυµα and βο"λησις is aimed “to guard against a possible misunderstanding as to the 
nature of βο"λησις and +piιθυµα which might arise from carelessness in analyzing the sense 
of popular phraseology.”239  By popular phraseology, Bury seems to mean that people 
                                                 
236Symp. 205d1. 
 
237Symp. 207a1- c1. 
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 Bury, 91. 
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often speak of wanting things they already have, such as health; thus Socrates specifies 
that what people really want in such cases is to continue to possess such goods as they 
already have.  In this sense, both +piιθυµα and βο"λησις indicate something about our 
relationship to beloved objects with respect to time and our being in time.   The beloved 
object of which we are +νδε/ς in these instances is one which we have already but which 
we recognize as good and so wish to continue to have through time.  The νδεια inherent 
in the structure of Eros, then, is revealed to be present even if Eros is spoken of or 
understood in terms of +piιθυµα or βο"λησις, and this further emphasizes the intentional 
and desiderative sense of Eros as always moving toward that of which it is +νδε/ς.  It is in 
terms of +piιθυµα and βο"λησις that the relation of Eros to lack (νδεια) is first 
established.240   
The usage of βο"λησις in this section of the Symposium suggests that it designates 
a rational desire.  Socrates first uses βο"λοµαι in his examination of Agathon when he 
begins to speak of different sorts of objects that are desired—here health, strength, and 
wealth.  These are not the desires associated with the +piιθυµητικν of the Republic,241 
though neither are they the desires proper to the philosophical part.  Nonetheless, a desire 
for continued health indicates an awareness of self and an awareness of self as persisting 
through time that would be for Plato singular to a rational being.  This indicates that the 
objects of βο"λησις, at least in this passage from the Symposium, are the objects that can 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
240Symp. 200a-c. 
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 W. Joseph Cummins, “Eros, Epithumia, and Philia in Plato,” Apeiron 15 (June 1981), 
13-14. 
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only be desired by a rational nature.242  This is significant not only because of its 
contribution to the conception of Eros as intermediate, but also because of its temporal 
relation to νδεια.  If we recall Kosman’s point that we are +νδε/ς with respect to our own 
nature, we find that this conception of lack is especially appropriate to our rational 
awareness of our being in time; for it is our rational desire to continue being healthy, 
wealthy, strong, or virtuous that follows from our awareness of our future possibilities. 
mpiιθυµα, in contrast to βο"λησις, is typically linked to desires associated with the 
body and with those desires humans share with beasts.  When Socrates draws attention to 
the fact that desire ceases as soon as the desired object is attained, he seems to be 
particularly concerned with these bodily desires.  If limited to this model, the explanation 
of Eros will be unable to account for the human ability to love an object even once it is 
acquired, making the common human regard for things such as health, family, and well-
being quite inexplicable.  Such a model of Eros has the further problem of presenting 
Eros as temporally insatiable and, in failing to identify different kinds of beloved objects 
according to their inherent goodness, leads to the conception of Eros as tyrannical.  For, 
as soon as an object is acquired, a new one will come into view, and such a picture of 
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 Throughout the dialogues, Plato makes use of several terms (in both verb and noun 
form) that indicate desire, love, and affection, including +piιθυµα, Eros, βο"λοµαι, στ5ργω, 
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the relations of these various Greek terms to one another in Plato’s work.  For a 
discussion of the meanings of +piιθυµα, Eros, βο"λοµαι, and φιλα see W. Joseph Cummins, 
“Eros, Epithumia, and Philia in Plato,” op. cit. and Drew Hyland, “bρως, mpiιθυµα, and 
Φιλα in Plato,” Phronesis 13 (1968): 32-46.  For a broader discussion of Plato on desire, 
see Charles Kahn, “Plato’s Theory of Desire,” Review of Metaphysics 41 no. 1 
(September 1987): 77-103.  Kahn gives an interesting account, but curiously states that 
nρεξις is never used in Plato (79), whereas Leonard Brandwood, A Word Index to Plato 
(Leeds: W. S. Maney and Sons, 1976), 641, indicates that nρεξις and its verbal forms 
appear in several of Plato’s writings. 
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desire and Eros will result in the sort of Eros proper to the Republic’s tyrannical soul.243  
It is clear that this cannot be the proper use of Eros for a human being, as it leads to the 
destruction of the individual human being rather than its flourishing.   
In setting forth the relationships among Eros, +piιθυµα, βο"λησις, and νδεια, Plato 
introduces the relationship between Eros and lack.244  This lack is used to articulate the 
structure of Eros, since its lack indicates the object or state for which the subject wishes, 
or has desire.  In this manner, the discussion of Eros and its relation to νδεια is a 
preparation for the discussion of Eros as intermediate, and this discussion of Eros as 
intermediate is a description of the metaphysical structure of Eros as well as the human 
psychological experience of Eros.   
 
The Structure of Eros 
 
 
 
The depiction of Eros as deficient and as having an object introduces the triadic 
structure of Eros, a structure that emphasizes the relational quality of Eros and its status 
as intermediate.  The elenchus of Agathon and the first major section of Diotima’s speech 
reveal the structure of Eros as intermediate and as an intermediary with the ability to lead 
the soul to its proper end.  The description of Eros as lack is not so much a description of 
subjective psychological motivation, as an articulation of the metaphysical structure of 
Eros, a structure that is revealed in the unfolding of the discussion between Socrates and 
Diotima.   
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 Respublica 9. 572d10-574a2. 
 
244
 Bury notes “observe that the entire argument here is based on the identification of 
Eros with +piιθυµα (see 205d)”(Bury, 91), and also that “the notion of Eros, it is shown, is 
equivalent to that of Desire (ρως = τ- +piιθυµο4ν)—a quality, not a person” (xxxvi-xxxvii). 
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An Enquiry into the Senses of Intermediacy Applicable to Eros 
 
 
 
 The discussion of Eros as intermediate occurs in three distinct moments of the 
dialogue:  (1) the elenchus of Agathon, (2) Diotima’s initial questioning of Socrates and 
discussion of Eros as daimon, and (3) Diotima’s explanation of Eros’s intermediate 
nature within the context of the myth of his origins.  Diotima’s first explicit assertion that 
Eros is intermediate occurs in the second of these passages in which Eros is called µεταξ", 
and further described as the intermediate daimon that fills in the middle (µ5σος) between 
gods and mortals.245  The elenchus of Agathon, however, sets the stage for this discussion 
by directing attention to the relational nature of Eros, and is an important step in the 
development of the understanding of Eros as intermediate.  In what follows I will 
consider what each of these three passages contributes to the understanding of the 
intermediate nature of Eros.  Once this investigation into the different senses of 
intermediacy is complete, I will proceed to establish what can be concluded from these 
senses, their order in the dialogue, and other textual evidence.  
 The discussion of Eros as intermediate begins with Socrates’ questioning of 
Agathon, and is recapitulated and further developed when he recounts his own 
conversation with Diotima.  Socrates’ exchange with Agathon first establishes that love is 
always “of something”.246  Having established this much, Socrates then shows that Eros 
“desire[s] that of which it is the love”,247  proceeding to the stronger claim at 200b1 that 
                                                 
 
246
 Symp. 200a1. 
 
247
 Symp. 200a2. 
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“it’s necessary that this be so: a thing that desires desires something of which it is in need 
(νδεια); otherwise, if it were not in need, it would not desire it.”  The object of Eros’s 
desire is beauty.248  All of this leads to the conclusion that Eros cannot be as Agathon 
described him—beautiful and good—because he desires only what he lacks, and these 
things are the beautiful and the good.249   
R. E. Allen’s comment on this passage argues that it serves to establish the 
fundamentally relational character of Eros, even though the passage does not adequately 
distinguish between Eros understood as a relation and the lover himself: 
 
The logic of this argument is obscured by the personification of Eros, and 
an ambiguity in the word ‘beauty’.  Love is a relation.  As such, it lacks 
nothing and desires nothing.  It implies, however, privation or lack in the 
lover.  But when one distinguishes love and the lover, this argument to 
show that Eros is neither good nor beautiful nor divine is inconclusive.  
The lover, who lacks and is by so much imperfect, cannot be divine.  But 
it does not follow from this that love itself is not divine or good.  Plato 
later recognized this.  In the Phaedrus, when Socrates comes to describe 
the upward passage of Eros to the huperouranios topos, he describes it as 
“a god, or something divine” (242e), since it seeks the divine; and later, 
when he criticizes the Eros described in his first speech, a love which 
seeks unworthy objects and leads to evil rather than good, he calls it 
“sinister” or “left-handed,” a love of ill omen, (skaios Eros, 266a).250 
 
Allen’s analysis is revealing in its distinction between personified Eros and Eros 
considered as a relation, but his claim that the personification of Eros is primarily an 
obfuscation is not convincing.  There is good reason to look more closely at the 
personification of Eros, for the way in which he is later personified by Diotima is 
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foreshadowed by the analysis in the elenchus that establishes his relational quality.  This 
indicates that the relational quality of Eros does not describe merely the subjective and 
psychological experience of Eros, but also a metaphysical reality, and this metaphysical 
reality is epitomized in the personification of Eros.251  The relational quality of Eros is 
vividly present in his personification as daimon and through this personification is 
understood as µεταξ"; it is as µεταξ" that Eros is the way to be joined or bound to the 
divine.  Even though Eros is described in terms of lack in the elenchus, his essence lies in 
his mediation between gods and men, without which communication between the two 
would not be possible, and without which the vision of Beauty would be impossible.  The 
relational and intermediate quality of Eros that is here established prefigures the structure 
of Eros, a structure that is triadic.  
Every instance of Eros involves the lover, the beloved, and the love relationship 
that binds them together in some way.  Anne Carson discusses this triadic structure of 
Eros as it occurs in a poem of Sappho: 
But the ruse of the triangle [in Sappho’s poem] is not a trivial mental 
maneuver.  We see in it the radical constitution of desire.  For, where Eros 
is lack, its activation calls for three structural components—lover, beloved 
and that which comes between them.  They are three points of 
transformation on a circuit of possible relationship, electrified by desire so 
that they touch not touching.  Conjoined they are held apart.  The third 
component plays a paradoxical role for it both connects and separates, 
                                                 
251
 Dover’s remarks regarding the personification of Eros, as well as Προς and Πενα, 
supports such a reading.  The personification of external forces as gods or daimons is a 
means to articulate the working of these forces in and on human beings; personification is 
a device for understanding how these forces work.  “There is no reason to suppose that 
Plato found this story [of the origins of Eros] in any earlier writer; the construction of 
relationships between forces personified as deities is a common Greek way of 
characterizing those forces (cf. 197d7 n.), and the chief purpose of the story here is to put 
eros before us as a force which impels us to seek to acquire” (Dover, Symposium, 141). 
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marking that two are not one, irradiating the absence whose presence is 
demanded by Eros.252  
 
Carson’s analysis of the structure of Eros in the above passage is remarkably similar to 
the structure of Eros that emerges from the elenchus and continues to be developed in the 
exchange between Socrates and Diotima.  In both analyses, the lover and beloved are not 
sufficient to account for the phenomenon of love; there must be a third element, an 
intermediary that exists between the lover and beloved, preserving their distinctions while 
uniting them to one another.253 
The second phase of the discussion of Eros as intermediate occurs when Socrates 
recounts his own conversation with the priestess Diotima about the nature of love.  As 
Agathon, Socrates had conceived of Eros as “a great god” who “belongs to beautiful 
things.”254  Like Agathon, Socrates was forced to admit that his own speech showed that 
“Love is neither beautiful nor good.”255   Socrates then asks whether this means that Love 
must be ugly and bad, thinking that this must be the only alternative.  But Diotima is 
quick to show him that Love is not ugly or bad; rather he is in between the two just as 
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Dalkey Archive Press edition, 1998), 16. 
 
253
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instance, Fr. 10, “Things taken together are whole and not whole, something which is 
being brought together and brought apart, which is in tune and out of tune; out of all 
things there comes a unity, and out of a unity all things” (Aristotle de mundo 5. 396b20 
as quoted in G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, eds., The Presocratic Philosophers, 
2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 190. 
 
254
 Symp. 201e5. 
 
255
 Symp. 201e5. 
 
 124 
‘correct judgment’ is between wisdom and ignorance.256  Eros is identified as µεταξ" five 
times in this passage.257 
The conclusion that Love is neither good nor beautiful leads to the conclusion that 
Love cannot be a god, since all gods are beautiful and happy.258 To be happy is to 
“possess good and beautiful things.”259  Love “needs good and beautiful things, and that’s 
why he desires them—because he needs them”260, so cannot be a god.  Repeating his 
earlier mistake, Socrates concludes from this that Love must be a mortal, but is quickly 
redirected by Diotima, who states that Love is in between (µεταξ") the mortal and the 
immortal, a great spirit or daimon.  It is important to note at this point that Eros’s 
intermediate status does not necessarily indicate that he is situated between opposites that 
mutually exclude one another; this is evident by Diotima’s reproval of Socrates when he 
assumes that if Eros is not ‘x’ then Eros must be the opposite of ‘x’.  Eros’s lack of 
beauty does not render him ugly, but situates him at a point between these two extremes, 
as if on a continuum whose endpoints are the ugly and the beautiful.  The further 
implications of this description will be discussed below. 
The role of Eros is epitomized in Diotima’s description of the power (δ"ναµις) of 
daimons, for the nature of a daimon here described is to be not simply in between or 
intermediate, but intermediary: 
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They [daimons] are messengers who shuttle back and forth between the 
two, conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men they 
bring commands from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices.  Being in 
the middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to 
all.261  
 
This description of the work of daimons reveals several things about the nature of 
Eros.  Their actions are described by the verbs Zρµηνε"ω and διαpiορθµε"ω; on the one hand 
they are interpreters or messengers, and on the other their action is likened to the 
ferrymen who provide transport across rivers.  The verb Zρµηνε"ω alludes to the god 
Hermes, who carries messages for the gods.  The verb διαpiορθµε"ω is used primarily to 
designate the crossing of a river, and may allude more specifically to “the office of the 
piορθµε"ς, Charon, being ‘animas e terra ad sedes deorum transvehere’.”262  The distinct 
meaning of the two verbs indicates that the work of Eros is not limited to carrying 
messages from men to gods, but extends to leading souls to the gods.263  The daimons are 
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 Remarking on the intermediate and daimonic status of Eros, Santas writes “Plato does 
not make his attitude explicit towards the main themes in Eryximachus’ speech.  We may 
note that in Socrates’ view (presumably Plato’s own), specific Eros is essentially 
connected with begetting or creativity, and that it extends beyond sexuality.  But in 
Plato’s theory the lover is always a human being, and Eros mediates not between 
opposites (such as the beautiful and the ugly or the good and the bad), but rather between 
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and Freud, 18).  But it is clear that Plato does not have romantic love as his paradigm 
here, especially prior to making any distinction between generic and specific Eros (if 
indeed this exists in the manner claimed by Santas).  The elucidation of the intermediate 
role of Eros draws upon a Greek tradition of mantic possession by divine forces which 
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further presented as filling up (συµpiληρω) the space between gods and men, and thus 
binding (συνδ5ω) the extremes together.  This is cosmologically necessary, since gods and 
men cannot mix with each other.264  On both the individual level and the cosmic level, 
then, daimons serve as intermediates that join together the mortal (θνητς) and the 
immortal (θνατος).265 
                                                                                                                                                 
lead the souls of men to act in certain ways, and upon mystery religions as evidenced in 
several places by Plato’s language; it seems the intermediaries most natural to such a 
context are those that can go between men and gods.  It makes no sense to talk of 
intermediates between intermediates since intermediates typically arise only in contexts 
of discussions of contraries or opposites that are perceived to be unable to both be in the 
same way at the same time. 
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 It is perhaps natural to wonder at this point whether Eros’s intermediate existence is 
between sets of opposites that absolutely exclude each other.  It is, of course, difficult to 
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λλ; τι µεταξ", φη, το"τοιν” (Symp. 202b1-5)).  In fact, the tendency toward assigning 
one opposite to a thing because it is said not to be the other opposite is precisely what 
Diotima criticizes at 202b1-5.  Further insight into Plato’s use of intermediates and their 
relation to opposites may be found in the following remarks by R. E. Allen. “Plato uses 
the term intermediate in at least two distinguishable senses.  Sometimes intermediates are 
described as having a share of opposite qualities...in another sense, intermediates instead 
of possessing both opposites possess neither” (Allen, Symposium, 49).  “If intermediates 
are things that may have opposite qualities, it is unhelpful to explicate intermediates in 
terms of the Square of Opposition and the distinction between contraries and 
contradictories; the Square, after all, has to do with statement relations, not the things 
statements are about.  If Eros is not beautiful, it does not follow, according to Diotima’s 
account, that Eros is ugly; so beauty and ugliness are not contradictories, since if both 
cannot be true, it does not follow that one must be true (201e-202a).  Are beauty and 
ugliness then contraries, in that both cannot be true but neither may be true?  But 
contrariety does not obtain if the same things may be both beautiful and ugly.  Perhaps 
then intermediates are subcontraries, in that both may be true.  But subcontrariety does 
not obtain if the same thing may be neither beautiful nor ugly, that is, if it is not the case 
that at least one is true.  Again, where subcontrariety obtains, I propositions are 
convertible, but O propositions distribute their predicates and are not convertible.  This 
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Diotima’s further explanation of the relationship among these three kinds of being 
elucidates the role of the daimonic in human knowledge about the divine and human 
practices with regard to the divine. 
It is through this that the whole expertise of the seer works its effects, and 
that of priests, and of those concerned with sacrifices, rites, spells, and the 
whole realm of the seer and of magic.  God does not mix with man; 
through this it is that there takes place all intercourse and conversation of 
gods with men, whether awake or asleep; and the person who is wise 
about such things is a spirit-like man, while the one who is wise in 
anything else, in relation to one or other sort of expertise or manual craft, 
is vulgar.  These spirits, then, are many and of all sorts, and one of them is 
Love himself.266 
 
If we are to take Diotima’s claims seriously, we must recognize in this passage that the 
work of priests and seers, and all human practices designed to garner divine favor, are 
dependent upon daimons for their efficacy.  Without the mediation of daimons, all such 
practices would be in vain.  This is a consequence of the radically different natures of 
gods and men; because they are opposites, they can only touch through an intermediary.  
Taken with Diotima’s further assertion that there are many different kinds of daimons, we 
can understand the δαιµνιος ν/ρ to be like the particular daimon he knows or follows.  
The myths of the Republic, Phaedo, and Phaedrus depict the souls of men following 
daimons.267  In both the Republic and the Phaedo, the individual soul chooses a daimon 
to follow, and in the Phaedrus, the soul possessed by Eros follows in the train of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
shows that it is a root of confusion to identify opposites with predicates; opposites are not 
true or false of some subject” (Allen, Symposium, 49, n. 81). 
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particular god, and becomes like the god he has followed.268  In becoming like the 
daimon it follows, the soul moves closer to divinity.  Diotima’s assertion that one who is 
wise about daimons is a δαιµνιος ν/ρ affirms this, for a human who has become like a 
daimon is closer to and more like the gods; one becomes like the objects one knows.  As 
Eros is himself a daimon, the soul that follows Eros will become like the daimon himself, 
who is described in the subsequent text of the dialogue. 
 The third phase of development of Eros as intermediate begins with Socrates 
enquiring into the parentage of Eros.269  This prompts Diotima’s mythical account of 
Eros’s origin, which she uses to explain the intermediate nature of Eros, who unites the 
disparate characteristics of his parents while preserving their distinct identities.  It is 
noteworthy that the discussion of the intermediary role of Eros is prior to Diotima’s 
mythical account of the parentage of Eros, for this account further explains the nature of 
Eros as intermediary.  In this sense, this examination of the intermediate nature of Eros is 
preparatory, for it helps the reader to properly understand the myth of Eros’s origin.  
Diotima explains that Eros was conceived on the day that Aphrodite was born, during the 
celebration held by the gods to celebrate her birth.270   
 
When they had feasted, Penia came begging, as poverty does when there’s 
a party, and stayed by the gates.  Now Poros got drunk on nectar (there 
was no wine yet, you see) and, feeling drowsy, went into the garden of 
Zeus, where he fell asleep.  Then Penia schemed up a plan to relieve her 
lack of resources: she would get a child from Poros.  So she lay beside him 
and got pregnant with Love.  That is why Love was born to follow 
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Aphrodite and serve her: because he was conceived on the day of her 
birth.  And that’s why he is also by nature a lover of beauty, because 
Aphrodite herself is especially beautiful.271  
 
The parents of Eros, while perhaps not precisely opposites,272 follow the pattern of 
elements that exclude one another that have been set forth in the preceding passages as 
the poles between which Eros exists.  Eros is here presented as the consequence of the 
union of Πενα, or Poverty, and Προς, or Resource.  Eros is presented as in between these 
two extremes—one that is without resource (piορος) and one that is resource itself 
(though, notably, not wealth itself).  As the child of these two, Eros is not simply a 
midpoint between two extremes, but shares in the qualities of both his parents; for, as 
Diotima tells Socrates, Eros’s “lot in life is set to be like” that of his parents.273  Insofar as 
Eros resembles his mother, Πενα, he is “always poor (pi5νης)” and “always living with 
Need (νδεια)”; he is “far from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary people think he 
is); instead he is tough and shriveled and shoeless and homeless, always lying on the dirt 
without a bed, sleeping at people’s doorsteps and in roadsides under the sky.”274  But all 
of these deficiencies are joined with the more positive characteristics of Eros’s father, 
Προς, who bequeaths to his offspring the character of “a schemer after the beautiful and 
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the good; he is brave, impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter, always weaving 
snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all his life, a 
genius with enchantments, potions, and clever pleadings.”275  
Diotima continues to apply these characteristics in order to explain Eros’s 
intermediate status with respect to the same sets of extremes she cited in her initial 
exchange with Socrates:  immortal and mortal, wisdom (σοφα) and ignorance (µαθα), 
beautiful and ugly, good and bad.  The intermediate status of Eros with respect to the 
beautiful and the good turns on his status as intermediate between wisdom and 
ignorance—as philosopher—for it is as the supreme instance of beauty and goodness that 
wisdom is desired.  Diotima explains to Socrates that Eros is neither wise nor ignorant, 
but again as a consequence of his ancestry—a mother “not wise and without resource”, a 
father “wise and resourceful”—between these extremes.   But this intermediacy is given 
more explanation, for it is clear that the ignorant person cannot even desire wisdom, 
having no knowledge that he lacks it; similarly, it is clear that those who are wise—the 
gods—do not desire what they already have.  To be a lover of wisdom, then, is to be one 
that has some idea of one’s own deficiency, else there would be no movement toward the 
filling of that deficiency.  But this deficiency need not be understood as a void that needs 
filling by some external object; it might be understood as the deficiency of a being that 
has not yet fully actualized its potential, as the acorn has not yet grown into the oak tree.  
But the Eros-daimon does not seem quite to fit the example of the acorn, for the things he 
seeks—wisdom and beauty—are indeed outside of him; nonetheless, he cannot be said to 
acquire wisdom or beauty in manner that makes these common objects his own 
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possession in a way that excludes another person’s having it.  The “objects” the Eros-
daimon pursues are immaterial, so his possession of these objects will be fundamentally 
different from the kind of possession that would belong to a lover of material goods, 
whose consumption of these goods renders them necessarily his own to the exclusion of 
others.  If the Eros-daimon comes to have some share of wisdom or beauty or goodness, 
these beloved objects must come to be in him in spite of maintaining existence elsewhere.  
Thus, if the void of Eros becomes filled, it is filled in an immaterial manner, much like 
the filling up of the soul that is described in the Republic.276 
 
On the Diverse Ways of Being Intermediate 
 
 
 
In each of the passages I have discussed, Eros is described in his role as 
intermediate.  The question of just what sort of intermediate Eros is intended to be, 
however, remains.  From what we have seen thus far, Eros might be understood to be 
intermediate in any of the following senses:  (1) as simply existing in between two 
extremes, but partaking of neither,277as the daimon seems to exist between the good and 
bad, the beautiful and the ugly;278 (2) as existing between two extremes while sharing in 
the natures of both, and as such, of a mixed or blended nature, as the daimon-Eros exists 
as both piρος and piενα;279 (3) as binding together two apparently disparate or unmixable 
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elements, e.g. opposites, and thus as mediator, as the daimon exists between men and 
gods,280 facilitating communication between them.281  In what follows, I will briefly 
discuss the possible meanings of intermediacy and then proceed to examine how these 
senses of intermediacy apply to the interpretation of Eros in Diotima’s discourse. 
The discussion of intermediates, opposites, extremes, and mixture will likely 
remind the reader of the Phaedo’s discussion of opposites—the Hot and the Cold, Life 
and Death—that cannot mix but must give way to one another.  Though this is one 
important conception of opposites and their relation to one another put forward in the 
Phaedo, it is not the only such account provided there.  Furthermore, the discussion of 
intermediates and the extremes between which they lie in the Symposium is importantly 
different from the discussion of the Phaedo.  First, as Plato discusses what sort of thing 
Eros is, and describes him as intermediate and daimon, he does so without recourse to the 
language of Forms or to opposites that do not yield to one another.  Rather, Diotima 
pointedly remarks that Eros does not have to be the opposite of what he is not.  Second, 
Plato himself talks about intermediates in a variety of ways, both in the Phaedo and in the 
Symposium, so there is no prima facie reason to employ the Phaedo’s last account of 
opposites to the interpretation of the Symposium’s account of intermediates.282 Third, 
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Diotima’s development of Eros’s intermediacy indicates that the different senses of 
intermediacy she includes do not exclude one another, but all contribute to the account of 
the nature of Eros. 
The meaning and implications of Eros’s intermediacy in the Symposium are also 
difficult to determine because of the diverse conceptions of intermediates in the thought 
of Plato’s predecessors, contemporaries, and successors.  As Souilhé notes in his study of 
intermediates, the concept of intermediate is closely related to and sometimes used 
interchangeably with the concepts of mean or middle, and measure (µ5σος and µ5τριος).283  
The term ‘µ5σος’ designates not only the middle or being in the middle, but also the state 
of being in the middle, i.e. moderation.284  It is found in discussions of mathematics and 
music, as well as discussions of proper proportion in virtue.285  Its related verbal forms 
include µεσω, “to form the middle, be in or at the middle” and µεσ"ω, “to keep the 
middle or mean between two” or “to stand midway, to be neutral”.286  Similarly, the term 
‘µ5τριος’ designates proper proportion, the mean or middle state and so also moderation; 
and the related ‘µ5τρον’ designates both the standard of measure and proper proportion.287  
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The term ‘µεταξ"’ designates more specifically that which lies between, though it also 
designates the middle.288  As we have seen above, there are several corresponding senses 
of intermediacy present in the Symposium, and both µ5σος and µεταξ" appear in Diotima’s 
discourse.   
It might seem that Eros, especially in the first two passages considered above, is 
most properly understood as existing between a set of opposites, in neither of which he 
shares; but in fact there are several senses of intermediacy utilized in the gradual 
development of the nature of Eros as an intermediate.  In the first passage considered 
above, he is presented as in between good and bad, beautiful and ugly, on account of his 
deficiency.  He is said to have “no portion (µοιρας) of good and beautiful things.”289 Eros 
shares in neither of the extremes between which he is situated, and his place is best 
described as a midpoint between extremes.  In the second passage, his relationship to the 
mortal (θνητς) and immortal (θνατος ) is described as similar to the good and bad, 
beautiful and ugly; “It’s as in the previous cases...he’s in between the mortal and the 
immortal.”290  But this latter point moves the dialogue forward to speak of the power of 
Eros insofar as he is a daimon, and here his intermediacy takes on a new dimension.  He 
is no longer merely a midpoint between extremes; as daimon he provides the middle 
necessary for gods and men to communicate.  It is notable that here Eros is no longer 
presented as in between the mortal (θνητς) and immortal (θνατος), but as in between 
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gods (θει) and men (νθρωpiοι); thus, the new sense of intermediacy is not in conflict with 
that which preceded it, since the extremes to which Eros bears this relation are different. 
This second sense of Eros’s intermediacy resembles the intermediacy of the µ5ση 
or middle tone of the lyre; the µ5ση lies at an equal distance from either of its extremes as 
Burnet explains in his summary of the Pythagorean analysis of the ratios of the notes of 
the lyre.  This term (µ5ση), writes Burnet  
exceeds and is exceeded by the same number, namely 3.  It is what is 
called the arithmetical mean (ριθµητικ> µεστης).  On the other hand, the 
term 8, which represents the note of the paramesē, exceeds and is 
exceeded by the same fraction of the extremes; for 8=12 -12/3=6 + 6/3.  
This was called the subcontrary (0piεναντα), or later for obvious reasons, 
the harmonic mean (sρµονικ> µεστης)…Now this discovery of the Mean at 
once suggests a new solution of the old Milesian problem of opposites.  
We know that Anaximander regarded the encroachment of one opposite 
on the other as an “injustice,” and he must therefore have held there was a 
point which was fair to both.  That, however, he had no means of 
determining.  The discovery of the Mean suggests that it is to be found in a 
“blend” (κρXσις) of the opposites, which might be numerically determined, 
just as that of the high and low notes of the octave had been.291  
 
As Burnet’s exposition shows, the concept of the mean has significance not just in its 
indication of proportion, but also because it provides an approach to understanding the 
relationships of different kinds of opposites.  It is notable that Aristotle identifies several 
kinds of opposites at Metaphysics V, and this distinction among kinds of opposites is 
related to the different senses of mean, middle, and intermediacy:  
The term ‘opposite’ is applied to contradictories, and to contraries, and to 
relative terms, and to privation and possession, and to the extremes from 
which and into which generation and dissolution take place; and the 
attributes that cannot be present at the same time in that which is receptive 
of both, are said to be opposed—either themselves or their constituents.  
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Grey and white colour do not belong at the same time to the same thing; 
hence their constituents are opposed. 292 
 
The opposites at issue in the passage from Burnet above are the low and high; finding the 
middle between these results in sρµονα.  The discussion of the parts of the soul in 
Republic IV makes use of this language, explicitly identifying θ"µος as µ5σος situated 
between the extremes of the low and the high.293  The sense of the middle in the Republic 
is quite similar to that articulated at Symposium 202e1-203a7, where Eros is first 
described as daimon and the daimonic is said not only to exist as intermediate between 
gods and men, but to fill in the middle (µ5σος).  In both cases, the middle exists not just to 
separate the extremes, but to allow communication between them.   
Burnet’s discussion of intermediates draws attention to several significant points.  
First, his discussion of the foundations of the concept of the intermediate in Greek 
mathematics highlights its relationship to opposites, extremes, and proportional 
relationships among these.  Thus, any discussion of an intermediate as such will involve 
extremes, often opposites between which it is situated, and a discussion of whether and 
under what circumstances the extremes are mixable.  This is, indeed, the manner in which 
Diotima’s discourse proceeds, by first identifying the intermediate, then the opposites or 
extremes between which it lies, and finally by examining the relationships among these. 
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The intermediate, on Burnet’s account, arises in response to the difficulties 
presented by opposites, especially those that are, or appear to be, mutually exclusive.  In 
response to these difficulties, at least two distinct conceptions of combination arise.  The 
first is that of blending (κρXσις), and appears in the Symposium in the speech of 
Erixymachus.  In his account of Eros, opposite qualities present within the patient are 
adjusted to bring about a balance or sρµονα.  This adjustment of opposites results in a 
proportionality that achieves the well-being of the patient.  Opposites in this example are 
not the sort that are mutually exclusive, i.e., they are not as the Forms of Life and Death 
in the Phaedo that do not admit the existence of the other.  The situation in the material 
particulars is importantly different, since individual hot and cold elements may blend in 
order to achieve a point intermediate between these opposites that is the proper amount of 
each, e.g. warmth is a proportion of hot and cold.  Erixymachus does not even speak of 
mixing opposites, but rather of the blending (κρXσις) of them that achieves sρµονα.  While 
he does not, in his speech, draw a clear distinction between mixture and blending, his 
description of the opposites at work in the body of a patient indicate that the opposites do 
not maintain distinct identities while existing in close proximity to one another.  Rather, 
the blending of the natures of hot and cold produce warmth, what is intermediate between 
these two extremes.294   
Erixymachus’s description of good Eros as balance and proportion is perhaps as 
much Pythagorean in its inspiration as it is Empedoclean or Heraclitean, and suggests a 
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distinction between the conceptions of κρXσις or blending and that of mixture (µ2γµα or 
µ2ξις, both derived from µγνυµι).  Where the goal of combining opposites is to achieve a 
sρµονα, the opposites must join together and blend in order to form the middle.295  
Blending is, perhaps, a special instance of mixture.  At this point, we can distinguish 
κρXσις from mixture by noting that κρXσις creates something new by achieving sρµονα.  
The blending of hot and cold, for example, produce an intermediate like warmth.  The 
blending of high and low, strictly speaking a proportion of high to low, yields a new note, 
a middle term.  Significantly, however, this new term is achieved by the blending of the 
high and the low, and has its being in the proportion itself.  Such a middle is health for 
the body, whose being also depends on the proper proportion itself.  The distinction 
between κρXσις and µ2γµα is significant, for in the first, a new entity is created and 
maintained by the blending of opposites.  In the second passage discussed above, 
however, Eros is identified as a daimon that joins men to the gods precisely because men 
and gods cannot mix.  The relationship between gods and men is presented as that of 
opposites or extremes that exist in close proximity to one another, held apart by an 
intermediate, but not yielding their individual identities.296  This suggests that the 
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intermediate status of Eros is what allows men to mix with gods in a manner that is akin 
to participation.  The daimonic, being able to communicate with both gods and men, is 
able to join them together.  Mixture, then, has a distinct sense, and is one possible way of 
describing how µ5θεξις occurs.297 
 From this analysis of the mean, the significance of intermediates as mathematical 
objects becomes more evident; intermediates are not merely matters for mathematicians 
and musicians, for their ability to express relationships between various kinds of 
opposites is not limited to the mathematical realm.  This point is made clear in Souilhé’s 
La Notion Platonicienne d’Intermédiaire, which distinguishes among the psychological, 
moral, political, and cosmogonical senses of intermediates in Plato’s dialogues and in 
Plato’s predecessors. 
Thus far, we have seen that the initial exposition of Eros as in need of the 
beautiful and the good emphasizes his relational character and introduces the triadic 
structure of Eros.  Eros’s intermediacy is not here presented as a mixture or unification of 
the opposites between which he lies, but rather as a point between them.  This, of course, 
does not mean that Eros bears no relation to these extremes.  While Eros is not a mixture 
of these extremes, his place between them emphasizes that his relation to the extremes is 
essential to his nature.  The very fact that Eros is neither good nor bad makes it necessary 
for Diotima to clarify, later in her speech, the proper use of Eros.  The establishment of 
the intermediate nature of Eros, however, is what positions her to embark upon such a 
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discussion.  In identifying Eros as an intermediate, she points to a problem with Eros 
generally: it may lead to either good or bad.  This indicates, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, that the human use of Eros is of primary importance.  Nonetheless, though 
Diotima acknowledges that Eros in itself is neither good nor bad, she maintains that it is 
always of or directed toward the good and the beautiful.  It is this very fact, after all, that 
has revealed Eros’s intermediate nature.  This must mean, then, that when a person has 
Eros for the bad or the ugly, Eros is badly directed. 
In the second passage considered above, Eros is again presented as in between the 
extremes of good and bad, beautiful and ugly, but further positioned in between the poles 
immortal and mortal, wisdom and ignorance; his position with respect to divinity and 
knowledge is added to the discourse.  Eros’s relationship to these new extremes is 
slightly different from those identified in the first passage, for to be a daimon, between 
immortal and mortal, is to have a share of what belongs to each in a way that is similar to 
what the person with true opinion has.  The person with true opinion is said to have 
something of the real, but without being able to give an account of it.  Eros’s position 
with respect to mortality and wisdom is similar.  His daimonic nature is not the same as 
the immortal nature of the gods; yet he is not subject to death as are mortal beings.  He 
has a kind of immortality, since he does not die, but it is not the immortality of the gods, 
who do not merely exist forever, but who also are not subject to change and motion.  This 
peculiar kind of intermediacy is more fully developed in the passage immediately 
following Diotima’s account of Eros’s origins, and is discussed below.   
The most significant sense of intermediate in this second passage is the 
identification of Eros as daimon.  It is in this passage that Eros is first called daimon and 
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that the man who truly understands the daimonic is called a δαιµνιος ν/ρ; here that Eros 
is portrayed as moving between gods and men, even as ferrying prayers and gifts of men 
across the chasm that divides mortal from immortal, and so as binding the all to itself; 
here that Eros is clearly a mediating intermediary.  This sense of intermediacy 
corresponds to the µ5ση.  Just as the µ5ση must lie between the high and the low, so also 
must Eros lie between the gods and men.  The sense of intermediacy here is of the 
intermediate that joins together elements that otherwise could not touch.  The opposites 
here are mutually exclusive, and the chasm that separates them is filled by intermediates.  
But by separating the beautiful from the ugly, the intermediate also holds them together.  
The movement of an individual soul from ignorance to wisdom, from ugliness to beauty, 
and from mortal existence to immortal existence depends upon the intermediate.  This 
passage presents an account that makes it necessary that the intermediate actually exist if 
we are to take seriously the metaphysical structure of Eros that Diotima has been 
propounding.  One means of making sense of the reality of intermediates and their 
metaphysical role in the Symposium, is to consider the evidence found in accounts of 
Plato’s mathematical objects. 
Both Burnet and Ross present an account of intermediates that is based on Plato’s 
recognition of mathematical objects and thus recognizes the metaphysical importance of 
intermediates as a link between the sensible and intelligible realms.  From the passages 
examined in section two of this chapter, it is evident that the Eros-daimon is presented as 
intermediate at least in part to establish a metaphysical continuity between gods and men.  
But as much as the existence of intermediates is important to establish this continuity, so 
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also is it necessary to adequately describe the phenomena of human experience.  Ross 
captures this necessity in his comment on the Phaedo in the following passage: 
It would be a mistake to describe Plato as having, either at this or at any 
stage of his development, made a complete bifurcation of the universe into 
Ideas and sensible things.  For one thing, we have the casual reference to 
‘equals themselves’—an allusion to mathematical entities which are 
neither Ideas nor sensible things, an allusion which paves the way for the 
doctrine of the ‘intermediates’.  Plato very likely at this stage did not 
himself appreciate the significance of his own allusion.  But he very 
certainly recognizes the existence of another type of entity which is 
neither an Idea nor a sensible thing; for there is a whole section in which 
he describes soul as akin to the Ideas and not to sensible things in respect 
of unchangeability, and yet nowhere suggests—and indeed how should 
he?—that souls are themselves Ideas.298 
 
As Ross notes, it is not only the existence of mathematical objects, but the existence of 
other things that appear to defy classification as sensible or ideal that calls for a new 
category.  Daimons, being immaterial but many in number, belong neither to the sensible 
nor to the ideal realm;299 their converse with both gods and humans places them between 
these classes of beings.  The discussion of the parts of the soul in Republic IV centers 
around the same problem, namely that the description of the observable powers of the 
soul yields the identification of a power that is neither purely rational nor purely 
irrational.300  This third power lies between the extremes that are opposed to one another, 
and is ultimately seen to mediate between them. The human soul itself provides another 
instance of this phenomenon, for it seems to exist in a sensible medium while persisting 
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through change in a manner that suggests it is more like the eternal and unchangeable 
Forms.  The ability of the soul to interact with both the material and immaterial realms 
suggests that it is itself intermediate between these extremes and that this intermediacy 
allows for its mixing with each.  Again, the observable phenomena provide evidence for 
an underlying metaphysical reality. 
Aristotle’s concise summary of Plato’s view of mathematical objects as 
intermediate between the sensible and intelligible provides a framework for 
understanding the metaphysical importance of Eros’s intermediacy:301 
Further, besides sensible things and Forms he says there are the objects of 
mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position, differing from 
sensible things in being eternal and unchangeable, from Forms in that 
there are many alike, while the Form itself is in each case unique.302 
 
As Aristotle notes, mathematical objects are distinct from Forms because there are many 
of them rather than one, i.e. there are many different circles studied by the 
mathematicians, though none of these are circularity itself.  If we apply this framework to 
gods, humans, and daimons in the manner suggested by Diotima, daimons exist in a 
manner similar to the mathematician’s circles.  According to the myths found in the 
Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic, there are at least as many daimons as there are souls, 
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for each soul has its own daimon to follow.303  Because there are many diverse instances 
of daimons, they are not τ δαιµνιον itself; on the other hand, daimons, as immaterial 
beings, do not belong to the sensible realm either.  Just as the mathematician’s circles are 
not enmattered, so also are daimons free of matter; just as the mathematician’s circles are 
different from one another in having radii of varying lengths, so also are daimons 
different from one another in having different orientations toward different gods (e.g. 
Aphrodite or Zeus).  Just as the existence of the mathematician’s circles does not 
preclude, but rather necessitates the existence of circularity itself, so also the existence of 
the Eros-daimon does not preclude the existence of a Form of Eros.  If Eros itself exists 
as a Form and the Eros-daimons that are actual in the many different instances of love 
exist as intermediates, then there is one primary instance of Eros, and it may be 
understood as a real relation.  There is no reason to assume that Eros cannot exist as a 
Form because it is a relation, since relations such as equality, sameness and difference are 
also identified as Forms.304  The proper object of Eros as Form is the loveable, that which 
is good and beautiful; so much is stated in Diotima’s discourse.  This, then, articulates the 
ideal Eros, and the many manifestations of Eros that exist in the daimonic realm or the 
sensible realm approximate this ideal Form to a greater or lesser degree.  This allows also 
for the existence of many distinct instances of Eros as an intermediate (metaphysically) 
and accounts for instances of misdirected Eros and the variety of loveable objects among 
human beings.  This metaphysical understanding of intermediates, then, helps to elucidate 
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the underlying metaphysical structure of Eros that provides the foundation for 
understanding its use, work, causality, and moral status. 
In the third passage, Diotima draws together these different elements of the nature 
of Eros, presenting them unified in the myth of Eros’s origins.  It may be true with 
respect to good and bad, beauty and ugliness, considered absolutely, that Eros cannot be a 
mixture of these opposites; but it is certainly not the case that Eros is in between the 
natures of his parents in this sense, for Diotima describes Eros as sharing in the qualities 
of his parents and inheriting the characteristics of both.  In some curious fashion, Eros is 
able to be poor, but never without resource.   
A further sense of intermediacy is suggested by Eros’s position between wisdom 
and ignorance, and as moving toward wisdom.  In this sense, the extremes are conceived 
of as the absolute endpoints of a spectrum; what is intermediate lies at a point on the 
spectrum in between.  Conceived thus, the intermediate may lie at a number of points on 
the spectrum, closer to or further from either of the absolutes that lie at the extremes.305  
This allows Eros to be understood as a moveable intermediary, by which the lover (or 
philosopher) makes progress toward or falls away from the positive end of the spectrum, 
or absolute beauty, as he will be described in the ascent passage later on.  This sense of 
the intermediate is expressive of the stages through which something changes on its way 
to full development; it is the way to completion.  This is consonant with Diotima’s 
description of the Eros-daimon as one who knows or finds a way to something, as Προς. 
In another sense, the intermediate status of Eros is evidenced in his life of poverty 
(Πενα).  Insofar as he is poor (pi5νης), he lives the labourer’s life, having just enough, but 
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neither excess nor deficiency.  His very existence is intermediate between privation and 
excess; he is never absolutely full, nor absolutely empty.  The moderation implanted by 
poverty is itself an intermediate state, one that is characterized by proper proportion.   
A further aspect of this intermediate existence is depicted in Diotima’s description 
of Eros as moving from being in need of something to pursuing something.  This aspect 
of Eros as daimon and µεταξ" includes in the conception of Eros a source of motion.  The 
life of Eros is described as one of continual flux, and this reveals also his similarity to 
sensible being, ever falling short of perfection and fulfillment, but ever striving toward it.  
This depiction of the life of Eros emphasizes the movement of Eros itself within the 
human being he possesses, as the human being moves toward fulfillment of the 
perfections possible for him.306  This constant motion of Eros is described by Diotima as 
occurring throughout the cosmos and within individual beings.307  Bury’s comment on 
this aspect of Eros’s existence distinguishes between the causal effect of Eros in the lover 
and causal effect of Eros that animates the cosmos: 
Lastly, we should notice the emphasis laid on the fluctuating character of 
Eros, whose existence is a continual ebb and flow, from plenitude to 
vacuity, from birth to death.  By this is symbolized the experience of te 
φιλκαλος and the φιλσοφος, who by a law of their nature are incapable of 
remaining satisfied for long with the temporal objects of their desire and 
are moved by a divine discontent to seek continually for new sources of 
gratification.  This law of love, by which τ- piοριζµενον ε, 0piεκρε2, is 
parallel to the law of mortal existence by which τ; µRν (ε,) γγνεται, τ; δR 
piλλυται (207 D ff.)—a law which controls not merely the physical life 
but also the mental life (+piιθυµαι, +piιστ[µαι, etc.).  Accordingly the Eros-
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daemon is neither mortal nor immortal in nature (pi5φυκεν 203 E), neither 
wise nor foolish, but a combination of these opposites—σοφ-ς-µαθ/ς and 
θνητ-ς-θνατος—and it is in virtue of this combination that the most 
characteristic title of Eros is φιλ-σοφος (which implies also φιλ-
αθανασα).308    
 
The motion implanted by Eros is a consequence of his nature as comprising Προς and 
Πενα.  This nature of Eros is a result of his genesis, as Diotima states near the end of her 
description of his parentage.309  As Souilhé notes, the structure of Eros put forward here 
suggests that Eros is a product of a genesis that proceeds from the opposites Προς and 
Πενα, in a way that is similar to the double genesis from opposites described in the 
Phaedo:  
Notons la similitude des termes par lesquels Platon décrit l’instabilité 
d’Eros dans le Symposion et las génération des contraires dans Phédon.  –
Eros qui est situé entre deux extrêmes, puisque οQτε Sς θνατος pi5φυκεν 
οQτε Sς θνητς, reste come flottant et sans cesse en voie de transformation, 
λλ; τοτR µRν τ[ς α$τ[ς =µ5ρας θλλει τε κα, ζ_, eταν ε$piορ/σw, τοτR δR 
piοθνxσκει, piλιν δR ναβι6σκεται (Symposion 203E).   
Par sa nature, il réalise assez bien la définition des doubles 
intermédiaries de Phédon qui sont des γεν5σεις, tels que καταδαρθνειν et 
νεγερεσθαι, piοθνxσκειν et ναβι6σκεσθαι (Phédon, 71B.C.D.E.), grâce 
auxquels est possible la transformation des contraires.  C’est par un milieu 
que les absolus passent de l’un a l’autre.310 
 
This double genesis gives an account of the metaphysical status of Eros as an 
intermediate whose being is derived from the genesis of each of the extremes between 
which he lies.  The motion attendant upon Eros is the motion derived from his status as 
an intermediate. 
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This last sense of intermediacy, that of the double genesis, indicates the 
relationship between intermediate status of Eros and the motion imparted by Eros.  This 
relationship is indicated also by the passages depicting Eros as the source of the 
animation of the cosmos.  It is difficult to determine the precise nature of Eros’s motion, 
since it seems, given his intermediate status, to flow from both extremes, and so not to 
lead exclusively to goodness as the ascent passage seems to suggest.  Diotima addresses 
this, however, when she moves to the next stage of her discourse, in which she addresses 
the use and work of Eros.  It is by means of this discussion of the use and work of Eros 
that his motion is more fully explained and the implications of this motion for morality 
and human flourishing are clarified. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METAPHYSICS, MOTION, AND MORALITY 
 
 
 
In the last chapter, Eros’s lack was seen to provide the foundation for his 
intermediate status.  This intermediate status is a central feature of the nature of Eros, and 
allows for an understanding of Eros at three distinct metaphysical levels: as Form or real 
relation, as daimon or metaphysical intermediate, and as cosmic force or motion.  Though 
the establishment of the intermediate nature of Eros allows Diotima to incorporate 
multiple senses of Eros’s metaphysical reality into her speech, it also raises some 
questions about the use of Eros, or the moral consequences of his intermediate nature, 
and so also about the motion for which Eros is responsible.  The various senses of 
intermediacy we have identified in chapter four show Eros to be bidirectional, since he 
may move both from man to god and from god to man.  But the presentation of the final 
mysteries of Eros in the ascent passage present a more unidirectional picture of Eros’s 
movement, i.e., it seems that the lover is necessarily led upward, and toward the divine.  
As we shall see, this is in part because the ascent passage describes the proper use of Eros 
to achieve ε$δαιµονα.  It will be the purpose of this chapter to examine the relationship 
between the metaphysical status of Eros as intermediate and the use that humans make of 
Eros, and this itself reveals that the motion of Eros is made good use of by humans when 
directed toward human perfection.   
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The Metaphysical Status of Eros as Intermediate 
 
 
 
The characterization of Eros as daimon and intermediate suggests that Eros has a 
real existence as a daimon.  One notable proponent of this view is Robin, who notes that 
Eros in the Symposium is synthetic, and that his intermediate nature is a consequence of 
this: 
Mais ce n’est pas seulement sur la nature synthétique de l’Amour 
qu’insiste le Banquet, c’est aussi sur sa nature intermédiaire.  Cette 
seconde caractéristique est d’ailleurs étroitement liée à la première: la 
nature synthétique de l’Amour fait de lui un intermédiaire entre les 
qualités opposées que cette nature a pour function d’unir.311 
 
Robin continues to argue that as an intermediate, Eros has a real and independent 
existence, namely as a daimon.312  It is notable that Robin’s position regarding the 
metaphysical reality of Eros is not dependent upon the acceptance of the existence of 
mathematical objects.  This position is also held by Plotinus, and though Robin finds that 
Plotinus is not a reliable source of Plato’s original meaning,313 he still maintains that 
Plato’s assertion that Eros is a daimon establishes the metaphysical status of Eros as an 
independent being.  In partial support of his claim that Eros is a daimon, Robin cites the 
use of daimons in both the Pre-Socratic philosophers and poets, and Plato’s other 
dialogues.314  Within the Platonic dialogues themselves, Robin identifies two distinct 
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kinds of daimons:  the soul and the tutelary spirit.315  The Eros of the Symposium and the 
Phaedrus is of the latter type, and it is by daimonic possession that one is transformed 
into a δαιµνιος ν/ρ.  For Robin, becoming a δαιµνιος ν/ρ leads the soul to a keener 
vision of the Beautiful and so also to the ascent to the vision of Beauty itself; in this 
sense, Eros is the source of motion toward the Beautiful itself. 
 In addition to Robin, Rist, Cornford, and Friedlander identify the soul as a 
daimon.316  Where the soul is considered as daimon, it is on the grounds that its rational 
faculty is like the divine.  Though its rational faculty raises the soul toward divinity, its 
habitation in the body mixes it with mortality.  The soul, in this sense, is very like the 
daimon-Eros described in the Symposium, since it binds together the human and the 
divine.  If we bear this in mind, the cathartic regimen of the Phaedo that demands of the 
philosopher a progressive and habitual disassociation from his body follows quite 
naturally, since it is by this purification from the mortal element that the soul will regain 
its divinity.  When the philosopher frees his soul from its bodily fetters, his soul becomes 
possessed by a daimon and he has truly a god within him.317 
 It may be the case that Plato intends the Eros-daimon to be identified with the 
soul in the Symposium, but identifying him as a tutelary spirit is an equally viable 
alternative.  Given the passages in the Phaedo and the Phaedrus that describe the soul as 
following daimons, it seems plausible that Eros might be one such daimon.  The guiding 
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power of the daimon is appropriate to the Symposium’s description of the lover as being 
led in the ascent passage.  Understanding the Eros-daimon as tutelary spirit rather than 
soul appears to have one distinct advantage; it maintains the sense that Eros comes to the 
soul from without, and that, without this divine intervention, the soul would not acquire 
the vision necessary for its ascent to the divine.  What remains true in the Phaedo, 
Phaedrus, and Symposium, however, is that the soul must regain its vision of the Forms if 
it is to draw near to the divine; in the Phaedo this is accomplished by the practice for 
death, and in the Phaedrus and Symposium by association with the Eros-daimon.  
Regardless of whether the Eros-daimon is here meant to designate the soul, it does seem 
that Plato intends the Eros-daimon to depict or point to some metaphysical reality. 
Allen objects to this interpretation of Eros as having metaphysical reality, as 
articulated in the positions of Cornford, Robin, and Plotinus, on the grounds that they 
make an ο$σα of Eros: 
It will be evident that both Cornford and Robin, like Plotinus, treat 
Eros as a substance in its own right, an ο$σα.  Once this is done, it is but a 
short step to suppose that it is identical with soul, and its identification 
with self-moving motion in the Phaedrus appears to follow as of course. 
It seems evident that Eros cannot be identified with self-moving motion.  
For if Eros were a motion, it could not be self-moving: arising in lack, 
ending with fulfillment, the child of both Προς and Πενα, it is motion a 
quo and ad quem.  Eros cannot be identified with soul, conceived as self-
moving motion, because soul is immortal and Eros implies lack of 
immortality. 
Nor can Eros be said to be moved by its objects.  Eros involves 
furtrity: the object of desire is not a presently existing thing, but a future 
state of affairs involving possession.  The thirsty man desires, not water, 
but to possess water.  Since desire implies lack of possession, the object of 
desire does not exist when desire exists.  So the object of desire is 
peculiarly evanescent: when desire is, it is not; and when desire is not, it is 
not.  Insofar as desire implies possession of an unpossessed object, its 
object is, and is necessarily, nonexistent.  What is nonexistent cannot 
move anything, either as efficient or as final cause. 
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If Eros is not a motion, neither is it a “force” nor a “moving fund 
of energy.”  The hydraulic metaphor for desire, as a stream capable of 
being diverted into other channels is helpful precisely because it states a 
common-sense truth: that human beings must often choose between 
gratifying contending kinds of desires, and their choices shape their 
character.  Because desire is a relative, desire is not a substance, as 
Plotinus had it, nor a force nor a fund of energy, as Cornford had it, nor 
the soul, as Robin had it; these are metaphors that merely obscure.  The 
ascent to Beauty is, and is explicitly said to be (210A), that of the lover.  If 
we choose to describe this as the ascent of Eros, we do so by virtue of the 
logical import of a literary fiction, namely, Diotima’s personification of 
Eros; Eros is the lover qua lover, the lover just insofar as he loves.  The 
lover insofar as he loves is neither a motion nor a force nor a fund of 
energy; and since he is not, qua lover, immortal, neither is he his soul.318 
 
Allen’s argument from the position that Eros is a relation and as such has no 
independent existence fails on several counts.  In the first place, as we have seen, Plato 
explicitly names Eros as an intermediate, and this implies actual existence.  Furthermore, 
as Souilhé’s analysis shows, this intermediate status provides a means for explaining the 
motion of Eros “a quo and ad quem” by understanding it as the double genesis from 
opposites described in the Phaedo.  This provides an interpretation of Eros as source of 
motion that does not entail the identification of Eros with soul; it leaves open the 
possibility that Eros is something that comes to be in the soul from without.  The soul 
may be self-moving as the Phaedrus claims, and yet be acted on by other things.  Second, 
the various senses of intermediate discussed above entail that the intermediate actually 
exist.  Furthermore, the naming of Eros as a daimon supports the view that Eros exists 
independently.  The fact that Eros may be identified with motion, the origin of motion, or 
the force that binds two things together does not, for Plato, preclude the possibility of its 
independent existence.  As we have seen above, it is both plausible and likely that Eros 
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exists as Form at the purely intelligible level, as daimon at the intermediate level, and in 
the motion of the cosmos at the sensible level. 
It need not be the case that Plato means for Eros to be understood literally to be a 
daimon.  As we saw in chapter two, Plato’s use of mythical elements often do not intend 
to convey a literal truth, but rather to use a more sensible image to convey meaning that 
would be difficult to grasp in any other way; the sensible image points to an invisible 
reality.  In the case of the Eros-daimon, this would mean that Eros does have a real 
existence and its interaction with gods and men is similar to that ascribed to the Eros-
daimon in Diotima’s speech.  The intermediate existence of the Eros-daimon explains the 
metaphysical ground of the phenomenon of love.  The psychological experience of Eros, 
however, is better conveyed by appealing to the imagery of divine possession; for 
humans experience Eros as coming to them from without, taking hold of them, and 
leading them toward certain objects.  The image of the Eros-daimon provides Plato with a 
means of conveying the metaphysical reality of Eros and its structure, as well as the 
psychological experience of Eros. 
The diversity of beloved objects among human beings remains a difficulty on this 
account of Eros.  It seems there is no way of accounting for the fact that human beings 
choose different kinds of goods to pursue, and the diversity of chosen goods among 
human beings appears to indicate that Eros arbitrarily directs different people toward 
different objects.  This unresolved difficulty calls our attention to the motion of Eros, and 
in particular to the relationship between the motion of Eros and its use for human beings.   
Thus far we have seen that Eros as intermediate must have a real existence, and 
that, whether this existence is as rational soul or tutelary spirit, Eros carries with him 
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motion.  Eros is himself a mover in this sense, and because he is a source of motion, he is 
a catalyst for action.  We have seen already that Eros’s intermediate nature is 
bidirectional, since there could not be converse between men and gods if the case were 
otherwise; indeed, it seems that Eros leads as often to bad as it does to good, and this 
remains a puzzle.  But, as we shall see in chapter six, Eros is manifest at various levels in 
the soul, and it is only the lover led in the correct way who is able to ascend to the vision 
of the Beautiful itself; thus the proper use of Eros will be related to this upward journey, 
just as the misuse of Eros will be to lesser destinations.  In the next section, I will discuss 
the relationship of Eros to the good and bad, and so also the question of the proper use of 
Eros.   
 
The Use and Work of Eros as Intermediate: The Moral Consequences of the 
Metaphysical Status of Eros’s Intermediacy 
 
 
 
Given that Eros is an intermediate, the question arises as to the consequences of 
this status for the relationship of Eros to virtue.  But the meaning of Eros’s intermediacy 
seems consequent upon the interpretation of Eros as designating only a relation or as 
additionally designating something metaphysical.  Since Allen takes the personification 
of Eros to be an obfuscation of the philosophical analysis of Eros as relation, he 
understands its intermediacy in a manner that reflects this.  He provides the following 
analysis of intermediates: 
Sometimes intermediates are described as having a share of opposite 
qualities; if Eros were intermediate in this sense, it would be both good 
and bad, beautiful and ugly, mortal and immortal.  In another sense, 
intermediates instead of possessing both opposites possess neither.  In the 
Gorgias (467 ff.; compare Lysis 216dff.), for example, intermediates are 
actions and physical objects that take their value, not from their own 
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nature, but from their purpose or use; they are neither good nor bad in 
themselves.  The intermediate character of Eros is of this kind.  In itself, it 
is neither good nor bad; it takes its value from its objects.  Thirst, for 
example, the desire to drink, is neither good nor bad in itself; its value is 
determined by the effect of its gratification in particular circumstances.319    
 
For Allen, then, because Eros is merely relational, it is the sort of intermediate that is 
neutral because of its existence between good and bad.  It can be directed toward bad 
objects, and Allen’s argument concludes that it is the choice of object that determines the 
worth of Eros.  An example of Eros directed toward something bad is found in the 
description of the tyrannical man in the Republic, whose Eros is directed toward the 
wrong kinds of objects; but the love of the wrong objects does not seem adequate to 
account for the anarchy that characterizes the tyrannical man.  He is insatiable in part 
because he loves the wrong kinds of objects too much, and in part because he is unable to 
distinguish between the better and worse objects available to him.  Eros does not rule and 
corrupt the tyrant merely because he pursues the wrong objects; the tyrant is ruled by the 
objects of his desire because he has an improper relationship to them. 
Allen’s remark above that “actions and physical objects that take their value, not 
from their own nature, but from their purpose or use” does not seem to resolve this 
difficulty; indeed, it further complicates his assessment of the intermediate nature of Eros 
and of desire.  If we consider a particular action, like running, it is apparent that the 
ability to run is a good, though it may be used badly.320  The ability to run is essential to 
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Like Allen, he indicates here that the situatedness of the action determines whether it is 
good or bad, but his discussion here does not distinguish the intrinsic goodness of an 
ability or action from its possible employments.  “That Plato himself, like his 
commentators, did not distinguish a mean between two extremes (black, white, grey) 
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the survival of a number of animals, including humans, if only for the purpose of fleeing 
danger.  But the final good of such an ability is the well-being of the agent who possesses 
it.  The end of this ability and the end of the agent coincide.   
This analysis applies also to desires that are instilled in animals and human beings 
for the sake of their preservation, namely those bodily desires for things like food, drink, 
and sex, that preserve both the individual and the species.  The desire to drink, simply 
taken, is a desire for a good necessary to the preservation of the human being.321  One 
might desire inappropriate beverages (antifreeze) or desire them in inappropriate 
quantities (vats of wine), and this impropriety of the desired object is revealed in its 
negative effect on the good of the human being, i.e. on his health in this case.  The fact 
that antifreeze and vast quantities of wine have negative effects on a particular individual 
does not mean that they are not good in themselves.  They have at once an intrinsic 
goodness and a goodness (or lack of goodness) in relation to different objects; this latter 
aspect is what Allen terms the use or purpose of the object.   
Allen uses the terms ‘use’ and ‘purpose’ interchangeably, but there seems to be an 
important distinction between the terms.  The use of a thing is determined by its proper 
                                                                                                                                                 
from something which in itself is neither because outside their range, appears from Gorg. 
467e.  There as examples of what is between (µεταξ") good and bad he gives sitting, 
walking, running, stones and wood, on the grounds that they are sometimes one or the 
other, sometimes neither.  Yet surely the difference is real and important.  An 
intermediate like greyness cannot be either of the extremes; what by itself bears no 
relation to the extremes can, by the addition of circumstances or motive, become either 
(running to save a drowning man, running to commit a murder; running leading to health, 
running leading to a heart attack)” (Guthrie, History, 4: 225). 
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end or τ5λος; this is specifically indicated in the Symposium when Socrates asks Diotima 
what use (χρεα) Eros has for human beings.322  In the ensuing discussion, the structure of 
Eros does not change, he is still “of beautiful things” and so still intermediate.323  Diotima 
reformulates Socrates’ original question so that it asks “Why…is Love of beautiful 
things?”324  The ultimate answer to Socrates’ original question comes only after the 
question has been reformulated twice more.  The answers to the intermediate questions 
establish first that “the person who loves, loves beautiful things” in order “to possess 
them for himself.”325  The triadic structure of Eros is present in this formulation, but to 
the understanding of Eros as intermediate between the lover and beloved is added the use 
(χρεα) of Eros.  The above answer is, of course, not the final answer, but once Diotima 
has established that in loving beautiful things the lover loves good things, the ultimate 
answer to Socrates’ question regarding the use of Eros is finally given:  “the person who 
possesses good things” will “be happy”.326 This discussion indicates that there is a direct 
connection between the use (χρεα) of Eros and the end or perfection of human being. All 
human beings have ε$δαιµονα as their natural end.  This end or perfection is not some 
purpose that the individual sets for himself, though he has a natural inclination toward it; 
nor does it differ from one human being to another.  Indeed, we find the universality of 
this end for all human being confirmed in the text immediately following this passage:   
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“This wish, then, this love—do you think it common to all human 
beings, and that everyone wishes always to possess good things, or what’s 
your view?” 
“The same as yours,” I replied; “that it’s common to everyone.”327 
 
We should, then, understand ‘use’ not as an instrumental means to acquiring some object, 
but rather as the appropriate directing of an activity proper to an individual being toward 
its proper end. 
 We can only speak of Eros being misused or badly directed if there is a proper use 
of Eros, and the fact that there is a proper use of Eros is supported by its situation within 
the framework of a teleological cosmos.  There is a sense in which Allen’s statement that 
“its [the desire to drink] value is determined by the effect of its gratification in particular 
circumstances” is true, but it falls short of the complete truth by neglecting the 
teleological structure inherent in desire.  There are proper objects of desire because 
certain things are objectively better for certain kinds of beings. 
There is evidence for Eros having a proper use not just in the above passage from 
the exchange between Socrates and Diotima, but also in the speeches of Pausanius and 
Erixymachus.  The discussion of Eros in the Phaedrus and the identification of σκαις 
Eros in that same work further indicate both the potential misuse of Eros and the fact of 
its having a proper use.328  Further evidence is seen in Dover’s analysis of Eros as it is 
treated in a passage from Democritus focusing on the relationship of prostitution to Eros; 
this analysis distinguishes between what he terms non-legitimate and legitimate Eros.329  
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His further analysis suggests a reluctance among Greek authors to apply the term Eros to 
relationships other than “those homosexual relationships from which what is not dikaios 
is excluded: rape, fraud and intimidation are obviously excluded, and the trend of the 
whole speech [of Aiskhines] shows that prostitution is also excluded.”330   
 The intermediate nature of Eros does not conflict with its having a proper use, but 
supports it.  Simone Weil writes that “no human being should be deprived of his metaxu, 
that is to say of those relative and mixed blessings (home, country, traditions, culture, 
etc.) which warm and nourish the soul and without which, short of sainthood, a human 
life is not possible.”331  Her understanding of the µεταξ" is grounded in her understanding 
of Greek philosophy, and her insight here is that these µεταξ" are the various beloved 
objects—objects that may be used for good or evil purposes—that populate the daily 
lives of men.  The µεταξ" make up the world in which we, as humans, live and love; they 
“form the region of good and evil”332 precisely because they are the stuff of love, and 
serve as the means by which we move toward one pole or the other.  Like Eros itself, the 
µεταξ" exist for the sake of the good of human beings; but also like Eros, when misused, 
the µεταξ" corrupt the very beings they were meant to perfect.  The Gorgias provides an 
example of such an intermediate in its discussion of rhetoric, with the important 
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conclusion that if rhetoric is not ordered to the good of the human being, it does not, in 
fact, have any use.333   
 
Χρεα and ῎Εργον 
 
 
 
 After identifying the χρεα of Eros as ε$δαιµονα, Diotima turns to the question of 
the ργον, or work, of Eros.  Her question arises after she has summarized the results of 
her discussion with Socrates thus far:  “we can sum up by saying that love is of 
permanent possession of what is good.”334  Diotima’s discussion of the work of Eros 
follows closely upon her discussion of its use for human beings, and it is evident that, for 
her, the work of Eros can only properly be understood in relation to its use for human 
beings, in this case, joining them permanently to what is truly good and beautiful.   
Burnyeat’s discussion of the proper use of objects in the Republic suggests that 
the use of objects has an objective determination and that this is further related to the 
function (ργον) of the object. 
The correct way to design and use a shuttle is determined by its function, 
to help turn thread into cloth.  The correct way to design and use a couch 
is likewise determined by its function, to help turn the impressionable 
young into worthy citizens.  There are constraints in both cases: you need 
a sound knowledge of the material you have to work with (the potential 
and limitations of woolen thread and human nature), and a clear 
understanding of the end-product you are aiming for (high-quality cloth, 
high-quality citizens).  These constraints make it possible to give an 
objective account of what a shuttle or couch is and how best to use it.  The 
long discussion of musical poetry in Republic II-III can be read as Plato’s 
account of the objectively best way to use couches and tables for the 
education and cultural fulfillment of human nature.  Republic X confirms 
that “the excellence, the beauty, the rightness of every implement, living 
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thing, and action are determined solely by reference to the use for which 
each has been made or grown” (601d).  The use of a couch is not just 
reclining.  It is reclining to participate in a culturally intense social 
gathering.335 
 
Burnyeat’s discussion is different from our own in that it examines objects produced by 
human beings, rather than something like Eros, which is one of many naturally occurring 
phenomena named by them.336  But this fact about Eros more strongly supports 
understanding it in terms of Burnyeat’s distinctions; for as much as reason and order are 
discernible in products made by human beings, even more is reason discernible at work 
in the order of the cosmos.  Burnyeat’s discussion of objects in the Republic suggests that 
both the use and the function of objects are objectively determined, rather than arbitrarily 
imposed by human beings.  Further, the use and function of objects are closely related to 
one another, and the proper use of an object is subservient to its function.  The ργον of 
the axe is to cut, and it is only properly used when it is employed in this work.  The ργον 
of the shuttle is to weave cloth, and it is only properly used when it is employed in this 
activity.  In Burnyeat’s examples of the couch and the shuttle, both objects act on the 
material proper to them in order to transform it; in similar fashion, Eros acts on human 
nature to transform it.  The proper use of each object yields a good product: the properly 
used shuttle weaves good cloth, the properly used couch forms good citizens, properly 
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used Eros yields ε$δαιµονα.337  The ργον of each object is an activity:  shuttles are made 
for weaving, and couches for cultivating good citizens, axes for cutting.  Diotima’s 
question at 206b1 supports this connection between ργον and activity:   
Given then, that love is always this,” she replied, “how will those pursuing 
it do so, and through what activity (praxis), if their intense eagerness in 
pursuing it is to be called love?  What really is this thing that it does (το 
ργον)?  Can you say?338   
 
The ργον of Eros is procreation or participation in immortality,339 and its proper use is 
ε$δαιµονα.  From the connection between the work of Eros and its proper use, we can see 
that the ργον is revealed in the activity, and the χρεα in the finished product.  Since the 
χρεα in this instance, however, is state or disposition, there is a discernible relationship 
between the use and work of Eros, such that the two may coincide.  In chapter six, we 
will see that this occurs when the rational soul pursues the proper path of love and 
achieves a share of immortality by contemplating the Beautiful itself.  In this instance, the 
rational soul engages in its highest activity, contemplation, and at once achieves its best 
disposition, ε$δαιµονα. 
 The discussion of the use (χρεα) and function or work (ργον) of Eros points to the 
multifaceted nature of Eros.  Plato’s presentation of Eros through Diotima’s discourse has 
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moved from identifying the lack of Eros to the intermediate nature of Eros; as 
intermediate, Eros is presented as the desire of the lover for the beloved object, and so 
also as the force that moves the lover toward the beloved; as intermediate, Eros unites the 
lover and the beloved object.  But Eros has also a proper use and a proper work, 
according to the kind of being to which he is joined.  Eros, like the cosmos he inhabits, is 
subject to rational order.  Though Eros animates the cosmos and causes all beings to 
strive toward participation in immortality, he causes this striving in accordance with the 
proper end of each kind of being.  Consequently, his proper use for human beings is to 
lead them toward states of ε$δαιµονα, and his proper work is manifest in the various kinds 
of procreation that afford them participation in immortality. 
 Though the discussion of the nature of Eros includes discussion of his use, work, 
and cause, this does not obliterate the triadic structure of Eros that was discussed earlier.  
Eros still joins the beloved to the lover, but his intermediacy is understood to include use, 
work, and cause.  This point is important for understanding how Eros is related to issues 
of psychological motivation, motion, and beloved object.  Allen’s suggestion above, for 
instance, that “intermediates are actions and physical objects that take their value, not 
from their own nature, but from their purpose or use”340 indicates that the purpose or use 
reveals a psychological motive on the part of the agent or lover, such that the purpose or 
utility of an action reveals why we act and the purpose or utility of an object reveals why 
we pursue it.  In brief, such purposes and uses reveal why we find certain actions and 
objects loveable.  It is not difficult to deduce from this analysis that all such intermediates 
are merely instrumental to the attainment of some good identified by the agent.  On this 
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analysis, the purpose we have for acting or pursuing an object is the reason we give for 
the action we choose, where reason determines the value of the object or action rather 
than recognizing the intrinsic worth of the action or object.  Insofar as reason determines 
the value of an object, it does so with respect to achieving some end, not with respect to 
the intrinsic goodness of the object and not with respect to an awareness of its place 
within a rationally ordered whole.  As I have argued above, this assessment of Eros and 
intermediates is incommensurate with Platonic teleology.   
The ramifications of such an assessment of Eros’s intermediacy are insidious, for 
it is precisely the issue of psychological motivation that lies at the heart of the charge of 
Eros’s egocentrism.  This assessment results from the failure to distinguish the proper use 
of Eros that is consequent upon his nature as part of a teleological universe from the 
purposes proposed by a human agent that direct him toward particular objects and 
actions.  Ends are inscribed in the natures of things, whereas purposes are reasons rational 
beings provide.  Ends determine things like the matter used for the making of an axe and 
the form that the axe must have; humans use the axe for the purpose of chopping wood 
.
341
  “Agents and actors have “purposes” by which they determine themselves to certain 
actions.  Purposes are motives, “motors” propelling us toward destinations.”342  It is not, 
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then, egocentric for a human to move toward ε$δαιµονα by virtue of Eros; rather, it is the 
natural end of a human to be so moved by Eros, it is this very movement that brings him 
to the completion of his nature.  Nor is the human participation in immortality an instance 
of egocentricism, for this participation is, once again, an instance of humanity fulfilling 
its natural perfection within the cosmos. 
Catherine Osborne identifies the issue of psychological motivation and its relation 
to the beloved object as central to the interpretation of love generally and Eros 
specifically as acquisitive, possessive, and egocentric.  “It is plain,” she writes, “that most 
thinkers have taken for granted the idea that love can be analysed and classified on the 
basis of the needs, desires, or motives that give rise to it.”343  In this passage, Osborne is 
considering the structure of Eros in itself and responding to several other accounts of 
love.  Nonetheless, her overarching concern is the recent tendency among scholars to 
divide love into the categories of acquisitive and egocentric on the one hand, and utterly 
selfless and giving on the other.344  Since Eros is typically placed in the first of these 
categories on the grounds that one loves an object for some purpose or other that benefits 
the lover, she is particularly concerned here to discuss psychological motivation.  While 
she identifies an important problem in recent literature on love and Eros, her failure to 
distinguish clearly among terms such as need, desire, and motive obfuscates her analysis.  
For example, she criticizes Aristotle’s account of friendship as an instance of the 
philosophical tendency to assess love according to “the motives (for pleasure, for profit, 
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or for the good)” for friendship.345  That pleasure, profit, and the good are psychological 
motives is not, strictly speaking, true for Aristotle.  In the Nicomachean Ethics, for 
instance, he writes:  “The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come 
to know the object of love.  For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, 
and this is good, pleasant, or useful….”346   The ensuing discussion in chapter three 
demonstrates that the object of love remains the good, pleasant, or useful with respect to 
the lover himself.  At best we might say that Aristotle’s analysis indicates a psychological 
motive in the lover with respect to the beloved object; but Aristotle’s analysis is not of 
the subject and his motives, rather it is a sketch or outline of relationships among friends.  
This, in itself, sets Aristotle’s account apart, since his subject is φιλα rather than Eros.  
But, more importantly, it highlights the flaw in Osborne’s analysis.  She moves from a 
critique of analyses of love that depend on need, desire, or motive as tools for 
categorization to a critique of the Aristotelian account of friendship that depends upon the 
beloved object for categorization.  While the Aristotelian account may indicate the 
existence of a psychological motive in the lover or friend, it maintains the distinction 
between psychological motive and beloved object that Osborne’s treatment obscures.    
Osborne’s treatment neglects to distinguish among needs, desires, and motives, 
and furthermore, to distinguish the various senses of motive.  Needs, for our purposes, are 
deficiencies in the subject that must necessarily be filled to ensure the well-being of the 
subject.  Such things might include food, drink, housing, and companionship.  That these 
things are needs does not exclude them from also being desires.  Often, the subject 
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desires those things necessary for her own survival and well-being.  In this sense, needs 
and desires may overlap or coincide.  Desires are distinct from needs in two ways, 
however.  First, it is possible to desire things that are contrary to the needs of the subject, 
as when someone with dropsy strongly desires drink when what he most needs is to 
abstain from it.  Second, it is possible to desire things that are not, strictly speaking, 
necessary for the survival and well-being of the subject.   This occurs, for instance, when 
someone desires not drink simply to satisfy thirst, not merely adequate quantities of 
water, but a fine single malt scotch.  In these senses, needs and desires are distinct from 
one another, and the scope of desire is broader than the scope of need.  In neither case, 
however, is it necessary to appeal to motive in a psychological sense in order to consider 
their natures. 
‘Motive’ is itself an obscure and imprecise term with many possible 
significations.  First, in its contemporary usage, it often signifies psychological 
motivation for action; but such motivations might be further distinguished as (a) reasons 
for acting identified by the agent, or purposes; (b) needs (thus deficiencies), such as 
hunger or thirst, that are nonrational catalysts for action; (c) desires as distinct from needs 
but inclusive of emotions such as anger; (d) any of the above-mentioned of which the 
agent is not aware.  Second, the term motive might designate a moving force, an origin or 
source of motion.  Third, as in Osborne’s assessment, a beloved object might be 
designated a motive. 
Osborne argues against the position “that the status of the beloved determines the 
kind of love or the motives for it” focusing on three examples of love generally deemed 
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not respectable.347  The first of these she calls “love in bad taste” and describes as 
occurring when “the lover finds beauty in an object which educated or fashionable taste 
scorns.”348  The second, “excessive love”, “is love that goes over the top for something 
that does not merit such devotion.”349  The third is “love that is motivated”, and its lack 
of respectability lies in the fact that the lover loves his object not for itself, but for 
“motives of personal gain”.350  These considerations lead her to the following conclusion: 
Saying that love is unseemly if it is motivated by some further hope of 
gain implies that there is always some motive for love.  This is precisely 
what I shall argue is a mistake.  On the contrary we need to recognize that 
love is a motive, if you like, among other motives; where some other 
motive explains my action, the action is not motivated by love.  If love is 
the motive, no further motive need be sought.  So it makes nonsense to 
look for a motive for love, though it may make sense to ask for motives 
for action.  If we see love as an attitude, rather than a response provoked 
by some object of desire or concern, we shall be less likely to seek a 
‘motive’ for the response.351 
 
Osborne’s position, as she states it here, intends to further clarify her claim that most 
treatments of love depend on “needs, desires, or motives” on the part of the lover “that 
give rise to it [love]”.  But in this formulation of the problem, she is claiming that the 
beloved object is the source of these categorizations.  The consequence of this statement 
is that both the lover and the beloved are sources of the needs, desires, and motives that 
cause the love relation.  Can it really be the case, especially for thinkers such as Plato and 
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Aristotle, that both lover and beloved are sources of “needs, desires, or motives” with 
respect to the same love relation, in the same way, and at the same time? 
As soon as we identify an object or person as beloved, we identify it as loveable.  
Any classical analysis of such a statement would recognize the beloved as good, 
beautiful, and therefore loveable, by virtue of its being at all.  This is a central truth for 
Plato—all that has being is also good, because being itself is good.  It is because of the 
intrinsic goodness of an object or person (however slight that goodness might be) that 
love in the lover arises.  This structure is fundamentally different from an account of love 
that begins by examining the subjective psychological motivations of the lover because 
the beloved object is not merely a good for him, but exists as objectively good insofar as 
the beloved exists at all.  To explain love in terms of psychological motives is to 
determine the beloved’s value according to the purposes set by the lover that the beloved 
might serve, rather than to recognize that the beloved shares in goodness insofar as he 
shares in being.  It is not, then, the beloved himself that is objectionable, but the purpose 
for which the lover loves him.  This is precisely Plato’s point in his caricature of such 
“reasonable” but utilitarian Eros in the Phaedrus.352  Eros in its true form never permits 
us to use others so badly; in fact, Eros is divine precisely because it comes from outside 
of us, as daimonic possession, and gives us the ability to see the beloved as intrinsically 
good.  Daimonic possession leads the soul to love appropriately because it gives the soul 
the vision of goodness and beauty as they exist objectively, and not merely as they exist 
for the individual, as part of the grandeur of the cosmos. 
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In the Symposium, Pausanius suggests such a distinction in distinguishing the 
beloved himself (always desired under the auspices of beauty of some sort) and the 
manner in which one loves, which is tied to what the lover hopes to get from or give to 
the beloved.  If we recall Diotima’s discussion of the use and work of Eros, we find 
another such distinction.  The object of Eros does not change—it is always of the 
beautiful and good.  The use of Eros for human beings is the attainment of ε$δαιµονα, the 
beautiful and good state of the human being.  The works of Eros are found in the various 
activities of lovers by which they participate in immortality.  If we return to a 
consideration of the triadic structure of Eros, we find that Eros still joins the lover to the 
beloved object.  The use of Eros and the work of Eros belong to him as intermediate; they 
are the means by which he brings humans to ε$δαιµονα and participation in immortality.  
Eros does have a motive in the psychological sense, and this is what Plato designates the 
use of Eros for human beings, but it is part of the nature of Eros itself and of human 
beings themselves. 
We have seen that Eros’s intermediate status affords him real existence, and that 
this real existence involves the motion not only of the cosmos, but also of the individual 
souls.  The theme and structure of daimonic possession is suggested by Eros’s description 
as intermediate, and yet the gods do not bless those possessed of hubris, but those who 
cultivate poverty.  Analogically, this means the daimon or tutelary spirit comes to be in or 
takes possession of the human being only if the proper disposition, i.e., poverty, is 
cultivated and present in the agent.  The sense in which the Eros-daimon leads the lover 
toward the vision of Beauty is discussed further in chapter six, and the further relation 
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between divine possession, katharsis, and the practice of poverty are discussed in chapter 
seven.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
POVERTY IN THE ASCENT TO THE VISION OF BEAUTY 
 
 
 
 In previous chapters, I have argued that the parentage of Eros353 is central to 
understanding his nature, that this nature is epitomized in the myth of his parentage that 
describes him as at once poor and resourceful, and that the kind of poverty distinctive of 
Eros is piενα because it makes possible φιλοσοφα φθονος.  It remains, however, to 
investigate the consequences of this understanding of Eros’s nature, as Diotima herself 
does in the last major section of her discourse, that which addresses the question of the 
cause (α%τα) of Eros.   
 This chapter will examine the presence and role of the Poros-Penia image in this 
last section of Diotima’s discourse.354  From the beginning of the section discussing 
immortality and procreation, Diotima’s language no longer refers to the Poros-Penia 
image of Eros and does not make explicit use of the imagery of lack or need.  Yet, there 
is in her initial description of Eros as the child of Poros and Penia a depiction of the 
continual motion that belongs to him as their child:  “His nature is neither that of an 
immortal, nor that of a mortal, but on the same day, now he flourishes and lives, when he 
finds resources, and now he dies, but then comes back to life again.”355  This image of 
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perpetual motion reappears in the discussions of immortality and procreation in this last 
section of Diotima’s discourse; not only is this motion present in the discussion of 
immortality and procreation, it is present also in the ascent passage,356 as the lover moves 
upward toward the final vision of the beautiful.  Poverty, as it appears in the discussions 
of immortality, procreation, and ascent, is revealed as dispositional, in relation to a 
resourcefulness and productivity, and is embedded in the descriptions of Eros that occur 
at each level of soul; in the ascent passage itself it appears in the ‘relaxing’357 of the 
soul’s passion toward objects it has found σµικρς in relation to other objects; it is 
captured in the description of the penultimate stage of the ascent, which presents the 
lover as procreating in φιλοσοφα φθονος, and is the precondition for the vision of beauty 
itself.  There are, however, also some structural elements of the dialogue to which I 
would like to draw attention as providing a framework for understanding the overall 
import and implications of the ascent passage.  Therefore, I will begin with a brief 
discussion of these elements, the way they draw the reader’s attention to the question of 
the α%τα of Eros, and suggest a division of the discussion between 207a5 and 212 d1 that 
is parallel to the tripartite division of the soul described in the Republic.  The question of 
the α%τα of Eros frames the discussion of immortality and procreation within which the 
ascent passage is situated as the way to the best form of participation in immortality. 
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The Structure of Socrates’ Discourse 
 
 
 
The structure of Socrates’ discourse is indicated by Socrates himself, when he 
twice refers to the oratorical method earlier espoused by Agathon.358  At the beginning of 
his own encomium, Agathon finds fault with all of the preceding speakers for 
“congratulating humans on the goods the god is responsible (αcτιος) for giving them” 
rather than “eulogizing the god” and saying what kind of character Eros must have on the 
basis of the goods he provides to humans.359  The correct way (τρpiος Mρθος) to give 
praise, Agathon argues, is “to describe in speech what sort of character whoever is the 
subject of the speech has in virtue of which he is actually responsible (αcτιος) for what.  
Thus it is right and proper for us too to praise Love himself first for what he is (ο\ς +στιν), 
then for his gifts (τ;ς δσεις).”360  
Socrates’ first reference to this method is at the beginning of his examination of 
Agathon:  “Well now, my dear Agathon: you seemed to me to make a good start to your 
speech, when you said that one should first of all display the sort of character Love 
himself has, and then go on to what he does.”361  This remark leads into his questioning 
Agathon regarding a specific ο\ς +στι of Eros that he had not mentioned, whether “Love 
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 Symp. 199c5-8, 201d7-e1. 
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 Symp. 194e5-195a1:  doukou=σι γρ µοι piντες ο7 piρσθεν ε%ρηκτες ο$ τ-ν θε-ν 
+γκωµιζειν λλ; το<ς νθρ6piους ε$δαιµονζειν τPν αγαθPν Yν : θες α$το2ς αcτιος· :piο2ος δ5 
τις α$τ-ς zν τα4τα Zδωpi/σατο, ο$δες εcpiηκεν. 
 
360
 Symp. 195a1-5. 
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 Symp. 199c5-8:  Κα, µ/ν, { φλε Αγθων, καλPς µοι δοξας κατηγ/σασθαι το4 λγου, 
λ5γων eτι piρPτον µRν δ5οι α$τ-ν +piιδε2ξαι :piο2ς τς +στιν : bρως, ?στερον δR τ; ργα α$το4. 
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[is] of the sort to make him love of something, or of nothing.”362  This elenchus of 
Agathon begins the section of Socrates’ account that will address the nature of Eros.  
Socrates’ speech regarding the nature of Eros is centered on this particular ο\ς +στι, 
which serves as the theme for his further variations.  It is notable, however, that Socrates 
has slightly reformulated Agathon’s statement of method.  Where Agathon speaks of “ο\ς 
+στιν”, Socrates speaks of “:piο2ς τς +στιν”; where Agathon speaks of “τ;ς δσεις”, 
Socrates speaks of “τ; ργα”.  While Agathon incorporates “αcτιος” as a way of speaking 
of the things Eros causes in virtue of his character, Socrates makes no mention here of 
αcτιος or its cognate α%τα. 
Socrates’ second reference to Agathon’s method occurs just before he begins 
recounting what he learned from Diotima. Here, Socrates says, “Now one should do, 
Agathon, as you did, first describing who Love himself is and what sort of character he 
has, and then going on to what he does.”363  His formulation here differs slightly from the 
first; instead of “:piο2ς τς +στιν” Socrates uses “τς +στιν : bρως κα, το2ς τις”, and so 
moves from speaking generally of what sort of thing Eros is to speaking about who he is, 
and with the interrogative “piο2ος” of what sort he is.   
Two particular aspects of Plato’s language here seem to bear upon the 
understanding of the ascent passage and its place in the discourse as a whole.  The first is 
Socrates’ use of τ; ργα in place of Agathon’s τ;ς δσεις; the second is Agathon’s use of 
αcτιος in relation to the nature of Eros, language that is echoed in Diotima’s discourse 
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when she takes up the question of the α%τα of Eros.  The first of these, the substitution of 
τ; ργα for τ;ς δσεις, occurs in both of Socrates’ statements of method, and so seems 
rather more than accidental.  What then, might be the purpose of such a substitution?  τ; 
ργα is the substantive derived from the verb ργω, to work, while τ;ς δσεις is the 
substantive derived from the verb δδωµι, to give.  τ; ργα,364 as “the workings” or “the 
works or deeds” of Eros, then, has a more active connotation than its counterpart in 
Agathon’s formula, so that Socrates’ formulation leads the reader to think of what Eros 
does or effects rather than what he dispenses to humans in the manner of “gifts”.   This 
prefigures the active role that the Eros-daimon will have in binding together the realms of 
the divine and the human.365  Furthermore, thematic in the dialogue as a whole is the idea 
that Eros in some way makes humans better,366 and these two different formulations of 
the interaction between Eros and humanity bring to focus a distinction between two ways 
of conceiving of Eros:  as one whose gifts are passively received or as one whose deeds 
and works may be shared or participated in by humans.  It is only the latter of these two 
conceptions that fully captures the sense of the daimonic in Greek life.367    
The second significant aspect of Plato’s language appears in Agathon’s 
formulation of method.  Agathon suggests that the things caused by Eros are in some way 
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 For an account of the daemonic in Greek life, see E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the 
Irrational (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). 
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indicative of his character; indeed Agathon states that it is “in virtue of which [this 
character] he is actually responsible (αcτιος) for what.”368  This allusion to the significant 
issue of α%τα and its relation to giving an account of the nature of things is taken up again 
in Diotima’s formulation of the cause (α%τα) of Eros that begins the discussion of 
immortality and leads eventually to the ascent passage.   
 Oddly, after the second time he recommends the aforementioned method, 
Socrates proceeds in the very next sentence to declare his intention of abandoning it, 
since “it seems…easiest to go about describing him [Eros] in the way the Mantinean 
visitor once went about it, by closely questioning me.”369  Given this, it is difficult to 
determine whether Socrates seriously intends to abide by the oratorical method he has 
endorsed.  Yet, an examination of the discourse of Diotima as a whole reveals that, even 
though the form of the discourse is largely dialogue, it may be divided into sections 
according to the questions that are raised within it, and these sections do follow the 
oratorical method espoused by Socrates, investigating first the character of Eros and then 
his works.   
 It is clear that the first part of the dialogue between Socrates and Diotima (201d1-
204c6) sets out to clarify the character or nature of Eros, or in Socrates’ words “τς +στιν : 
bρως κα, piο2ς τις”—who he is and of what sort he is.370  Thus, this early part of their 
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 The “piο2ς τις”, translated by Rowe as “what sort of character he has”, is broad enough 
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exchange establishes that Eros, because lack, and thus imperfection, are part of his 
nature, cannot be a god.  Further discussion of his nature as intermediate between the 
human and divine leads to the conclusion that he is a daimon.  This nature is further 
explained by the theogonic account of Eros, and the qualities of both his parents are used 
to explain the particular kind of intermediate nature he possesses.371  Thus, at the end of 
this section of the dialogue, the reader has already in his mind that Eros is a daimon, 
intermediate, always accompanied by a kind of lack or need, but never wholly without 
resource (piορος).  The next section of the dialogue proceeds to examine the use (χρεα)372 
of Eros to humans, and the answer to this question lies in the fact that it is by virtue of 
Eros that humans aims at happiness; this recognition of the universal nature of Eros as a 
desire for happiness leads to the further conclusion that all humans have in common this 
desire for happiness and so are lovers, regardless of the fact that the common usage of the 
term Eros has a much narrower designation.  This section of the dialogue ends by 
answering the questions of whom and of what sort Eros is with the following 
formulation: “Love is of permanent possession of what is good”.373   
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 R. G. Bury writes: “τνα χρεαν κτλ.  Here begins the second section of Socrates-
Diotima’s exposition.   For χρεα, “utility,”—equiv. here to the do/seiv of 195A, the ργα 
of 199C—cp. Gorg. 480 A, etc.”  The Symposium of Plato, edited with introduction, 
critical notes and commentary by R. G. Bury (Cambridge:  W. Heffer and Sons, 1909), 
105.  His remark indicates that the second major section of the Socrates-Diotima 
exchange properly begins at 203a with the discussion of what use Eros is to human 
beings.  R. E. Allen identifies the passage discussing the works of Eros as beginning at 
206b, with Diotima asking for a description of the work of Eros.  Symposium, in The 
Dialogues of Plato,  vol 2,  translated with comment by R. E. Allen (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1991), 71.  Neither of these positions, however, seems to 
account for the presence of ai0ti/a later on, or its relationship to ργα and χρεα.   
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 The next major section of the dialogue is clearly marked by Diotima’s transitional 
question to Socrates:  “Given, then, that love is always this,” she replied, “how will those 
pursuing it do so, and through what activity, if their intense eagerness in pursuing it is to 
be called love?  What really is this thing that it does (τ ργον)?”374  Diotima explains that 
its activity or work—that by which it is pursued—is procreation, and that this takes place 
“in relation both to body and to soul.”375  Diotima’s further explanation of this statement 
reveals that “all human beings…are pregnant both in body and in soul, and when we 
come to be of the right age, we naturally desire to give birth.”376  It is this giving birth 
and participation in procreation that gives mortal creatures a share in the divine.377  The 
work of Eros, then, seems to be this “procreation (γ5νεσις) and giving birth (τκος) in the 
beautiful.”378  Furthermore, procreation is the means by which humans participate in 
immortality,379 and these two—procreation and immortality—are added to the preceding 
formulation of Eros as “permanent possession of what is good” in the formulation at 
206e5: “Love is of procreation and giving birth in the beautiful.”   This is the final 
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 Diotima can make such an assertion because, as she explains, “procreation is 
something everlasting and immortal, as far as anything can be for what is mortal; and it is 
immortality, together with the good, that must necessarily be desired, according to what 
has been agreed before—if indeed love is of permanent possession of the good.  Well, 
from this argument it necessarily follows that love is of immortality as well” (206e7-
207a3). 
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reformulation of the nature of Eros, and the one the reader is left to take with her to the 
next part of Diotima’s discussion, which is pursued under the auspices of seeking the 
cause (α%τα) of Eros. 
 The fact that Diotima inquires after the ργον of Eros at 206b3 indicates a new 
stage of the discussion; it fulfills Socrates’ stated intention to speak first of the nature of 
Eros and then of his works.  Further evidence of this is provided by Diotima at 204d, 
when she summarizes the discussion that has gone before: “Love’s character, and his 
birth, are as I have said; and he is of beautiful things, according to what you say.”  It is 
evident, then, that Socrates’ intention to speak first of the nature of Eros, and then of his 
works is reflected in the structure and language of the dialogue itself.  In the course of 
Diotima’s speech, she moves from speaking of the parentage of Eros to his use (χρεα) for 
humans to his activity or ργον, and finally to his α%τα.  Two of these terms, use (χρεα) 
and cause (α%τα), stand out because they were not forecast by Socrates’ statement 
regarding method.380  In neither of the two reformulations of Agathon’s method for 
encomia does Socrates mention α%τα, though Agathon himself had used the cognate αcτιος 
to indicate what Eros causes as a result of his character.381  It is somewhat surprising, 
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 It might be argued that both terms could be included in τ; ργα, but the distinct terms 
themselves positioned within the questions that shift the direction of the dialogue suggest 
distinct meanings.  The movement from χρεα to ργα to α%τα, along with Diotima’s 
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happiness), and that α%τα indicates both beginning and end, i.e. the Form from which a 
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ργα, or characteristic activity of Eros.  Both χρεα and ργα are thus governed by α%τα, as 
the origin and end of Eros. 
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 Symp. 195a1-5. 
 182 
then, to find the question of α%τα as the catalyst for a major turning point in the dialogue; 
for without its mention, Diotima might not have the occasion to explain the relationship 
of immortality and procreation to Eros.  It is further significant that the question of Eros’s 
α%τα is the setting of the Lesser and Greater Mysteries of Eros.  In what sense, then, is 
α%τα meant in this passage and what role does it play in the understanding of the ascent 
and final revelation of Eros?   
 The Symposium does not offer a discussion of α%τα, though Diotima’s placement 
of the subject of Eros’s α%τα suggests that it falls within the domain of the works of Eros.  
There is, further, Agathon’s usage of αcτιος, which is suggestive of a relationship between 
what sort of thing something is and what it causes (or that for which it is responsible).  In 
this sense, α%τα indicates something flowing from the nature of the thing.  Such an 
understanding of α%τα is consonant with Socrates’ discussion of α%τα in the Phaedo,382 
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 Socrates argues in the Phaedo against those who misunderstand the true nature of 
α%τα, especially those who posit material elements, such as air and water, as causes.  
These people, he says at 98c1-3, do not “assign any real causes for the ordering of 
things.” Rather, as he says at 99b3-5, “whoever talks in that way is unable to make a 
distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the 
cause could never be a cause is quite another thing.  And so it seems to me that most 
people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, 
and are giving it a name that does not belong to it.”  In this passage, speaking of bones 
and sinews as the mistaken causes of his presently being seated in a prison cell, Socrates 
distinguishes his rational choice as cause from the material causes of his being.  This 
seems to be the sort of cause he has in mind at the beginning of his discussion of α%τα at 
Phaedo 97c2-6, where he says of Anaxagoras’s theory, “I was pleased with this theory of 
cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all 
things, and I thought, ‘If this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and 
establishes each thing as it is best for it to be.  So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the 
generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of 
existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it.”  This is, of course, just 
the sort of thing that the Form is, and Socrates’ subsequent discussion in the Phaedo 
makes it clear that these realities are the true objects of knowledge.  See also the 
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which suggests that approaching an understanding of things according to their α%τα is to 
understand that the only cause of a thing’s being is its participation in the Forms.383  Α%τα 
in this sense is not to be understood linearly, as an articulation of beginnings and the 
consequences that follow from them;384 rather the α%τα are the Forms or perfections 
toward which sensible being strives.  Thus, in asking for the α%τα of Eros, Diotima is 
asking for the perfect instance of it, and this prepares the way for her discussion of the 
various ways of participating in Eros, all articulated as images of desire for 
immortality.385   
The ascent passage proper begins at 209e5, situated after Diotima’s question 
regarding the α%τα of Eros and after her initial discussion of immortality and procreation 
that serves as answer to that question.  The entire discussion of the α%τα of Eros, then, 
can be divided very broadly according to her discussion of immortality and procreation 
between 207a5 and 209e4, and the Greater Mysteries of Eros that belong to the ascent 
passage.386  Both sections are united, however, by the themes of immortality and 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussion of the Phaedo in Hans Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight 
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telling of the final revelation, the text moves definitively beyond the preceding depictions 
of Eros. 
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procreation that serve as their subject.387  These sections should be understood, then, as 
one prolonged discourse on the themes of immortality and procreation insofar as these 
are the α%τα of Eros.  Viewed from this perspective, a tripartite structure of the text from 
207a5 to the end of the ascent passage emerges, along the lines of the tripartite division 
of the soul articulated in the Republic.388 The different descriptions of the lover’s activity 
and procreation are descriptions of the kind of procreation proper to each part of the 
tripartite soul.  Just as, in the Republic, each part of the soul has its proper pleasure,389 so 
in the Symposium, each part of the soul has a proper activity in the pursuit of its proper 
pleasure.   
This structure is further suggested by the introduction, early on, of a distinction 
between kinds of immortality, according to the manner in which mortal and immortal 
beings participate in immortality.  The mortal immortality of which Diotima speaks is the 
perpetuation of the name or image of an individual that occurs in time; such is the 
immortality insured to all beings that generate offspring.390  The immortality proper to 
divine beings, however, is of a different nature, because the divine, being perfect, is 
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removed from time and change.  Existing as it does beyond the realm of temporality and 
flux, the divine is truly immortal, “by always being the same in every way.”391  It is worth 
considering why this distinction is introduced at all, much less at this particular place, 
since Diotima never takes up the issue of the immortality proper to gods or of the gods 
themselves in what follows.  It seems, then, that the distinction between kinds of 
immortality only makes sense if there is a divine part392 in humans that can enjoy 
immortality in the manner of the divine, in addition to the ability to participate in 
immortality that belongs to humans as mortal beings.     
 Given this understanding of α%τα, then, the passage regarding immortality should 
be understood in terms of the relation of the realm of becoming to immortality itself; 
indeed, what serves as answer to Diotima’s question is a description of participation in 
immortality from the lowest grade of sensible being to the highest grade of being in 
humans, the rational element.  The discussion of procreation that is woven into the 
discussion of immortality is structured not only by the distinction between procreation of 
body and soul, but more fundamentally according to the distinction Diotima draws 
between mortal and divine immortality.  Nested within this distinction between mortal 
and divine immortality is a description of the manner in which the three different 
faculties of soul participate in immortality, each according to its proper object of desire.  
The desire to be immortal seems to be the soul’s desire to dwell with the Forms, to 
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 This part of the human soul, however, does not seem to be made explicit in the 
Symposium, if it is to be identified with νο4ς.  What is present in the Symposium is the 
claim at 206c6-7 that “living creatures, despite their mortality, contain this immortal 
aspect, of pregnancy and procreation.”  
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become more like that which, in its essence, it is itself; this is what moves it toward 
knowledge.    
 
Eros, the Tripartite Soul, and Participation in Immortality 
 
 
 
The passage from Symposium 207a5-212b1 depicts the different sorts of 
procreation and so also immortality at work in the cosmos.  Diotima gives an account that 
begins with the most general and universal instances of procreation and ascends to the 
more specific and limited instances of procreation that are singular to human beings, 
beginning with the physical aspects of human beings, proceeding to the affective393 
aspects of human beings, and finally to the rational aspect of human beings.  Out of this 
description arises an account of the manner in which the human soul participates in 
immortality insofar as its Eros is directed toward the objects proper to each of its parts, 
beginning with the appetitive, proceeding to the affective, and finally to the rational.394  
The first instance of this occurs immediately after Diotima asks about the cause of Eros, 
when she describes the physical procreation common to all animals, and also to the 
appetitive element of the human soul: 
What do you think, Socrates, is the cause of this love, and this desire?  
Don’t you see how terribly all animals are affected whenever they feel the 
desire to procreate, whether they go on foot or have wings—all of them 
stricken with the effects of love, first for intercourse with one another, and 
then also for nurturing their offspring, so that the weakest are prepared to 
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join battle with the strongest on their offspring’s behalf and even die for 
them, torturing themselves with hunger so as to rear them, and doing 
everything else necessary?395 
 
Diotima’s first description of the cause of love and desire, then, is articulated as an 
instance of appetitive nature.  This passage suggests that Eros is a motive force in all 
living beings, driving them toward procreation, and disposing them to suffer for the sake 
of their offspring.  In the animal world, this investment in the well-being of offspring is 
particularly puzzling, since this investment does not appear to be grounded in rationality.  
As Diotima continues, this appetitive drive is more clearly linked to the desire for 
immortality, but once again, at this primordial level, the desire for immortality is not one 
grounded in the rationality of the beings who exhibit it. 
Diotima’s description of procreation as the mortal participation in immortality 
occurs in the following passage:  
The same account applies to animals as to human beings: mortal nature 
seeks so far as it can to exist for ever and to be immortal.  And it can 
achieve it only in this way, through the process of coming-into-being, 
because it always leaves behind something else that is new in place of the 
old, since even during the time in which each living creature is said to be 
alive and to be the same individual—as for example someone is said to be 
the same person from when he is a child until he comes to be an old man, 
and yet, if he’s called the same, that’s despite the fact that he’s never made 
up from the same thing, but is always being renewed, and losing what he 
had before, whether its hair, or flesh, or bones, or blood, in fact the whole 
body.396 
 
Her first descriptions of procreation as participating in immortality, then, show that this 
procreation exists at all levels of mortal being; even the component parts of the human 
being are seen to be in a state of fluctuation, coming into being and passing away to be 
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replaced again.   At its most general and universal level, Eros is the natural motion of the 
cosmos.  In this brief description, Diotima provides a graded presentation of the activities 
of Eros in the cosmos—the everlasting coming-to-be and passing away of things occurs 
at a microcosmic level in the human being, as it does also in the physical preservation of 
any individual organism; at the macrocosmic level of physical procreation, animals and 
humans leave behind images of themselves in their offspring.  The desire for immortality 
is explained in terms of reproduction, and the changes of both the body and the soul that 
take place within an individual while he appears to remain the same are used as examples 
of the kinds of reproduction that allow mortal beings to pursue a more divine life.  Thus, 
in two ways, humans are seen to participate in immortality by procreation.  The desire for 
physical procreation that Diotima cites at the beginning of this section is the desire proper 
to the appetitive element.397  The irrational or appetitive element of the soul is responsible 
not only for animating the internal procreation necessary for growth and nutrition of the 
body, but also for the impulse that extends beyond the body-soul composite in 
procreating new physical beings.   
The procreation that is proper to the soul belongs, in one sense, to the honor-
loving part of the soul, or spirited element.398  The lover of honor procreates for the sake 
of immortal fame.399 Diotima gives two examples of this kind of lover.  There are those, 
like Alcestis and Achilles, who sacrificed themselves for their loves so that their names 
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would be remembered for their magnificent deeds.400  The second set of honor lovers she 
describes, however, are those who leave behind magnificent works, as do poets and 
craftsmen.401  This honor-lover is described in greater detail, and in relation to his 
beloved.  Upon finding someone beautiful in both body and soul, the lover “ε$piορε2 
λγων”; he is full of things to say about what will make his beloved good.402  It is notable 
that the lover is not said to procreate λγοι in this instance, and this distinguishes the lover 
at this level from the lover at the first stage of the ascent passage.  Rather, this lover 
produces beautiful works, the immortal children of the soul—in poetry, laws, virtue; the 
lover is inspired by the beauty he perceives in the beloved, and gazing upon this beauty, 
generates works in praise of it.  The comments here regarding the poets and craftsmen as 
being pregnant with φρνησις and the other virtues seem to have at least a two-fold 
significance.  On the one hand, it is unlikely that Plato or his Socrates would endorse the 
position that poets and craftsmen would have the truth regarding virtue;403 and, taking 
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 “Wisdom and the rest of virtue; of which all the poets are, of course, procreators’:  
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203d6), of the sort generally attributed to Homer and Hesiod (cf. d3-4n.), but neither of 
whom has actually managed to show much evidence of wisdom.  Whatever we suppose 
to be P.’s general view of poets, the handling of the two actually present in Symp. renders 
it actually impossible that ‘of which all the poets are procreators’ could be taken as 
seriously and literally meant—unless, of course, Diotima is a real and independent 
individual, whose actual views S. (P.) is reporting.  Since the evidence against this 
overwhelmingly strong, the ironic reading—for which Apology 22a-c would provide 
good background reading—seems inevitable.”  C.J. Rowe, Commentary on Plato: 
Symposium, 190, n. 209a3-4.   
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this passage as a description of the thumotic soul suggests also that the kind of virtue 
spoken of here is not the complete, final, or best virtue attainable by man.  So there is, in 
this sense, an ironic, mocking significance to the passage.  On the other hand, the 
thumotic soul desires to be perceived as noble, good, and virtuous, and so engages in 
those activities that will help him gain such renown, without adequate attention to the 
true nature of his behavior or perhaps because, without reflection or contemplation, he 
takes conventional views on virtue to be the model for his behavior.  In this sense, the 
description of this lover is most apt.  Even the description of the poets404 as lovers of this 
sort makes sense in this context, for their odes praise and chronicle the sort of virtue that 
is valued by society; and any created likeness of virtue by the poets remains a likeness 
and so at best an image of actual virtue.   
It can be seen from this, that the section of Diotima’s discourse from 207a5 to 
212b1 is organized in three parts that correspond to the divisions of the soul in the 
Republic, such that they reflect the appetitive, spirited, and rational elements of the soul.  
This section describes the lives of those who imitate mortality at the level of body and at 
the level of honor, parallel to the lives dominated by the lower two of the three elements 
of the soul articulated in the Republic.405  The lover who is initiated into the final 
mysteries of Eros has moved beyond both of these sorts of love and procreation; for his 
                                                 
404
 Hesiod and Homer are cited as examples here, more perhaps for longevity than 
content.  It is puzzling, for instance, that no mention is made of Pindar, who is so notable 
a poet if one is looking for a poet full of words on virtue and what makes men good. 
 
405
 Rowe links the passage regarding honor with philotimia, but does not link the 
preceding section to the appetitive element of the soul. 
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love and procreation are proper to the rational element in man so that even when he gazes 
merely on a beautiful body he generates λγοι.   
At the lower two levels of soul, there is evidence of the nature of Eros that is 
described in the theogonic account of his origins.   The poverty of Eros is depicted in the 
sacrifice and suffering that is embraced by lovers for the sake of participation in 
immortality; parents are willing to forego certain pleasures, or to endure pain and 
hardship, in short to dwell with poverty, as a means or way to ensuring the well-being of 
their offspring.  Similarly poets and craftsmen willingly endure hardships for the sake of 
their ‘immortal offspring’—those works of art or laws or famous deeds that history 
should not forget—and in this sense, they too embrace poverty as a means or way to a 
share in temporal immortality.  The lover who is not directed toward love of such images 
of virtue and such temporal, worldly immortality, is the lover who enters upon the 
Greater Mysteries of Eros, those which are proper to the rational part of the soul.  The 
immortality to which he aspires is divine, for his final end will be to dwell with the Form 
of beauty itself.  Diotima indicates that the lover who begins the ascent at the rational 
level is already apprised of the workings of Eros at all of these other levels, not only with 
regard to the soul, but also with regard to the work of Eros as a cosmic force that 
animates and perpetuates the cosmos and its inhabitants.406  It is at this level that the full 
force of all that has gone before is brought to bear.   
                                                 
406
 “ ‘Into these aspects of erotics, perhaps, S., you too could be initiated’:  evidently (see 
e.g. Gorgias 497c, with scholiast; and Burkert 1983:266) initiation into the Lesser (or 
‘Small’) Mysteries, at Agrae (‘in the city’), was a necessary qualification for initiation 
into the Great(er), at Eleusis; and on any account it must be true that S. will have needed 
to learn what has gone before in order even to begin to grasp what follows.  But 
Diotima’s main point is just about the relative importance, and difficulty, of the two sets 
of ideas; it hardly matters that the real Greater Mysteries were evidently not particularly 
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Diotima marks the beginning of a new section of her speech and of her teaching 
with the following words:  
Into these aspects of erotics, perhaps, Socrates, you too could be initiated; 
but as for those aspects relating to the final revelation, the ones for the 
sake of which I have taught you the rest, if one approaches these 
correctly—I don’t know whether you would be capable of initiation into 
them.  Well, she said, I’ll tell you this next part, and spare no effort in 
doing so: and you must try to follow, if you can.  It’s like this, she said.  
The person who turns to this matter correctly must begin, when he is 
young, to turn to beautiful bodies, and first, if the one leading him leads 
him correctly, he must fall in love with a single body and there procreate 
beautiful words….407 
 
Her speech clearly indicates a turning point in the description both of erotics and the 
human participation in immortality through procreation.  Diotima distinguishes this 
passage as containing the highest mysteries of Eros.  The preceding teachings408 were 
                                                                                                                                                 
difficult…Pace Riedweg 1987:2-29, it is unnecessary to go back and re-read Diotima’s 
preliminaries in the light of the new image, which is suggested above all by the idea of 
the final vision of Beauty (210e-212a).” Rowe, Commentary on Plato: Symposium, 193, 
n. 209e5-210a1.    
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 Symp. 209e5. 
 
408
 Diotima has throughout utilized language from the mystery religions, and her 
language here designates what is to follow as +piοpiτικς (highest mystery).  If we are to 
take the descriptions of human participation in immortality that begin at 207c5 as a 
parallel to the initiation rites of mystery religion, we might recognize that there is an 
analogous movement from concern with body to concern with soul.  Whether the 
activities described at each level are intended as prescriptions for behavior rather than as 
descriptions of the activities characteristic of souls dominated by one of the two lower 
elements is dubious.  It is not, at any rate, necessary to read these two lower levels as an 
indication of prescribed action, as Guthrie notes that τελετ can indicate sacred writings 
as well as initiatory rites.  W. K. C. Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1993), 201-204.  With this in mind, it is not difficult to 
understand all that Diotima transmits as a teaching and not a blueprint for action.  Thus, 
contra Nussbaum’s suggestion in The Fragility of Goodness, there is no reason to 
suppose that any part of Diotima’s discourse recommends promiscuity en route to the 
vision of the beautiful itself.  See page 181, where she writes that “we can perhaps, 
though with difficulty, get ourselves, in imagination into the posture of seeing bodies as 
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necessary, but seem undesirable as ends to pursue in themselves, since they are, as 
Diotima emphasizes, for the sake of the final revelation.  This is an indication that the 
lover who pursues these highest mysteries must already have been initiated into the 
Lesser Mysteries, and that he knows the things about erotics that Diotima has thus far 
explained.  Her language here also indicates that what follows is a description of the 
correct way of pursuing erotics and so also that the preceding ways are deficient, since 
she describes the would-be lover as “wanting to search after or pursue correctly”(MρθPς 
µετw) the highest mysteries, distinguishing qualitatively the activity of this lover sharply 
from those of the two preceding lovers.  Twice more, in the space of five lines, Diotima 
emphasizes the Mρθς quality of the way the lover must proceed in order to achieve the 
final revelation.409 
Within these same lines, Diotima moves between referring to the lover’s progress 
as his own seeking and as his following another.  Her first description of this lover, using 
the subjunctive form of µ5τειµι, indicates a searching after, or following after.  Her second 
formulation states the necessity of “going correctly” (MρθPς %ντα), and is followed by the 
first mention of a leader (=γο"µενος) who is responsible for leading his youth correctly.  
The verbs used in both places are ambiguous; it is unclear whether the one embarking on 
these final mysteries is seeking or being led.  The significance of the leader at 210a6 is 
also ambiguous.  It is not clear who the leader is; in the traditional pederastic relationship, 
                                                                                                                                                 
qualitatively interchangeable with one another—because we have, or can imagine having, 
relevant experiences of promiscuity or of non-particularized sexual desire.” 
 
409
 Symp.  210a2-6. 
 
 194 
one would expect the lover to be leading the beloved.410  But Diotima’s depiction of Eros 
throughout her speech has been from the perspective of a lover who seeks his beloved, so 
this seems implausible.  Rowe suggests that:  
If we follow out the metaphor of the Mysteries, ‘the one leading him’ will 
be a mustagôgos, someone who guides the new initiates.  In the real 
Mysteries, this will apparently have been a person already initiated and 
responsible for keeping the new initiates both in order and informed…in 
the present context the ‘mystagogue’ will be someone already initiated in, 
i.e. experienced in, ‘loving correctly’, but also, insofar as the initiate’s 
progress will be a philosophical one (see e.g. d4-6n.), in philosophy.411   
 
It is possible, however, that this leader is none other than the daimon Eros described 
earlier by Diotima, and this would not be incompatible with the understanding of a 
daimon as mystagogue.  If such were the case, the daimonic possession of the lover 
would lead him through the stages of loving correctly, and yet this same lover would be 
seeking and active in his own right.   
This model of divine possession helps to answer the question of how the lover 
moves from one stage of the ascent to the next, since the daimon is able to cause motion 
in the human being.  It does not seem, however, to be the complete answer.  The allusions 
to mystery religions, the description of the lover as “going correctly”, and the description 
of the actions of the lover at each stage of the ascent, together suggest that Diotima is 
describing a practice, analogous to religious ritual that, if employed, will assist the lover 
in his progress.  The description of Eros as a “co-worker (συνεργς) with human nature” at 
the end of Socrates’ encomium also emphasizes the joint contributions of Eros and 
                                                 
410
 Such a reading would be supported by the explicit mention of correct pederasty at the 
end of the ascent passage, though the existence of meaning on this level does not exclude 
the possibility of others.   
 
411
 Rowe, 194, n. 210a6-7. 
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human beings.412  In the examination of the ascent passage itself, then, how are the 
contributions of Eros and the lover revealed?  What does our understanding of Eros as an 
intermediate who is both piενα and piρος contribute to an understanding of the ascent 
passage?  In what sense can this section of the dialogue be seen as a continuation of the 
explanation of the desire for immortality as α%τια?  How does the understanding of the 
ascent passage as an expression of this desire for immortality as proper to the rational 
element influence its interpretation?   
The very first stage of the lover’s progress presents a structure and motion that is 
reiterated in subsequent stages.  The lover first loves a single beautiful body, and in doing 
this, generates beautiful λγοι.  The lover then realizes “that the beauty that there is in any 
body whatever is the twin of that in any other”; or, conceived more generally, that there is 
some other beautiful object of the same kind as his beloved object.413  From this 
realization, he moves to the realization that beauty exists in all objects of this same sort, 
in this case, all bodies; his love is extended to include all instances of this beauty, in this 
case, beauty of all bodies.  The result, then, of loving one particular sensible body is the 
recognition that it shares something with other beautiful bodies, such that for the one who 
wishes to “pursue beauty of outward form, it’s quite mad not to regard the beauty in all 
bodies as one and the same.”414 Thus, from the love of all bodies comes the realization 
that there is something shared or universal in the beauty that belongs to bodies; it is this 
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recognition of the universal beauty of bodies that prompts the lover to regard the beauty 
of a single body as something paltry and to love it less.   
This is the first instance of a recurring realization and movement on the part of the 
lover.  At each stage of the lover’s progression, he begins by loving a particular kind of 
object, generates something as a result of his love, and proceeds to the recognition that 
the beauty in his beloved object is only one instance of the beauty he seeks.  At the first 
two stages, this discovery leads him to think415 that the beloved object is trivial (σµικρς), 
and so to be less ruled by his beloved, as at the first stage he is said “to relax this 
passionate love for one body.”416  There are two moments of poverty in this movement.  
The first occurs as a result of the lover’s generation; his very loving causes him to pour 
himself out and thus to become poor.  The lover is then filled again with a greater vision 
of beauty, one that is more universal than his last.  After this comes the second moment 
of poverty, when the lover recognizes the smallness of the beauty he first loved and 
releases himself from its hold.    
Once the lover loves all bodies, he moves on to the recognition of beauty of soul 
without, it appears, first recognizing the triviality of physical beauty.  Rather, the lover 
recognizes that beauty of soul is τιµι6τερος—more honorable—than beauty of body.  
Again, at this level, the lover loves a single object, in this case a beautiful soul, and 
consequently procreates λγοι.  This time, however, the λγοι are both begotten and sought 
after, and they are of a particular kind, those “that will make young men into better 
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 +ννο5ω at 210b4, =γ5οµαι at 210b3, b7, c7. 
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men.”417  In generating λγοι that will “make young men into better men” the lover will 
have cause to think about practices, customs, and laws, as those things that are designed 
to teach and guide the young.418 Customs and laws are both products of convention; they 
have been alluded to previously in the section regarding the honor lover in the reference 
to governance of cities and households that is connected to the discussion of virtue as 
“things that it is fitting for the soul to conceive and to bring to birth.”419  
The lover, who is still by virtue of the initial description himself being led, at this 
stage seems to find his own beloved and so to become a leader of sorts himself.  He 
delivers λγοι to his beloved in order to improve him; he loves and cares for the boy, so 
that at this level there is an indication that the beloved object is tended by the lover, 
where there was not at the prior level.  Because he wants to improve the beloved, the 
                                                 
417
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418
 “ ‘And gives birth to the sorts of words—and seeks for them—that will make young 
men into better men’: the words ‘and seeks’ (delayed also in the Greek) are frequently 
bracketed by editors, but on inadequate grounds.  Thus Dover says ‘the…seeker has 
already found his partner…, he does not “seek” arguments [logoi in the Greek: it seems 
better to keep the more neutral ‘words’], and toioutous [‘the sorts of’] obviously looks 
forward to hoitines…[‘that will…’]’; but as Sier sees, it is exactly the lover’s seeking for 
things of the right kind to say that will ‘compel’ him to ‘contemplate beauty as it exists in 
kinds of activity…’ (c4: he will have to look at the different kinds of things people do, 
etc., if he is going to ‘care for’ his beloved), and it is also what makes sense of ‘that will 
make young men into better men’.  (The general point was seen by Stallbaum and Rettig 
in the last century; Bury unfortunately rejects their defence of ‘and seeks’ as ‘futile’.)  
Since the lover is being guided and taught, it surely fits that he shouldn’t have the right 
sorts of logoi off pat—he’s bursting with ideas, but will also need to do some seeking, 
inquiring (presumably with his guide, but no doubt also with his beloved).  If Love, and 
the lover, is a philosopher (see d4-6n.), this should hardly come as a surprise; contrast the 
lover of 209b8-c1, or indeed our lover at the beginning (210a7), both of whom do have 
things off pat, in a way distinctly unlike Diotima’s picture of the perpetually indigent 
Love.  In short, removing ‘and seeks’ is not only unjustified, but does some damage to 
the argument” (Rowe, Symposium, 195, n. c2-3). 
 
419
 Symp. 209a2. 
 
 198 
lover is “compelled…to contemplate beauty as it exists in kinds of activity and in laws, 
and to observe that all of this is mutually related, in order that he should think beauty of 
body a slight thing.”420  Upon the realization that the beauty of laws and practices is 
shared and universal, again the lover realizes that the beauty that attracts him is present 
not only in physical manifestations, but also in the human soul and those human 
creations—laws and practices—that can cause it, i.e. the soul, to grow in beauty.  And, 
once again, the realization of this beauty causes the lover to think differently about 
beauty of different kinds, namely that of body, for he realizes that beauty to be σµικρς 
when compared to the beauty he has seen in laws and practices.  Thus we can see that the 
lover begins to love that beauty which is further removed from physical particulars, so 
that his love for an object is proportional to its place in a hierarchy that begins with one 
particular body and extends to the universal principles embedded in practices and laws.  
But, this sort of principle is not yet the highest, and so the lover continues his ascent.  
The next manifestation of beauty the lover gazes upon is that in “the different 
kinds of knowledge”, and this stage is marked by several differences from those that have 
preceded.  It is first notable that this contains the first clear statement that the lover is “no 
longer slavishly attached to the beauty belonging to a single thing—a young boy, some 
individual human being, or one kind of activity.”421  This stage is also marked by a strong 
ambiguity in the language of leading.  The image of the lover being led, obscure from the 
outset, was turned about at the prior stage, as he became the leader of a beloved.  At this 
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level, there is no explicit mention of his beloved, and the Greek formulation422 further 
obscures the personages doing the leading and being led.  The third rather remarkable 
feature of this stage is that the lover himself, because he is “no longer slavishly attached 
to the beauty belonging to a single thing…may cease to be worthless and petty 
(σµικρολγος).”423  This is striking because at the previous stages, the lover recognizes 
some object external to himself as σµικρς; in this case, however, though his vision of 
beauty continues to grow to include more universal objects, Diotima does not state that 
he finds either activities (+piιτηδε"µατα) or kinds of knowledge (+piιστ/µη)424 trivial as a 
consequence of his increased vision.  Rather it is the case that the lover himself becomes 
a person not concerned with trivialities or caught up in them because he does not devote 
himself exclusively to one person, custom, or activity; hence he is not ruled by any of 
these things.   This poverty with respect to individual objects of affection is echoed in the 
passage that follows, in the description of the lover procreating beautiful “words and 
                                                 
422
 “ ‘After activities, he must lead him to the different kinds of knowledge’: the 
translation here accurately represents the Greek in not identifying either the subject or the 
object of the ‘leading’, but the Greek even omits the ‘he’ and the ‘him’.  In a way not 
explicit identification is needed; we know who is doing the leading (the leader) and who 
is being led (the lover).  However the sudden use of the transitive verb, with no subject, 
and with the likely candidate for the role last mentioned seventeen lines ago (in a6), is 
striking (that the object is unspecified is less so, since the obvious candidate for that role 
has been present all the time).  Nor, if there are two relationships involved (guide/lover, 
lover/beloved), is the question ‘who must lead who?’ obviously otiose.  In that case, it is 
not unreasonable to suspect a deliberate ambiguity: perhaps both guide must lead lover, 
and lover the beloved (that is, on separate occasions)?  It is already fairly clear, after all, 
that both lover and beloved will progress; and if they do, they presumably do in the same 
way”  (Rowe, Symposium, 196, n. c7-8.) 
 
423
 Symp. 210d1-3.  This is the last occurrence of σµικρς or its compounds in Diotima’s 
speech. 
 
424
 For a useful discussion of +piιστ/µη and its relation to practices (+piιτηδε"µατα) and 
virtue, see John Rist, Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origen, 115-156. 
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thoughts in a love of wisdom that grudges nothing.”425  For the abundance of the lover—
his procreation of beautiful words and thoughts—is of a piece with his freedom from the 
kind of Eros that dominates a lover obsessed by his beloved.  This disposition, the love of 
wisdom that grudges nothing, is the state the lover must achieve if he is to attain the 
vision of the beautiful itself.   
But instead, turned towards the great sea of beauty and contemplating that, 
[he] may bring to birth many beautiful, even magnificent, words and 
thoughts in a love of wisdom that grudges nothing, until there, with his 
strength and stature increased, he may catch sight of a certain single kind 
of knowledge, which has for its object a beauty of a sort I shall describe to 
you.426 
 
It is only after the lover has achieved this state, in which he is himself no longer 
σµικρολγος, that he is able to “catch sight of a certain single kind of knowledge,”427 that 
of beauty itself.428  It is in catching sight of beauty itself that the lover is moved to the 
final stage of the ascent.   
Each stage of the ascent has described the disposition of the lover toward 
potential objects of affection; at this level, his gaze moves upward from “kinds of 
knowledge” or, more properly perhaps, multiplicity of knowledge to “catch sight of a 
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 Symp. 210d5-6. 
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 Symp. 210d3-7. 
 
427
 Symp. 210d6-7. 
 
428
 Good was earlier substituted for beauty at 204e1-3; the daimon Eros was described as 
intermediate between the beautiful and ugly, wisdom and ignorance, immortal and 
mortal, good and bad; there is perhaps, then, good reason to view the beautiful, good, 
immortal, and wisdom as coextensive, though not as identical.  Participation in the 
immortal, then, is also participation in the good, the beautiful, and the wise; but to 
participate or share in it is not to be the same as it.   
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certain single kind of knowledge.”429  Where before the lover beheld the beauty 
belonging to knowledge generally, as knowledge of various things exists in its various 
forms, now the lover will behold a knowledge that seems to sit above the rest, and this is 
knowledge of beauty itself, the beauty by which all other knowledge is made beautiful.  It 
is at this level that Diotima describes life430 as “worth living for a human being, in 
contemplation of beauty itself.”431  The final goal of loving and living, then, is to engage 
in the activity of contemplating beauty.  As the lover gazes at this highest beauty, once 
again, he will recognize that it is a finer thing than all of the other beautiful objects, that it 
is not “of the same order as…gold, and clothes, and the beautiful boys and young 
men.”432  And at this level the lover procreates “true virtue”; but following from this, “it 
belongs to him to be loved by the gods, and to him, if to any human being, to be 
immortal.”433   
Rowe suggests that “the general upshot [of the ascent passage] is that the 
conversion away from the individual—whether lover or beloved?—is an epistemological 
process, involving the acquisition of that ability to grasp the general/generic which is 
blocked by too great an attachment to the particular; that is, so the context seems to tell 
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 The word for life here is βος, a term associated with the way of life followed by 
Orphics and Pythagoreans.  Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, 301-304. 
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us, to particular, physical, instantiations of beauty.”434  While the epistemological process 
does seem to serve as the analogue here, it seems that the context and purpose of the 
dialogue demand an application in terms of affectivity, so that Rowe’s phrase “too great 
an attachment to the particular” is more to the point.  What is described in the ascent 
passage is certainly proper to the soul considered as a rational being, and particularly in 
terms of his rational element, but considered here insofar as it is erotic or affective.  
The continued presence of γ5νεσις and τκτω link the ascent passage back to the 
discussion of procreating and begetting as participation in immortality, and so also to the 
discussion of the α%τα of Eros.  In the context of this discussion, the ascent passage 
follows the descriptions of the two lower parts of the soul participating in immortality 
through the kind of procreation available to each of them, and so may be viewed as 
descriptive of the erotic movement of the rational element as it participates in 
immortality.  If the α%τα are to be the Forms, then the Form of both Eros and +piιθυµα is 
the desire for immortality, and so what follows is a description of the various ways that 
the cosmos and its inhabitants strive to become like the Forms; for the rational element in 
human beings, the process involves the distancing of the soul or mind from the 
particularity, changeability, and sensuality of the material world.  The structure of this 
section of Diotima’s speech as a description of the ways in which the parts of the soul 
participate in immortality also suggests that the immortality participated in at the highest 
level of the ascent passage is more akin to divine immortality than it is to temporal or 
mortal immortality.  Just as the powers of the soul exist within an hierarchical order, so 
also do the activities that are its participations in immortality.  The lower parts of soul are 
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only able to participate in immortality in the way Diotima describes as proper to mortals, 
by leaving images of themselves behind in the temporal realm.  Such immortality is 
distinguished from divine immortality: “And in that way everything mortal is preserved, 
not, like the divine, by always being the same in every way, but because what is 
departing and aging leaves behind something new, something such as it had been.”435  
The immortality attributed to the lover who achieves the highest stage of the ascent and 
beholds beauty itself seems to be of this divine order; for in the course of the ascent, he 
has himself been transformed and become more like the Forms his soul desires.  In his 
beholding them and dwelling with them, he shares in the immortality that is theirs, that of 
always being the same. 
 
                                                 
435
 Symp. 208b1. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
κθαρσις AND  THE PURIFICATION OF EROS 
 
 
 
 The themes of impiety and hubris appear throughout the Symposium.  The first 
and last speeches are given by men who will be tried for crimes of impiety toward the 
Eleusinian mysteries, Phaedrus and Alcibiades.  And, as noted in chapter three, the 
dialogue presents two members of the drinking party as charging Socrates with hubris, 
Agathon at the beginning of the party, and Alcibiades at the end.  But this charge of 
hubris is subtly countered in the drama of the Symposium by Socrates’ evident poverty, 
and poverty appears throughout the dialogue as a counterpoint to this worst of all possible 
kinds of greed that is the ruin of man. 
 The kind of poverty we find at the center of Eros’s nature is closely associated 
with σωφροσ"νη, or temperance, the very virtue which requires of humans that their 
desires be ordered toward the right things and to the proper degree, the virtue that 
supplants greed.  The practice of this virtue is the practice of poverty, and entails the 
turning of the soul away from material goods and pleasures toward the more substantial 
goods and pleasures that belong to the soul as a consequence of its very nature.  The 
Phaedo describes this transformation of the soul as practicing for death, and this practice 
itself is called κθαρσις.  The κθαρσις described in the Phaedo parallels the ascents of the 
soul to the vision of the Good and the Beautiful described in the Republic and 
Symposium.436  This parallelism suggests that the processes described in the Republic and 
                                                 
436Resp. 7. 514a1-520d5, Symp. 210a5-211e6, Phd. 99e1-100e1.  See also Kenneth 
Dorter, “Three Disappearing Ladders,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 29, no. 3 (1996): 279-
99. 
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Symposium are cathartic processes.  In the case of the Symposium itself, this implies that 
the effect of Eros rightly directed, is κθαρσις, and that the elucidation of various levels of 
ascent to the vision of the Beautiful is an elucidation of the stages of this κθαρσις.  
Where the Phaedo describes κθαρσις in terms of man’s rational element, however, the 
Symposium describes a κθαρσις of man’s affective element.  In what follows, I will 
discuss the nature of κθαρσις, the concept of κθαρσις put forward in the Phaedo, and 
show how this conception of κθαρσις is present in the Symposium’s presentation of Eros 
as comprising Poverty and Resource. 
 
The Concept of Kθαρσις in the Phaedo and the Sophist 
 
 
 
In the Phaedo, the true philosopher (Mρθς φιλσοφος) is described as practicing for 
death,437 and this practice, insofar as it aims for the separation of the soul from the 
pollution of the body, is described as κθαρσις.  The term κθαρσις itself has several 
applications, descriptive of the purification needed by the body for physical health, 
descriptive of the purification of both body and soul needed by initiates of mystery 
religions, and finally descriptive of the philosophical process by which the soul is 
purified of the confusion and misdirection that results from its communion with the 
body.438  We might, then, distinguish three distinct senses of κθαρσις: medical (of the 
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body), religious (ritual purifications of both body and soul), and philosophical.  Though 
Plato’s sense of κθαρσις in the Phaedo is primarily philosophical, it seems best 
understood in relation to and as arising from the others. Evidence from both the Phaedo 
and the Sophist shows that Plato applies the concept of κθαρσις to both body and soul.  In 
the Sophist, Plato identifies κθαρσις as a kind of separation and distinguishes purification 
of the body from that of the soul.439  In the Phaedo, Plato presents κθαρσις as necessary 
for the proper attitude toward bodily pleasures as well as for the proper orientation of the 
soul toward the divine, suggesting both a kind of bodily κθαρσις and a spiritual-
intellectual one.   
Each of the kinds of κθαρσις mentioned above requires a cleansing, and it is by 
means of this cleansing that a certain kind of health is achieved; that which cleans the 
physical, leads to physical health; that which cleans the spiritual and intellectual to 
spiritual and intellectual health.  In the Phaedo, Plato describes a κθαρσις that benefits 
the health of the whole soul, so that his description of the philosophical life is not limited 
to describing the life of a rational ego, but encompasses the desires and passions shared 
with animals, the passions singular to man in his aspirations to glory and fame, and the 
passion most singular to man in his desire for truth.440  Plato’s presentation of κθαρσις in 
the Phaedo has three distinct aspects: (1) it is necessary for the proper attitude toward 
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bodily pleasures (2) it is necessary for the acquisition of pure knowledge, and so also for 
the proper orientation of the soul toward the divine (3) it involves a practice and a 
habituation of the soul, and so a way of life or ‘βος’.441   
In the Phaedo, as in the Sophist, κθαρσις is defined in terms of separation.  The 
Phaedo’s initial definition of κθαρσις is offered by Socrates: 
And does not the purification (κθαρσις) consist in this which has been 
mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the 
soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and 
bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it 
can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from 
fetters?442 
  
Kθαρσις, as a process of separating the soul from the body, and as the teaching of a habit, 
is a kind of practice.  This means, on the one hand, that the κθαρσις is not achieved all at 
once and in one moment.  It also means that the actual doing, the activity, of κθαρσις is 
repeated.  Whatever this activity turns out to be, it will be an activity that must be done 
repeatedly, and, since the end of this activity is separation from the body, the repetition of 
the activity that achieves this end will move the soul gradually toward its purification.  
The repetition is not merely the doing of the same thing over and again, but the doing of 
an activity at increasing levels of perfection.  There is a second sense in which the 
activity associated with κθαρσις is not merely replication, for the κθαρσις the 
philosopher undertakes is one of both body and soul.  This is illustrated in the Phaedo’s 
discussion of practicing for death. 
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The practice for death that Plato describes in the Phaedo involves a κθαρσις of 
both the body and the soul.  One reason that the philosopher in the Phaedo is presented as 
practicing for death (or dead already) is his attitude toward worldly or temporal goods.  
This is in fact one reason that Simmias gives for most people’s poor opinion of 
philosophers—they seem so insensible as to be dead already.443   The philosopher does 
not “care much about the so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking…[and] the 
pleasures of love…the possession of fine clothes and shoes and the other personal 
adornments.”444  Rather, Socrates proposes that the philosopher will either despise such 
things or desire them in a way that is proportional to their necessity for life.445  The 
philosopher, then, adopts an attitude that might be described as frugal; he does not reject 
bodily goods and pleasures altogether, but rejects the attitude that seeks these goods more 
than they are necessary, to the exclusion of other more important goods.  In this respect, 
the philosopher lives a life of poverty; part of his practicing for death involves disdain for 
material goods, bodily pleasures, and the indulgences of the dandy.  The κθαρσις, or 
separation from the body, regards the necessary desires described in the Republic,446 and 
thus also entails a proper disposition toward the pleasures associated with these desires.   
 The philosopher’s practice for death is not limited to purification from pleasures 
associated with the body, but includes also purification from knowledge associated with 
the body, that which is gained by means of sensation.  Even the best of the senses, i.e. 
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sight and hearing, yield only inaccurate knowledge.447  Sense knowledge, and so the 
body, do not seem to bring the soul to pure knowledge.   Pure knowledge, in this case, is 
“to understand the true essence of each thing”448 and is best achieved by one “who 
employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of 
things”.449  Plato’s description of the soul’s separation from the body indicates that the 
separation from the body, accomplished completely only in death, involves the 
withdrawal of the soul, so far as possible, from its sharing in the activities of the body.  
The separation at which the soul aims is akin to the separation ascribed to the Forms, for 
it is only the soul that is καθαρς that will dwell with the Forms after its final separation 
from the body.450   
 The soul’s best disposition in this life is described here: 
But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor 
sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, 
and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association 
or contact with the body, reaches out (Mρ5γηται τo4 nντος) toward the 
reality.451 
 
This passage makes clear that the κθαρσις of the soul applies both to the activities of 
thinking and sensing.  In one sense, this indicates that the philosopher’s practice applies 
both to mind and body.  The Phaedo is concerned with how we can think well, and the 
ways in which our body interferes with this, through its material needs, desires, 
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sensations, and perceptions.  Nonetheless, there is an indication that even when the soul 
is “alone by itself” it desires in some sense, for it “reaches out toward” the Forms.  The 
term Plato uses here is from the verb ‘Mρ5γω’, which may also mean “to yearn for” and is 
related to ‘nρεξις’ or desire.  Given Plato’s identification of three different kinds of 
pleasure proper to three different powers of soul in the Republic, it seems that he is 
alluding to the desire and pleasure proper to the rational element here.  This aspect of the 
rational element is central to understanding what rationality is for Plato; it is at the heart 
of the coincidence of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, and the reason why one who seeks 
truth also seeks goodness. 
 
The Method of Kθαρσις 
 
 
 
Subsequent to this description of the need for a κθαρσις of the rational element in 
man, Socrates describes a method of ascending to the highest of (principles or realities).  
This “hypothetical method”452 is itself a κθαρσις, and describes the means by which the 
philosopher moves closer to knowledge of the Forms.  Socrates’ brief description of this 
method begins with the assumption “that there are such things as absolute beauty and 
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good and greatness and the like.”453  It is these absolute realities that cause things to be 
and to continue in existence.454  In giving an account or explanation of a thing, it is these 
absolute realities to which the true philosopher appeals.  “…and when you had to give an 
explanation of the principle, you would give it in the same way by assuming some other 
principle which seemed to you the best of the higher ones, and so on until you reached 
the one which was adequate.”  This is the procedure proper to philosophers.455  
 The method described is an ascent that works its way toward knowledge of the 
highest possible principle of explanation.  The κθαρσις here described can be thought of 
in terms of clarification, for it is by the removal of the nonessential elements that the 
philosopher comes to know what is essential, and so also comes to know the Form itself.  
Though the description given in this section of the Phaedo is a description regarding 
objects of knowledge, this same description applies to the philosopher’s knowledge of 
himself as a soul.  As he separates himself from the matter of the body, from the 
mutability of the material world, and gathers his soul up into himself, his soul is 
separated from these things and becomes more itself.  The nature of the soul itself is 
clarified by this process—a process of κθαρσις. 
Plato’s description of the hypothetical method offers a method for seeking the 
truth of things.   Though the ultimate objects of knowledge are essences or realities, the 
end of philosophical method seems to encompass both disposition and attainment of this 
end.  The method itself requires constant practice.   With respect to both knowledge and 
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the body, this account of κθαρσις requires the philosopher to become distanced from 
certain things, to voluntarily undergo deficiencies.  The hypothetical method itself 
involves a willingness to be deprived of one’s current hypothesis—one’s convictions, 
one’s trusted reality—in order to come closer to pure knowledge.  Cornford describes the 
Phaedo’s emphasis on the withdrawal of the soul from the body as having “brought out 
the ascetic strain in Socrates, the man of thought to whom the body with its senses and 
appetites is at best a nuisance.”456  But this is not to say, as Cornford goes on to note, that 
Socrates has “ignored or ‘abolished’ the passionate side of human nature…the man of 
thought was also the man of passion, constantly calling himself a ‘lover’.”457  Curious as 
it may seem, it is the relinquishing of passion that allows Socrates to become truly 
passionate; his willing poverty allows him to appreciate things according to their place in 
the cosmos.  It is by not holding too tightly to bodily and material goods that one is freed 
from paying them constant attention; one is no longer ruled by longings for these 
transitory goods.  Rather, by not clinging to them, one enjoys them when they present 
themselves, and does not suffer from worries about their cessation.  One may be truly 
grateful for what is at hand, and truly present to the beauty and goodness of the moment.  
This is, as we have seen in chapter three, the disposition designated by ‘φθονος’. 
 With respect to both knowledge and pleasure, the separation of soul from body is 
deemed necessary because the association and community (κοινωνα and :µιλα) with the 
body misleads the soul, directing it toward and making it like the inconstant and 
transitory nature of body and matter.  As always with Plato, the soul becomes like the 
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things on which it gazes and with which it spends its time.  In terms of both the 
intellectual and moral lives, then, the soul’s bodily habitation presents obstacles to it.  
The practice for dying is, in the case of the body and the soul, done in order to make the 
soul most like the realities that it resembles, i.e. the Forms.458   
 
Virtue and κθαρσις 
 
 
 
 After the initial discussion of κθαρσις and its relation to sensation and pleasure, 
the Phaedo offers another definition of κθαρσις:  
And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other 
without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish 
and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in fact a purification 
(κθαρσις) from all these things [pleasures, pains, fears], and self-restraint 
and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification 
(καθαρµς).  And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries 
were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they 
said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other 
world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified 
will dwell with the gods.  For as they say in the mysteries, “the thyrsus-
bearers are many, but the mystics few”; and these mystics are, I believe, 
those who have been true philosophers.459 
 
This second definition of κθαρσις distinguishes between real and apparent virtue.  In the 
two conceptions of κθαρσις discussed above, the concept of purification and the practice 
for death were applied to the bodily appetites and the rational faculty.  Here, these same 
concepts are applied to the moral virtues, and the conception of moral virtue that informs 
this application is built upon what was previously established with regard to bodily 
pleasures and pains.  It becomes clear in this passage that moral virtue encompasses 
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pleasures and pains that are not, strictly speaking, bodily.  Such pleasures and pains are 
those Plato associates with the middle part of the soul in the Republic, and they are 
brought to mind here in part because of the emphasis on the virtue of courage.   
 The perfection of the soul is not a merely “rational” enterprise, for it must acquire 
virtues as well as knowledge.  Truth is able to achieve this, and the virtues are described 
as “καθαρµς”, which may indicate that they are the means of purification, but also that 
they are states of purification.460  This double meaning of καθαρµς suggests that virtue, as 
a practice, is the means by which the soul is purified, but that this practice which by 
means of repetition becomes habit is thereby also a purified state or disposition.  Virtue 
understood as a habit is thus a state of purification, but the actions that continue to flow 
from that habit are virtue as practice continuously enacted, and so also practice 
continuously purified.  It is in this sense that κθαρσις is thus both disposition and 
activity.  
 Also notable in the above passage is that it develops a distinction between real 
and apparent virtue, where apparent virtue involves a false ordering of pleasures and 
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pains.461  The false order of pleasures occurs when one pleasure is chosen as supreme and 
other pleasures are foregone for its sake.  For example, a lover of money foregoes the 
pleasures of fine food and drink so that he can retain his money.  Though he may appear 
moderate, he is not, since he checks his desires for fine food and drink only for the sake 
of a pleasure he has chosen to preference—that of having money. He has not purified 
himself of love for material goods in this instance, but developed instead a form of greed 
with respect to a particular object.  This greed prevents him from loving and desiring 
higher goods, like the virtues themselves, that are proper to the soul.  His actions and 
habits are also governed by this love that he has made supreme, so that all he does is 
ordered to achieving this one purpose—the accumulation of wealth.  Plato’s distinction 
here between real and apparent virtue emphasizes the importance of properly ordered 
desire, where the proper orientation of desire is made possible by knowing truth and thus 
what is truly desirable.462  
 The Sophist provides a clearer set of distinctions regarding κθαρσις, 
distinguishing between κθαρσις of soul and body, and then further distinguishing kinds 
of κθαρσις proper to the soul itself.  The two kinds of purification of the soul are based 
upon the two kinds of evil that may befall the soul.  The first kind of evil that may befall 
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the soul is disease, or discord, the “dissolution of kindred elements” in the soul, and this 
is called vice.  The second kind of evil is deformity, “the want of measure” in the soul 
that makes itself evident in the soul’s motion, especially its cognitive motion, and this is 
called ignorance.463  When the motion of the soul repeatedly fails to hit its mark, this 
indicates a lack of measure or symmetry in the soul itself.  This want of measure is the 
cause of the movement of the soul going astray and not hitting its mark.  The Stranger 
describes this sort of ignorance as “the aberration of a mind which is bent on truth, and in 
which the process of understanding is perverted.”464    
 The Sophist’s description of the deformity of the soul as a want of measure 
implies that the motion or Eros of the soul is affected by the disposition of the soul itself.  
Purification removes these evils from the soul, leaving behind only what is good.465  As 
such, the purification described in the Sophist is therapeutic.  The method of purification 
is not the same for both kinds of evil, but is specific to each.  This passage from the 
Sophist shares with the Phaedo the principle of κθαρσις as the means by which the soul 
is rid of those things that are detrimental to it, as well as the application of this principle 
to the moral and theoretical virtues alike.  The soul is a thing with motion, and this 
motion is Eros.  Eros has a natural or proper object, i.e., the Beautiful itself, and goes 
astray when it aims at this but does not hit it.  A perversion of Eros in this sense would 
be, e.g., taking the beauty of a particular body as Beauty itself, because this would 
amount to confusing a particular instance of beauty with Beauty itself, and mistakenly 
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taking this particular beauty as the proper object of Eros.  The lover’s mistake in this 
example becomes more apparent if we bear in mind the use and work of Eros discussed 
in chapter four.  Teleologically, Eros is the human means to ε$δαιµονα and participation 
in divine immortality.  The latter of these, in particular, is only achieved by the soul’s 
vision of the Form of Beauty itself.   
 It is habituation that creates the measure and symmetry needed in the soul if Eros 
is to hit its mark—if it is to lead the soul to Beauty itself.  In the Sophist, education and 
instruction are the cures for the ignorance that is exemplified in the soul’s want of 
measure.  Cornford suggests that the description of the Symposium depends on prior 
habituation, on having attained σωφροσ"νη, the disposition of poverty.  Poverty, at the 
levels of bodily appetite and θυµς, is the condition for the ascent in the Symposium.  
Poverty applied at the next level is a poverty of mind, but with regard to its desire for 
truth under the aspect of the beautiful.  The rational order is also an aesthetic and moral 
order.  As much as the soul desires to gaze on Beauty, its attitude or disposition toward 
its objects must remain free of graspingness and greed. 
  Croissant’s exposition of κθαρσις in Aristote et les mysteres shows that the 
mystery religions in general made use of music and rhythm within their rites to 
accomplish κθαρσις.466  The divine enthusiasm achieved in the ritual supplants the 
enthusiasm that is characterized by imbalance, and in its place reestablishes balance and 
proportion.  What is restored, according to Croissant, is balance and proportion; but she 
argues that Plato views this as a lesser achievement, (in the religious rituals), as it is a 
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“physical” balance that is achieved.467  Indeed, this is the sort of balance that Plato 
describes in the Republic when he discusses the musical and physical education of the 
guardians.  The important contribution of Croissant’s discussion is that it highlights the 
sense in which habituation is central to the concept of κθαρσις that Plato appropriates 
from the mystery religions.  The rituals and initiations there are practices that are 
designed, in part, to restore balance and proportion to the body and soul.   It is by means 
of the periodic ritual dances that participants are relieved of ailments and restored to 
health; just as the body requires regular food and exercise to maintain itself, so also with 
the passions.  The rituals and initiations are repetitious, they must from time to time be 
repeated.  In this sense, the engagement in dance is both habit and responsible for 
maintaining disposition.  The practice is engaged in at regular intervals, as any habit, and 
the consequence of the maintenance of this habit is the maintenance of a balanced and 
proportioned disposition. 
As Croissant’s discussion indicates, the concept of purification is closely bound 
up with that of madness or µανα, since it is by µανα that κθαρσις is achieved.  As 
Burkert notes in Greek Religion, “the aim [of µανα], nonetheless, in reality and in myth, 
is to bring madness back to sense, a process which requires purification and the purifying 
priest.”468  The discussion of madness in the Phaedrus supports this description, 
especially in its account of the second kind of madness that frees people from evil by 
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means of κθαρσις.469  For Plato in particular, it seems that µανα is not merely a means of 
returning to sense, but the means by which man transcends sense, and, by allowing 
himself to be possessed by a god, becomes divine himself.  This divinization of the 
human being is at once the product of purification and the purified state of man, i.e., the 
soul liberated from the bondage of place and time. 
 In addition to this conception of κθαρσις as restoring order via µανα, the mystery 
religions provide a conception of κθαρσις as progressive and transformative.  Burkert 
writes: 
Every initiation means a change in status that is irreversible; whoever has 
himself initiated on the basis of his individual decision separates himself 
from others and integrates himself into a new group.  In his own eyes the 
mystes is distinguished by a special relation to the divine, by a form of 
piety.470  
 
 The interpretation of κθαρσις as not only a process, but also as the acquiring and 
maintaining of a disposition through habit and practice is supported by Plato’s 
appropriation of the language and imagery of mystery religions in the Phaedo and the 
Symposium.  This language appears in both the Phaedo and the Symposium.  It seems we 
tend to think of a “process” in linear fashion, starting with A and ending with B, where A 
might be transformed by the process it undergoes in such a way that nothing of its 
original state remains.  But neither the “process” of the κθαρσις, nor the “process” of 
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ascent is such a thing;  the process of purification makes A more what it essentially is by 
removing what is extraneous, on the one hand, and by the establishment of habit and 
disposition on the other.  The establishing of a habit and disposition is gradual, and one 
action, every time it is performed, adds strength to the habit and grounds the disposition.  
The transformation that occurs, then, is not one that obliterates the beginning, but one 
that builds upon and further completes the individual engaged in the initiations.  What is 
paradoxical is that this completion is a process more akin to refinement, where the 
individual becomes more truly herself by the progressive removal of what is inessential 
to her being.  Like the movement toward truth in the Phaedo, and like the dialogical 
movement of the Symposium itself, the erotic ascent is a description of such a refinement. 
 In both dialogues, Plato appropriates language and imagery from mystery 
religions, and by their employment contributes to the conceptual framework of the 
process of κθαρσις.  In the Phaedo, the most significant terms employed are τελετ/,471 
βος,
472
 µελ5τηµα.
473
  The term τελετ/ is used generally of the rituals belonging to mystery 
religions.474  τελετ/ designate the rituals and initiations in which a mystes would engage.  
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474In his edition of the Phaedo, Archer-Hind notes that τας τελετας is not specific to a 
particular cult, but generally designated rituals belonging to any such cult, and so might 
indicate Orphic, Bacchic, or Eleusinian mysteries.  His note on 69b7 reads “τας τελετας. 
It seems probable, as Stallbaum says, that the Orphic traditions are in Plato’s mind, not 
the Eleusinian mysteries.  The line piολλο ναρθηκοφροι µRν βκχοι δ5 τε piα4ροι is said by 
Olympiodoros to be Orphic; it occurs, slightly changed, in Anthology X 106.  Plato is 
fond of borrowing terms of ritual, as in Phaedrus 250 C, Laws 759 C, Timaeus 44 C” 
(The Phaedo of Plato, edited with introduction, notes, and appendices by R. D. Archer-
Hind, 2nd edition (Salem, NH: Ayer Co., 1988), 25-6). See also Brisson’s introduction to 
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Such initiations are frequently purificatory, but are also closely bound up with the way of 
life adopted by members of a particular cult.  Such a way of life is designated by the term 
βος.  Burkert’s description of the Pythagorean way of life, according to the oral teachings 
or akousmata, provides an illustration of the way that ritual and practice transform daily 
life: 
To take the akousmata seriously means a disconcerting narrowing of life.  
As one rises or goes to bed, puts on shoes or cuts one’s nails, rakes the 
fire, puts on a pot or eats, there is always a rule to be observed, something 
wrong to be avoided.475  
  
Burkert’s description draws our attention to the different ritualistic facets of religious life, 
and points to a distinction between the rituals and initiations of ceremony and those of 
daily life.  Rituals and initiations are instances of ceremonial purification, but the daily 
rituals adopted by the practitioners of the religion are the stuff of the way of life, and it is 
these daily practices that are ultimately transformative of individual habits and 
dispositions. In this way, the βος is a constant and continuous purification.   The 
difficulty and arduous nature of such practice is indicated in the Phaedo by the term 
‘µελ5τηµα’, which “is regularly used of practicing an activity requiring effort and 
attention.”476 
   In the Symposium, the terms τελετ/ and βος appear again, and the allusions to 
mystery religions, especially the cult of Demeter, are more vivid given the presence of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Le Banquet, in which he notes that the term τελετ/  is synonymous with the intitations of 
mystery religions, indicating a lack of distinction between ritual and initiation. 
 
475
 Burkert, 303. 
 
476
 Rowe notes that the formulation at 67e5, “meletan + infinitive…is regularly used of 
practicing an activity requiring effort and attention” (Rowe, Phaedo, 144-5).  
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priestess, the depiction of an νοδος or ascent, the specific naming of the mysteries at 209e 
and the description of the final vision of Beauty in terms of the final revelation of the 
mysteries, as +piοpiτικς.  The understanding of τελετ/ and +piιτ/δευµα as making up part of 
the βος of the mystes is further clarified by the structure of the ascent to the vision of the 
Beautiful, which is itself described in terms borrowed from the Eleusinian mysteries.477 
 The use of religious language and imagery in the ascent passage, the centrality of 
the theogonic account of Eros, and the presentation of Eros as a daimon, together suggest 
that Plato intends his readers to understand Diotima’s account within a religious context.  
This supports an understanding of the ascent passage as a kind of κθαρσις.  Though 
neither κθαρσις nor µανα are explicitly named in the ascent passage, they are present in 
the imagery of the Eros-daimon, the poverty of Eros, and the imagery of the ascent 
passage.  The Phaedrus’ inclusion of Eros as one of the four kinds of madness lends 
further support to such an interpretation, but the evidence of the Symposium, with its 
portrayal of Eros as daimon, provides good grounds for considering the effects of Eros, 
i.e. possession by a daimon and thus µανα, as a purification.478  The connection between 
Eros and κθαρσις is further suggested by the thematic development of Eros as bound to 
poverty that was discussed in chapter three.   
If we adopt Burkert’s description of the relationship between µανα and κθαρσις, 
that “the aim [of µανα], nonetheless, in reality and in myth, is to bring madness back to 
sense, a process which requires purification and the purifying priest”, then possession by 
                                                 
477
 Symp. 210a1-2; Guthrie, The Greeks and their Gods, 287. 
 
478
 For the relationship between daimons and mania, see E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the 
Irrational. 
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the Eros-daimon is the µανα that is at the same time the κθαρσις necessary for the soul’s 
ascent to the Beautiful.  This might be understood with respect to the various aspects of 
Diotima’s account of Eros.  The ambiguous leader of the lover in the ascent passage turns 
out to be the Eros-daimon, which moves the soul upward to the vision of Beauty.  The 
ascent passage itself describes a gradual purification from association with the body, in a 
manner parallel to that described in the Phaedo.  The lover who ascends is freed from and 
purified of the “hubris” of the body that is opposed to the poverty embodied in the Eros-
daimon.  In the Phaedrus, the person possessed by gods is purified of something and also 
produces something as a consequence of this purification, e.g. the Pythia of prophecy, the 
poet of poetry.  In the Phaedo, the consistent notion of κθαρσις is the deliverance or 
release of the soul from the fetters of its association with the body.  In the Symposium, we 
see these senses of µανα combined.  At every stage of the ascent passage, the lover is 
further separated from what is petty, material, and temporal; and at every instance of 
gazing on beauty, he produces something beautiful.  His madness is not unlike those 
Plato describes in the Phaedrus, for just as the prophetess and the poet, he produces 
beautiful things as a consequence of divine possession.   
The relationship between µανα and κθαρσις captures the sense in which the Eros-
daimon is at once Poros and Penia, at once moving forward and poor.  Perhaps, more 
fundamentally, this relationship between madness and purification, resource and poverty, 
expresses a paradox of human existence.  Pieper describes just such a paradox in his 
discussion of the Phaedrus: 
 
On the one hand man is of such a nature that he possesses himself in 
freedom and self-determination; he can and must examine critically all 
that he encounters; he can and must give shape to his own life on the basis 
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of his insights.  On the other hand this same autonomous man is 
nonetheless so much involved in the Whole of reality that things can 
happen to him and he can be dislodged from his own autonomy.  This 
need not take only the form of forcible restriction.  Provided that the man 
does not close himself off obdurately, it may take such a form that in the 
very loss of his self-possession another fulfillment is granted him, one 
attainable in no other way.479 
 
The same strange duality that Pieper describes is present in Diotima’s account of the 
lover’s ascent to the Beautiful.  The movement from one stage of the ascent to the next is 
dependent on the lover realizing the paltry nature of the beloved object, on his reflective 
interaction with the objects and persons around him.  At the same time, Diotima refers 
time and again to a leader or teacher who guides the lover from one stage to the next, and, 
in the final vision of Beauty, the lover must wait for the Beautiful to reveal itself.  The 
lover must do preparatory work, he must journey as far as he can on his own, but the final 
revelation comes to him from without, has its source outside of him, and he can only 
make himself receptive to it. 
 
Conclusion: The Purification of Eros 
 
 
 
 As we have seen, Plato’s use of the term ‘κθαρσις’ shows that it is a process by 
which the soul separates itself from the body, and that this process brings the soul to the 
fulfillment of its own nature.  In the Phaedo, this κθαρσις applies not only to the rational 
part of the soul, but also to the appetitive parts of the soul, and because of this involves 
                                                 
479
 Josef Pieper, Enthusiasm and Divine Madness: On the Platonic Dialogue Phaedrus, 
trans. by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1964), 
50-51. 
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both moral and intellectual virtue.480  The κθαρσις described is not a merely linear 
process, but is transformative of the soul because through practice it instills habit and 
disposition, from which flow virtuous actions.  To this concept of κθαρσις the Sophist 
contribrutes an understanding of κθαρσις as corrective of the motion of the soul, so that 
the purified motion is more able to hit the mark at which it aims.  In the Symposium, Plato 
makes use of the language of the mysteries, whose initiations are cathartic, to describe a 
progressive and transformative κθαρσις of rational affectivity.  Loving rightly is the 
positive articulation of the process of purification, whose negative articulation is the 
poverty of Eros.   
 Though the Phaedo’s treatment of κθαρσις remarks on the proper attitude toward 
necessary desires and the desires proper to the middle part of the soul, this treatment is 
given in terms of the soul’s capacity for thinking, rather than loving.  In the Symposium, 
on the other hand, we are presented with an account of how the soul moves from love of 
individual material beauty to love of the Beautiful itself.  This, too, is a kind of 
purification of the rational soul, but with respect to the motion proper to the soul—Eros.  
Cornford compares this ascent to the Beautiful to the ascent described in the Republic: 
 
Now in Diotima’s discourse the Greater Mysteries of Eros take this for 
their point of departure.  They describe the conversion of Eros from the 
love of a single beautiful person to the love of Beauty itself.  The upward 
journey of emotion runs parallel to the upward journey of the intellect in 
                                                 
480
 The relationship between the apparently simple and undivided soul of the Phaedo and 
the tripartite division of the soul in the Republic is well discussed by Archer-Hind in his 
introduction to the Phaedo ( xxxii-xxxvi).  He argues that the tripartite division of the 
soul does not indicate “different parts or kinds, but only different modes of the soul’s 
activity under different conditions.  The two lower eide are consequent upon the 
conjunction of soul with matter, and their operation ceases at the separation of soul from 
matter” (xxxiv). 
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the mathematical and dialectical studies of the Republic.  The intellect 
soars from the world of sense to the source of truth and goodness; but the 
wings on which it rises are the wings of desire for the source of beauty.  
The true self, the divine soul, is not a mere faculty of thought and 
dispassionate contemplation of truth; it has its own principle of energy in 
the desire kindled by goodness in the guise of the beautiful.  The 
intimations of immortality already discernible in the lower forms of Eros 
are now confirmed when its true nature is disclosed as a passion for 
immortality in an eternal world.481 
 
Cornford’s remarks indicate, as does my own analysis in the last chapter,that the ascent 
of the Symposium properly applies to the rational element of the soul.  The lesser 
mysteries of Eros that precede the ascent passage but are contained within the 
explanation of the effects of Eros describe the pleasures and activities proper to the 
irrational appetites and θυµς.  The ascent passage itself, however, describes the ascent of 
the affectivity of the rational element itself.   
  Just as the soul can be misdirected in its thinking and knowing if it focuses on the 
transitory objects of the material world, so also can it be misdirected in its loving.  The 
κθαρσις described in the Phaedo advises the philosopher to beware of the ways in which 
sensation and sensible pleasure can mislead his thought.  In similar fashion, Diotima’s 
description of the ascent to the vision of the Beautiful advises the philosopher to move 
beyond the merely material and particular instantiations of beauty found in the sensible 
realm.  The movement of ascent she describes moves from individual material 
instantiations of beauty, through beauties of soul and actions and upward toward their 
ground in Beauty itself. 
 Golden writes that the κθαρσις of the Phaedo “is clearly a purification process by 
which the soul is freed of the admixture of the body and thus becomes able to 
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contemplate clearly.”482  In similar fashion, as we saw in chapter six, the ascent to the 
vision of Beauty in the Symposium is a purification process; it, too, separates the soul 
from the confusions of the body, but with regard to its movement toward beautiful things, 
i.e., its rational affectivity.  The consequence of this purification is the state of existential 
readiness described as φιλοσοφα φθονος.  This is the state Josef Pieper describes in his 
discussion of erotic madness in the Phaedrus: 
However, Socrates’ speech does maintain that erotic emotion may also be 
one way in which man can partake of “the greatest blessings”—provided 
man does not corrupt the erotic emotion by, for example, refusing to pay 
the price of receptivity to the divine madness.  The price is a surrender of 
his autonomy; he must throw himself open to the god, rather than lock the 
doors of his soul by choosing sensual pleasures alone.483 
 
The lover must engage in the rituals and initiations of Eros, must learn the proper order of 
loving, and the proper order of beloved objects, and must learn to love them to the 
appropriate degree.  Much of the practice involved in this learning is the practice of 
σωφροσ"νη.  But human σωφροσ"νη yields only human immortality; divine immortality 
depends on the lover’s ability to wait in stillness and expectation for the vision of Beauty 
itself.   
 In his article “The Dialectic of Eros in Plato’s Symposium”, R. A. Markus writes 
that Plato “shows us love both as passivity subject to ethical evaluation and as the activity 
which performs this evaluation; as natural impulse and inclination as well as free, self-
imposed inclination or duty.”484  This “duality of love”, Markus writes, is not unlike St. 
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Augustine’s ordo amoris, insofar as it captures “the right order freely imposed on human 
love by human love itself.”485  These last words suggest an understanding of the ascent 
passage of the Symposium that encompasses more than a depiction of the steps one must 
take in order to study erotics properly and attain its ultimate end, the vision of beauty; 
they suggest that the attaining of this end results in a transformation of the lover such that 
his love is manifested differently according to the goodness of the object loved.  The 
ascent passage, then, accomplishes two things:  the articulation of a method or practice by 
which one ascends to the ultimate vision and a description of the disposition or attitude of 
the true lover toward beautiful objects located at the various stages of the ascent.486 
 This ordo amoris of which Markus speaks is the consequence of the purification 
of Eros.  If we return now to the Symposium, bearing in mind that the soul is a thing with 
motion, and that this motion is Eros, we can see the sense in which we might speak of a 
κθαρσις of Eros. Speaking of an affective κθαρσις of the soul involves the purification of 
the soul with respect to (1) the objects loved, (2) the order or priority of the objects loved, 
(3) the degree to which these objects are loved given their place in the cosmos, and (4) 
the motion or Eros itself of the soul insofar as it is teleologically ordered toward 
ε$δαιµονα and participation in divine immortality.  All of these aspects are contained 
within the ascent passage, both as a description of the method of κθαρσις, and as the state 
achieved by the lover who makes the ascent.  In the penultimate stage of the ascent, the 
lover is depicted as procreating in ‘φιλοσοφα φθονος’, or “a love of wisdom that grudges 
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 The final speech of the Symposium, given by Alcibiades, provides the reader with a 
concrete example of this ordered love in the person of Socrates. 
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nothing.”487  This love of wisdom that grudges nothing is the sought after state of the true 
lover and necessary predisposition for his seeing pure (καθαρς) beauty.  In ‘φιλοσοφα 
φθονος’ is an Eros that entails a kind of poverty, but one that is chosen, and in the course 
of the ascent cultivated, by the lover.  The lover is thus himself transformed in the course 
of the ascent, as is the nature of his love for things around him.  The lover’s soul itself 
becomes more like that which it loves most; in this sense too, the lover is transformed, for 
his soul becomes more like the καθαρς beauty that is the object of his love.  The erotic 
ascent in the Symposium is a kind of κθαρσις, and one that yields “a love of wisdom that 
grudges nothing.”   
 
                                                 
487
 Symposium 210d5-6. 
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